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SUMMARY 
This dissertation discusses the Singalovada suttanta, a 
text which is part of the Pali Canon and variants of which 
are also found in the Mahayana corpus. The Pali Text 
Society edition of this text is translated into both English 
and Afrikaans, and its place within the greater scheme of 
Buddhist religious philosophy and canonical literature is 
examined. It is concluded that the Singalovada suttanta is 
an integral part of Buddhist ethical teaching and that it 
displays clear connections to fundamental early Buddhist 
philosophy. The text is also checked for internal coherence 
and for variation between its different versions. 
It is shown how the ethical principles and practices that are 
expounded in the singalovada Suttanta can be applied to 
life in a modern society, and what this implies for the 
relationship between contemporary society, philosophy, 
religion and ethics generally. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
In this chapter, I shall set out my basic intentions with 
this study and indicate the method that will be followed to 
achieve these ends. Aspects of the history of the project 
will also emerge during this preliminary discussion. 
1.1. WHAT IS THIS WORK ABOUT? THE PROBLEM AND AN OVERVIEW OF 
EXISTING LITERATURE. 
Religion is a phenomenon with many faces. Even the most 
cursory examination of religions and religious people shows 
that one can distinguish an experiential dimension, a 
mythical dimension, a theoretical dimension and so on1 • 
This dissertation will focus on one such specialised area 
within the broad field of Religious Studies, namely the 
ethical dimension of religion, understood here primarily as 
the field of interpersonal relations rather than as wider 
ethical concerns such as political or ecological ethics. The 
question raised here is how I should act towards other 
people, not primarily in the abstract, as so much of the 
1. Cf. Smart (1978:42-43). 
2 
philosophy of ethics purports to explain, but concretely, to 
the very flesh-and-blood people with whom I come into 
contact every day; my wife, boss, professor, and so on. 
Furthermore, while trying not to lose sight of the wider 
picture, this work will focus on interpersonal relations 
within the religious complex known as Buddhism, and even 
more specifically as these are dealt with in the Buddhist 
text known as the Sid9alovada suttanta 2 • 
Apart from the Pali version published by the Pali Text 
Society3 (1976), the Sidgalovada suttanta is also 
available in translation. Perhaps the most accessible to the 
modern reader is Walshe's translation in his book "Thus have 
I heard" (1987), which is a translation of the Digha 
Nikaya. A more solemn and "biblical" tone is maintained by 
Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids in volume 3 of their "Dialogues of 
the Buddha" (1977), which is likewise a translation of the 
Digha Nikaya and therefore also contains a translation of 
the Sidgalovada Suttanta. Subasinha's "Buddhist rules for 
the laity" (1982) contains translations of the 
Sidgalovada suttanta, Vyaggapajja sutta4 and several 
illustrative stories, mostly from the Dhammapada commentary. 
2. Sutta Pitaka, Digha Nikaya, Sutta 31. 
3. Abbreviated as PTS. 
4. Aitguttara Nikaya, Atthaka Nipata ch. vi, verse 53. This Sutta is 
discussed further in section 3.3. 
3 
Its translation of the Singalovada suttanta, however, is 
somewhat suspect; for instance, it does not reflect the 
difference between the verbs "paccupatthatabba" and 
"anukampanti" in verses 28 to 33 5 • An abridged translation 
of the Singalovada suttanta can also be found in 
Venkatesananda's (1982) book of daily readings from the 
Buddhist scriptures6 • 
Selections from and more summary translations of the 
Singalovada suttanta may be found in Burtt (1982: 108-
111), Coomaraswamy (1985: 121-123) and Dutt (1981: 56-58). 
English translations of the Chinese versions of the text 
have been published and are fully discussed by Pannasiri 
(1950). 
Like many other Pali sacred texts, the Singalovada 
Suttanta is known by a variety of names, which are in fact 
little more than spelling variations. Sigalovada Sutta, for 
instance, is one common appellation, and seems currently to 
be the most popular among western authors. In using the term 
Singalovada Suttanta, my intention is to adhere to the 
terminology employed by the PTS (1976: vol. 3, pp. 168) in 
5. The importance of this distinction will be made clear in chapter 5. 
6. This book is not numbered on a page-by-page basis, but rather in a 
calendar fashion, with a passage for every day of the year. The 
Sirigalovada Suttanta may be found in the entries for the 20th and 
21st of July. 
4 
its publication of the Pali text of this discourse 7 • 
The si~galovada suttanta is well known and often quoted 
by contemporary Theravadin authors and western experts on 
Theravada Buddhism. Space precludes mentioning all those 
encountered during the course of this project, but the 
following are fairly representative of many other brief 
references to this text: 
Sigalovada-sutta is a famous sutra . . . of 
the Buddha. Here he proclaims the duties of 
parents to children, children to parents, pupil to 
teacher, teacher to pupil, wife to husband and 
vice versa (Kirtisinghe 1979: 193). 
The Sir'iga lovada suttanta consists of a 
discourse in which the Buddha lays down for a 
young layman the duties of those who live in the 
world, in general accord with the injunctions of 
Brahmanical scriptures (Coomaraswamy 1985: 272). 
Its form is interesting and typical of the 
Buddha's explicit reformism; he substitutes for a 
traditional ritual an ethical practice. Nominally 
he claims to be reinterpreting the ritual, but in 
fact he is abolishing it (Gombrich 1978: 109). 
In the charming Sigalovada Sutta, we find an 
admonition to a young householder, warning him 
7. Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids (1977: 168) use the term Sigalovada 
Suttanta for their English translation. Walshe (1987: 461) uses 
Sigalaka Sutta. 
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against the dangers of liquor, gambling, bad 
friends and the like. The young man is reminded of 
his responsibilities towards his parents, 
teachers, family, friends and companions, and 
servants. Sigala is even told how he should use 
his money ... (Kruger 1991: 135). 
More extensive use of the text is made by Saddhatissa 
(1987), who mentions its classification of interpersonal 
relationships throughout his influential work. 
The si~galovada suttanta is also known in Mahayana 
Buddhism: it is however less often quoted and discussed 
there than in the southern school 0 , so much less, in fact, 
that the research performed for this dissertation turned up 
only one secondary Mahayana reference to the 
Si~galovada Suttanta, by the Japanese Buddhist writer 
Mikkyo Niwano 9 , as opposed to the plethora of mentions of 
the Si~galovada Suttanta in Theravada-oriented 
literature. 
Despite the wide scholarly familiarity with the text, and 
the many passing references to it, there appears at present 
to be no comprehensive discussion of the Suttanta as a 
8. It is, for instance, not mentioned in Nariman's Literary history of 
Sanskrit Buddhism (1972). 
9. Niwano (1980: 201), where the text is named in Japanese as the 
Shikara-otsu-ropporai-kyo. 
6 
whole, as opposed to these brief mentions, in a western 
language. Only the introduction to Rhys Davids and Rhys 
Davids' English translation of the Suttanta (1977: vol. III 
pp. 168-172) and three pages in Rahula's well-known 
introductory work What the Buddha taught(l962: 78-80) expand 
on the brief references found elsewhere. Perhaps this should 
not surprise us; Reynolds, in his bibliography of Buddhist 
ethics10 (Reynolds 1979: 40) states that Buddhist ethics is 
an under-researched field, and an even more specialised 
subfield within this under-researched field would therefore 
have scant chance of existence. It is hoped that the present 
work will to some extent fill this gap in Buddhist studies. 
1.1.1. WHY THIS STUDY? A PERSONAL STATEMENT 
My reasons for pursuing this study are twofold: firstly, I 
believe one can reasonably claim that research into ethical 
codes is not a luxury in the last decades of· the twentieth 
century, but a necessity. Right across the modern and 
modernising world, traditional religion has lost its firm 
grasp on human minds. As Ninian Smart once put it "Who's 
still afraid of being excommunicated? 1111 • This is called 
secularisation and it is as true of formerly Christian 
10. In which, incidentally, there is no mention of any work dealing 
specifically with the Siftgalovada Suttanta. 
11. Personal communication. 
7 
Europe as it is of formerly Buddhist Japan. No longer do we 
inherit our religion, and therefore our ethical code of 
conduct, along with the colour of our eyes. Nor have people 
adopted nominally nonreligious, humanist codes to guide 
their behaviour, as was predicted in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Even as I write this paragraph 
(November 1991), institutionalised Marxism is collapsing12 • 
Liberal humanism, despite the claims of some fundamentalist 
Christians, has not been adopted by any considerable 
proportion of the world's population. One of its spokesmen, 
sir Julian Huxley, is quoted as saying in 1963 that "We 
shall need a new religious terminology, and a re-
formulation of religious concepts in a new idiom. A humanist 
religion will have to work out its own rituals and its own 
basic symbolism" (In Ling 1979a: 209). It does not seem to 
have done so. 
Thus, a considerable, and growing, part of the world's 
population has no explicit code of conduct on which to base 
their behaviour. The results are clear: escalating violence, 
overcrowded jails, drug abuse on an unprecedented scale and 
so on. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the 
South Africa of 1991, where almost every news bulletin 
12. Which, incidentally, may yet usher in a new era of the use of 
Marxism as an academic methodology, on a par and possibly in combination 
with others and free from the emotional "arguments" for and against it 
that have typified the recent past. 
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starts with the latest casualty figures in the factional 
strife raging in the "townships". Furthermore, I maintain 
that religious traditions should abandon any hope of 
regaining their previous hegemonic positions, or even of 
clinging to it in those few remaining pockets of premodern 
society where they still do have the upper hand. Modern, 
urbanised, technocratic society is a fact of life, and if 
present trends continue, it will become increasingly more 
difficult for any religion or secular philosophy to force 
its ethical code on people13 • 
But, I believe, the need for such codes of conduct still 
exists. While we may be quarrelsome, semi-carnivorous 
beings, we are also social animals who need to relate to our 
fellow-humans. What people have rebelled and are still 
rebelling against is not so much the existence of such a 
code as against a code being imposed on them without their 
informed consent. The modern democratic consumer-citizen is 
used to being able to "pick and choose", to examine the 
various options and select the most appropriate based on the 
evidence. Why should ethical codes and their religio-
philosophical presuppositions be different? And this is 
13. It is interesting to note the recognition of this state of affairs 
by the "postmodern" thinkers in recent years. It may well be that 
Buddhist philosophy, with its emphasis on relationality and 
interdependence, will be able to make a major contribution to this trend 
in contemporary philosophy. 
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where academics and other intellectuals can make a 
contribution: by explicating the options as clearly as 
possible, they can show the people what the various ethical 
traditions are, where they concur and where they differ, and 
how they are theoretically justified by their religious 
theoreticians and lived by their followers. 
Ultimately, such a project will have to be a comparative 
one, but firstly, and even after the comparative project has 
begun, the ethical codes of the different traditions will 
have to be explicated separately. And that is what this work 
is about. I make no great claims to impartiality: I am a 
Buddhist, and naturally I am biased in favour of my 
tradition's ethical theory and prescriptions. Whether this 
has completely blunted my critical faculties is for the 
reader to decide. 
The Si~galovada Suttanta is particularly well suited to 
such a project. The themes of ethics and interpersonal 
relations, while present in Buddhism, are not this religious 
tradition's prime concern, as is the case in, for example, 
Confucianism. Moreover, most Buddhist texts on ethics fall 
in the category of Vinaya literature: that is, they deal 
with the monastic way of life14 • 
14. See Wijayaratna (1990) and Prebish (1986) for e:{plications and 
discussions of the Theravada monastic code, and Collins (1988) for a 
comparative discussion of early Christian and Buddhist monastic social 
roles. 
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The Singalovada Suttanta is one of the few ethical 
scriptures in Buddhism that is specifically directed at the 
layman. In the Theravada tradition, it has in fact become 
known as the gihivinaya, that is, the "householder's code 
of discipline" (Ahir 1989: 20). In the absence, as seems 
likely, of a vast revival of monasticism in this century or 
the next, the Singalovada Suttanta is therefore 
particularly relevant to our situation. 
It is of course impossible to ascertain exactly how 
successful the Singalovada suttanta has been in 
influencing Buddhist society, but the following anecdotes 
may give some indication of the high regard in which the 
text has been held there: 
During the 1970's and BO's, the Sri Lankan government, which 
largely represented a Buddhist, Sinhala-speaking 
constituency, embarked on an active campaign of promoting 
the spread of Buddhism in the predominantly Hindu, Tamil-
speaking "dry zone" of that country. A key part of their 
strategy was the printing and widespread distribution of a 
booklet containing two Buddhist texts: one being the 
Singalovada Suttanta, the other the Vyaggapajjha Sutta, 
which is more specifically directed to the economic concerns 
of the layperson (Peebles 1990: 44). The same two texts can 
11 
also be found in Subasinha's (1982) Buddhist rules for the 
laity, but its relationship to the government-produced tract 
is unclear. 
Earlier (1898), the Sri Lankan Buddhist reformer Dharmapala 
had produced a booklet of ethical prescriptions for the 
laity which contained a mixture of precepts from the 
Si~galovada Suttanta and more western-oriented 
injunctions15 • This booklet has since "run through some 20 
editions and sold about 50 000 copies" (Gombrich 1988: 193). 
Clearly, such actions indicate that in Sinhalese Buddhist 
society at least, the Si~galovada Suttanta is considered 
to be an extremely important document as far as the 
layperson's practice of Buddhism is concerned. Thus, it may 
serve a similar purpose for westerners, whether Buddhist or 
not. 
My second reason for undertaking this study is more 
personal; in 1984, I visited the Buddhist Retreat Centre in 
Ixopo, Natal. The experience confirmed a favourable 
impression of the Buddhist way of life which had already 
emerged from reading and private pondering and I decided to 
accept Buddhism as my personal faith. Before I left I bought 
my first book on Buddhism, Subasinha's Buddhist rules for 
15. As an example of the latter, one might quote the fact that he 
recommended that Sri Lankans eat with forks, as westerners did. 
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the laity (1982) which is in part a translation of the 
Singalovada suttanta. Without this experience, it is 
unlikely that I would ever have gained the spiritual 
satisfaction that has come my way in the last nine years, 
nor that I would have started the process of academic 
investigation that has thus far culminated in this work. By 
presenting and explicating this account of the 
Singalovada Suttanta's code of interpersonal conduct, I 
am repaying a considerable personal debt. 
To summarise, I am writing this as a South African Buddhist, 
male and of European origin, in the twilight of the 
twentieth century, a period of considerable turmoil in 
matters social and philosophical, and the work as a whole 
should be seen in this context. 
1.1.2 IS IT REPRESENTATIVE OF BUDDHISM? 
In this work, the singalovada suttanta will be held up as 
an example of Buddhist ethical teaching directed to the 
laity. But the Buddhist nature of the text is disputed by 
some scholars, and this dispute arises out of a specific 
vision of what Buddhism is, and early Buddhism in 
particular. 
This interpretation of the early Buddhist ethos is that it 
entails a complete withdrawal from the world of social and 
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economic concerns. While this view is perhaps less prevalent 
today, it was originally proposed by such academically 
influential persons as Max Weber (1964: 266-8), and is still 
quite widespread16 • I do not wish to dispute that rejection 
of the world17 is the central concern of the Buddhism of 
monastic (and lay) meditators, but I would insist that early 
Buddhism also contains lifestyle instructions for those less 
intent on spiritual progress than on maintaining a life of 
both spiritual and material well-being10 • 
This does not imply that I support a radical discontinuity 
between these two forms of early Buddhism and their 
respective adherents19 • To the contrary, I would suggest 
that while the "world-rejection" aspect of Buddhism is 
central to its theoretical structure, the Buddhist message 
nevertheless extends much further. If the teachings to the 
laity do not comprise the primary Buddhist doctrines, they 
nevertheless exist and should be taken seriously by scholars 
16. It recurs, for instance, in a recent article by Richard Gombrich 
(1978: 107). 
17. Or more technically, seeing through the many layers of psychological 
illusions which prevent us from perceiving the world as it actually is. 
18. The relationship between Buddhist philosophy and social activism is 
thoroughly discussed by Jones (1989), who argues from within the 
contemporary Buddhist tradition that "withdrawal" from the world is only 
a preliminary to working within it. 
19. A point of view discussed at length in section 3.1. 
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of religion. 
From the understanding of Buddhism as a teaching of radical 
and universal world-rejection is derived a sceptical 
attitude towards the Sidgalovada Suttanta and other 
Buddhist texts that deal with laypersons' ethical behaviour 
and interpersonal relations. King (1989: 21), for instance, 
states that the precepts in this text "go little beyond the 
general pattern of traditional Indian duties 1120 . . . . 
Elsewhere (King 1964: 194) he is even more explicit when he 
writes that the Sidgalovada Suttanta "seems quite un-
Buddhist in its language of Brahmins and heaven; and the 
route by which it made its way into the canon may have been 
devious" 21 • King (1964: 204) then describes how the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta and the Mangala Sutta are used in 
contemporary Theravada Buddhism as basic ethical treatises. 
He comments: 
On such meagre and non-Buddhist material they 
would seek to erect a total social philosophy. 
This witnesses to that meagreness of social-
ethical materials in the Buddhist scriptures and 
tradition already referred to. 
20. A similar view is held by Bush (1960: 219). 
21. Various other authorities disagree with the latter statement, and 
believe it to be a quite early part of the Pali Canon - see section 
2 .1. 
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Based on my own understanding of the Buddhist message and my 
reading of the text, I disagree with this representation of 
the Si~galovada suttanta as a non-Buddhist document. 
Accordingly, one of the aims of this dissertation will be to 
show how it is authentically Buddhist by pointing out 
similarities between it and other Suttas and by showing how 
it reflects Buddhist philosophy and religious practice. 
Special emphasis will also be placed on the internal 
coherence and consistency of the text, as this will 
demonstrate that despite any later alterations that may have 
been made, it was conceived as a unit and can therefore 
serve as a coherent ethical guideline. 
1.1.3. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM 
Thus, to summarise the problem and its corollaries, we can 
ask the following question: 
( 1) What contribution can the Siiigalovada 
Suttanta make to our current existential 
situation? Can we learn from it anything that will 
assist us in our search for ethical guidelines? 
Given the vast differences in time and cultural context 
between twentieth-century western society and that of India 
in the fifth century BCE, the need to interpret the text 
must be constantly kept in mind. on a more specifically 
methodological level, in order to answer this question, we 
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shall f irst22 have to find answers to the following: 
( 2) What does the siiigalovada suttanta say23 ? 
How does it propose that we live our lives? 
(2.1) Are its ethical teachings aimed at the monk 
or at the lay follower? 
( 2. 2) Is the singalovada Sutta internally 
coherent? Should we, and can we, accept only 
ethical advice from some of its sections, or 
should we see the text as a whole and read it 
accordingly? 
( 2. 3) Does it accord with fundamental Buddhist 
principles such as ani-:o~'"i, anatta, dukkha and 
paticcasamuppada? 
Seen on a larger scale, question 1 deals with the 
application of Buddhist ethical teachings to the 
contemporary situation, while the second set of questions 
are mostly concerned with intra-Buddhist affairs. The 
, .. 
22. "First" on a purely methodological level - this should not be 
misconstrued as a hidden positivist agenda. While the second set of 
questions have a more "factual" character than the first, it is fully 
acknowledged that interpretation, evaluation and the determination of 
facts are all present, though in varying degrees, at all stages of the 
research process. But this need not deter us from seeing one particular 
aspect of the process as being more concerned with, say, the 
determination of factual information than others. 
23. Again, this should be read on a methodological level only, and not 
as presupposing a philosophical framework. The framework that will 
actually be used will be developed further on in this chapter. See 
section 1.4. for a more detailed exposition of the methodology to be 
employed in this study. 
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dissertation as a whole can therefore be seen as an attempt 
to merge these two worlds, or "horizons of meaning", as 
Gadamer's wellknown phrase puts it: the ancient Buddhist on 
the one hand, and the modern on the other. 
To a large extent, this dissertation is an exploratory work. 
For this reason, I would not care to posit a "hard", formal 
research hypothesis at this stage. But the entire project 
hinges on the fact that I had already read and appreciated 
the Sidgalovada Suttanta before the academic project 
commenced and had therefore already developed a "soft" 
hypothesis, a hunch that this text might be useful in 
supplying at least some answers to the contemporary ethical 
crisis. And ultimately, that is what this project seeks to 
resolve. 
1.2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION. 
Now that we have discussed the aims of the project and my 
motivation for undertaking it, let us discuss the way in 
which it will actually be done. First I shall discuss my 
philosophical framework and the resultant methodological 
approach. As was stated above, the formal, abstract theory 
of Buddhist ethics is not the main focus of attention in 
this work, but some attention to this topic is necessary if 
we wish to explore the detailed prescriptions in the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta. In particular, one should pay some 
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attention to the way in which an ethical theory could be 
integrated into Buddhist theology and philosophy. How, for 
instance, can one reconcile ethical prescriptions with the 
doctrine of impermanence, which seems to deny that there is 
any enduring reality with which we can interact? 
Next, I shall describe the si~galovada suttanta's 
position in the Pali canon24 and its Mahayana 
counterparts25 • Then the major part of this work follows: a 
new translation of the Suttanta, with comment and 
explication of the Suttanta's meaning, its relation to other 
texts and certain internal relationships within the 
Suttanta26 • I shall commence by answering the second set of 
questions mentioned in section 1.1.3 in chapters 2 to 5, 
while chapter 6 will then use these answers to answer the 
first set. Naturally, such a division cannot be too rigidly 
adhered to; some preliminary answers to our questions in 
respect of particular verses of the Si~galovada Suttanta 
will be encountered in chapters 2 to 5, while even chapter 6 
will of necessity contain an element of reiteration of what 
has been said before. 
In chapter 6, then, I shall attempt to unify such meaning as 
24. Section 2.1. 
25. Section 2.2. 
26. Sections 2.3. ff. 
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has been gleaned from the discussion by returning to the 
questions which prompted me to commence this project and 
ask; what can we learn from this? What relevance has it for 
us? This section will also contain any areas of criticism 
that could not comfortably be fitted into the main, 
exegetical section. After this, there will be three 
appendices, the first of which will supply the complete text 
of the translation without exegetical comment, to enable the 
reader to read the suttanta as a whole, while the second 
will be an Afrikaans translation of the Suttanta. The third 
appendix will summarise the internal thematic connections 
between the various sections of the suttanta, as explained 
in the exegetical comments in chapters 2 to 5, graphically. 
1.3. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND TO THIS STUDY. 
Early Buddhism taught that life was a process in which all 
phenomena were mutually interrelated and causally 
efficacious upon each other. Reality was not to be seen in 
terms of discrete "things", whose relationship to each other 
was philosophically highly problematical, but as a vast 
"web" of interrelated events. In the following sections, I 
shall indicate how this worldview was couched in technical, 
philosophical language and how ethical behaviour and 
interpersonal relationships can be seen to have a role to 
play in such a framework, especially as interpreted by the 
contemporary Buddhist philosopher bhikkhu Buddhadasa. This 
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integrated worldview will then be used as the theoretical 
background to this study. 
1.3.1. EARLY BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY 
In this section I shall briefly outline the main points of 
early Buddhist philosophy. Of necessity, this will only be 
on an introductory level, but a number of excellent works 
that deal with the subject more extensively can be found 2 '. 
To a large extent, "early Buddhism" coincides with the 
contemporary Theravada tradition, but this is not always 
the case: Kalupahana (1975: 80-83), for instance, has 
demonstrated that the Theravada acceptance of the theory of 
momentariness (k~auavada) is a relatively recent 
innovation that was introduced from the now extinct 
Sarvastivada and Sautrantika branches of Hinayana 
Buddhism. 
The early Buddhist philosophy will be discussed under the 
following headings; first the three characteristics of 
existence (tilakkhana) will be discussed. These are anicca 
(impermanence), anatta (insubstantiality) and dukkha 
(unsatisfactoriness or suffering). Paticcasamuppada 
(dependent origination) will be described as the dynamic 
process that explains how the empirical observations of the 
27. E.g. Verdu (1985), Kalupahana (1975,), Johansson (1979), Hoffman 
(1987), Kruger (1991) and Ross Reat (1987). 
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tilakkhana can be used to explain how the impermanent, 
insubstantial world nevertheless appears to our eyes to be 
relatively permanent and stable. ''Skilful means" (Skt: 
upayakau~alya) will be introduced as the way in which this 
Buddhist understanding is to be communicated. This concept 
will come to the fore strongly in our discussion of the 
Si~galovada suttanta. 
1.3.1.1. IMPERMANENCE 
Anicca lies at the very heart of all Buddhist philosophy, 
whether early, classical or contemporary. An in-depth 
investigation of reality, which equates to a state of deep 
meditative concentration and insight, so the Buddha taught, 
will show it to be a fleeting, ever-changing flow of 
phenomena (dharm.as). Entire worlds come into existence, 
endure for a while but always in a state of change, and 
finally decay. Individuals are born, grow u~ and die20 • This 
is true of all dharm.as except nibbana, the state of 
28. And are reborn, though it is debatable, and is in fact hotly debated 
in contemporary Buddhist circles, whether this should be taken literally 
or in a more metaphorical sense. For instance, Buddhadasa, an 
influential Theravadin monastic scholar of whom we shall hear more 
below, appears to favour a metaphorical interpretation in his essay 
Everyday language and Dhamma language (Buddhadasa 1989: 126-140). 
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existence of the arahant or enlightened person29 • 
1.3.1.2. INSUBSTANTIALITY 
Nor are human beings somehow exempt from this process. 
Unique among the world's religious traditions, Buddhism 
denies the existence of a permanent, immortal aspect to the 
human being. Instead, it posits a theory of anatta or 
insubstantiality30 • As Verdu (1985: 11) has put it, "Anatta 
.. represents the 'subjective' side of impermanence as this 
mark points to the insubstantiality of what appears to be an 
absolute and permanent ego" 31 • 
Among most western, and indeed among most eastern, 
philosophies, such a theory would indeed be the death-knell 
29. This is still Theravada doctrine, but in Mahayana thinking and 
that of a few Theravadin mavericks like Buddhadasa (l989: 141-145), 
the concept of nibbana (Skt. Nirvana) is reinterpreted as being 
identical to saip.sara, a term that simultaneously stands for the 
unenlightened state and the phenomenal world, needing only a shift of 
perspective for the psychological shift from the one to the other to 
occur. 
30. More literally, anatta means "non-self" or "non-soul". 
31. See Collins (1982) for a detailed explanation of the place of this 
concept, and of Theravada philosophy generally, in the history of 
ideas. The Buddhist anatta concept is quite foreign to most western 
philosophy, but perhaps the closest western analogue is Whitehead's 
concept of the 'actual entity' - see Inada (1971) for a discussion of 
possible similarities between these concepts. 
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of ethics. But Buddhists have nevertheless managed to be 
ethical people; texts like the one examined in this 
dissertation exhort people to behave in ways that are 
commensurate with those proposed by other religious and 
ethical systems.This gives us an initial clue that Buddhists 
do not see their philosophy and their ethics as 
irreconcilable. 
1.3.1.2.1. THE FIVE "HEAPS" 
If human beings do not consist of an immortal soul somehow 
coexisting with a perishable body, of what do they consist? 
The answer is that they are said to be comprised of five 
khandhas32 , these being riipa (form), vedana (sensation), 
safifia (perception), saipkhara (emotional and volitional 
factors) and vififiaga (consciousness). At first sight, this 
seems no advantage over a dualistic body/soul anthropology 
or ontology: to the contrary, instead of explaining how two 
distinct realities can coexist, we must now account for the 
interaction of five such realities. But in fact, the five 
khandhas are not seen as metaphysical postulates but as 
empirical observations. The system is also somewhat 
arbitrary since the factors themselves are highly 
subdivisible, perhaps infinitely so (Sangharakshita 1966: 
96). Thus, the khandhas appear to have served primarily as 
32. Literally "heaps", but more usually translated as "factors". 
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an empirical classificatory system and as objects of 
meditation rather than as objectively existing metaphysical 
constituents of the human being. 
These five empirically observed realities were seen as being 
in constant interaction, a process which is described by 
Kruger (1991: 95) as follows: 
all five the constituents are seen to be 
mutually dependent in an ongoing process. Never 
does one occur on its ow~ They constantly mix and 
part and reform in new patterns in the flowing 
stream of consciousness. This is the third way of 
the Buddha, offered as a alternative both to the 
eternal ism that postulates an unchanging 'self' 
and to nihilism that denies the existence of the 
individual altogether 33 • Early Buddhism taught 
personal continuity, but not substantiality. 
1.3.1.3. UNSATISFACTORINESS 
We have seen that there is nothing, then, with the possible 
exception of nibbana, that is permanent, stable or 
substantial. But, by a strange quirk of human psychology, we 
insist on searching for permanence, stability and 
substantiality. Since the universe is simply not set up in 
33. From this assessment of Buddhist philosophy as an intermediary 
between eternalism and nihilism derives the term "the middle path" as a 
synonym for Buddhism. See Nishitani (1970: 1-2). 
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this way, our craving (taQha) for these things can never 
be satisfied. Because of this, existence is said to be 
inherently unsatisfactory, or, in a more poetic turn of 
phrase, "fraught with suffering". The entire thrust of the 
Buddhist message is the proclamation of a way, first found 
by Siddhatta Gotama, the historical Buddha, that will lead 
away from desire and the suffering it causes to a condition 
of absence of desire and the resultant lack of suffering. In 
contemporary parlance, it offers a way for a person to stop 
fighting the impermanence that is the inherent nature of the 
universe and "go with the flow" of events. 
1.3.1.4. CAUSALITY AND DEPENDENT ORIGINATION 
But the universe does not change at random; to the contrary, 
it was empirically observed that there are certain 
regularities in the way that it changes, in the way some 
events were caused by others, and these regularities were 
classified into five general causal patterns. Kalupahana 
(1975: 110) lists them as follows: 
1. The physical (inorganic) world (utuniya:ma) 
2. The physical (organic) world (bijaniyama) 
3. The sphere of thought or mental life 
(cittaniyama) 
4. The social and moral sphere (kammaniyama) 
5. The higher spiritual life (dhammaniyama) 34 
34. The niyamas are discussed more fully in Kalupahana (1975: 110-146). 
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Any event on the gross scale of human experience must once 
again be seen, not as a mere instance of one of these causal 
patterns but as a subtle interplay between them. As the 
contemporary Buddhist thinker and social activist Ken Jones 
(1989: 67) has very strikingly put it: 
the Buddha declared that al though he taught 
that every willed action may produce an 
experienced effect he did not teach that al 1 
experienced effects are products of willed action 
(kamma). Thus, for example, a fatal but 
unexplained aeroplane crash may occur because of 
metal fatigue (utu-niyama), or an oversight on 
the part of an overworked ground controller (mano-
niyama) 35 , or even a covert suicide wish by the 
pilot (karma-niyama) ... The kammaic condition of 
each of the passengers is surely the least likely 
cause. And it is contrary to the whole spirit of 
Buddhism to go hankering after some 'meaning' for 
the 'coincidence' that it was those particular 
passengers who booked onto that 'fateful' 
flight. 
But in addition to these five general patterns of causation, 
and not quite included in any of them, was another common 
formula of causation "that was intended to explain important 
questions about man and his destiny" (Kalupahana 1975: 141). 
Known as the twelvefold application of paticcasamuppada 
35. Synonymous with cittaniyama. 
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(dependent origination) 36 , the formula is as follows: 
On ignorance ( avij ja) depend emotional and 
volitional factors (sa:rpkhara); 
on emotional and volition al factors depends 
consciousness (vifinaoa); 
on consciousness depends the psychophysical 
personality (namarupa); 
on the psychophysical personality depend the six 
sense organs (salayatana); 
on the six sense organs depends contact (phassa); 
on contact depends sensation (vedana) 
on sensation depends craving (taoha) 
on craving depends grasping (upadana) 
on grasping depends becoming (bhava) 
on becoming depends birth (jati) 
on birth depend a9eing and death (jaramaraua) 37 
36. Kruger (1991: 109) warns against the common misapprehension that 
this twelvefold formula "is or exhausts the teaching of 
paticcasamuppada. In fact, it is only a special application and 
formulation of that general principle". The general form is as follows: 
When this is, that comes to be; 
with the arising of this, that arises. 
When this is not, that does not come to be; 
with the cessation of this, that ceases. 
(Kruger 1991: 103) 
Hick (1991: 145-146) also mentions that the exact phrasing of the 
twelvefold application of paticcasamuppada varies slightly from one 
text to another. 
37. Translation by Kruger (1991: 109). cf. Kalupahana (1975: 141). For 
an example of the formula in a Sutta (one among many), see the 
Mabata"{lhasankhaya Sutta (Majjhima Nik:aya, Sutta 38). 
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This formula, which may be a late innovation (Kruger 1991: 
109) is open to a variety of interpretations: it may be seen 
as an explanation of the way in which a personality is 
reborn, with the formula stretching over three lives, and 
this diachronic explanation is the orthodox Theravadin 
interpretation (Kruger 1991: 110). Alternatively, it can be 
viewed as an explication of a synchronic psychological 
process, in which all the twelve factors are simultaneously 
present and active, and which explains how suffering arises 
on a moment-by-moment basis because of the presence of 
ignorance or nescience (avijja). As we shall see below, 
this is how Bhikkhu Buddhadasa interprets it and uses it to 
explain the relationship between Buddhist ideas of 
interdependence and conditionality on the one hand and 
Buddhist ethics on the other. 
1.3.1.5. SKILFUL MEANS 
Skilful means (Skt: upayakau~alya) is the term which is 
used in Buddhism to denote the way in which a Buddha (or a 
non-enlightened Buddhist) attempts to introduce Buddhist 
concepts and practices to a nonBuddhist. A certain 
sensitivity is required for this: 
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"Skill in means 3011 is the ability to bring out the 
spiritual potentialities of different people, by 
statements or actions which are adjusted to their 
needs and adapted to their capacity for 
comprehension (Conze 1982: 50, my emphasis) 
At times, this "if it works, use it" methodology could go to 
some quite extreme points to achieve its goal: even to the 
point of denying such apparently fundamental Buddhist 
teachings as the Four Noble Truths 39 • A common corollary of 
this practice is the contention that Truth, and its 
experiential realisation in nibbana, is ultimately 
inexpressible and that all Buddhist teachings are to be 
considered as mere skilful means (Conze 1982: 50, Pye 1978: 
159). While this may sound quite radical, it can be seen as 
an explicit acknowledgement that in any communication"··· 
there is always an element of interpretation" (Hick 1991: 
145). In this, then, Buddhist hermeneutics, as represented 
here by the concept of skilful means, is surprisingly (post-
38. An alternative translation, with the same overall meaning as 
"skilful means". See Pye (1978: 10-17) for a discussion of the terms 
used to express this concept in various languages. 
39. This occurs, for instance in the famous Heart Sutra, where it is 
said that " ... there is no suffering, no origination, no stopping, no 
path " (in Conze 1983: 163). A little closer investigation, though, 
reveals that this sutra is stating that this is the case "in emptiness", 
and thus the denial of what would seem to be the fundamental teaching of 
the historical Buddha is in fact a polemical device to point towards the 
Mahayana interpretation of these teachings as "emptiness" (Skt: 
siinyata). 
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)modern40 • 
It is true that skilful means is a doctrine usually 
associated with the later Mahayana development of 
Buddhism41 • But it is equally true that the seeds for this 
important Buddhist concept were sown by the Buddha himself. 
John Hick (1991: 142) has shown how instances of the concept 
can be found in the Pali canon in such well-known tales as 
the Parable of the Raft42 • 
As far as ethics is concerned, the implications of the 
concept of skilful means are as follows: ethics, seen as a 
normative system guiding human behaviour according to 
certain previously laid-down rules, is itself a skilful 
means and is therefore bound to disappear one day in the far 
40. In all fairness, it should be pointed out that "skilful means" need 
not be subtle and sensitive. In the Ghatikara Sutta (Majjhima Nikaya, 
Sutta 81 - see Horner 1975a, vol. II: 244-245) Jotipala, a potential 
convert, is brought by his friend Ghatikara the potter to Kassapa 
Buddha by being grasped first "by the waist-band" and later "by the 
hair". Jotipala, we later discover, was a previous incarnation of the 
Buddha. 
41. As Pye (1978: 118) has put it: "The term skill in means occurs only 
rarely in the Pali Canon, and then incidentally or in late texts". 
42. Compare chapter 7 of Pye's Skilful Means(l978: 118-137), which 
expands on the theme of the concept of skilful means in pre-Mahayana 
Buddhism, especially pages 128-129, where he comments on Ling's use of 
the concept in an analysis of the Figure of Mara in the Buddhist 
symbol-system. 
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future when "every blade of grass" attains enlightenment. 
But this does not mean that the compassion that is the 
hallmark of Buddhas and Bodhisattas will disappear. 
Enlightened ones act spontaneously, drawing their 
inspiration from the deep reservoirs of wisdom and 
compassion that are at their disposal. For them, there can 
be no question of obeying arbit~~ry little rules of 
behaviour: all of their existence is a continuing series of 
skilful means. But until we reach this point, rules do have 
some instrumental value, some utility for us nonenlightened 
beings. 
The si~galovada Suttanta itself is a shining example of 
this process. In this text, which is addressed to a 
layperson who apparently had little interest in religio-
philosophical discourse, there is little of the abstruse 
philosophy and intricate psychological analysis that can be 
found in so many other Pali Suttas, which were presumably 
aimed at a monastic and intellectual audience. Instead, 
there is practical, down-to-earth ethical advice on how one 
should or should not behave in society, how to choose one's 
friends and how to interact with other people43 in daily 
life. Clearly, the style and even the content of the message 
have been adapted to the audience. This does not necessarily 
imply that the text is "non-Buddhist", as has been charged 
43. "Significant others", as we might say today. 
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by King (1964: 204), but it does mean that it speaks from a 
different perspective to much of the rest of Buddhist sacred 
literature. While "skilful means" may at this stage not yet 
have been elevated to a fundamental Buddhist doctrine, as it 
would be at a later stage, this text does show the Buddha's 
ability to adapt the delivery of his message to his 
audience. 
That the essence of the message is nevertheless Buddhist, 
that is, that it reflects the themes of interdependence, 
causality, impermanence and so forth, will be one of the 
main undertakings of this work, and this is what will be 
implied when it is said that a particular verse in the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta is a reflection of skilful means, in 
addition to the more usual paedagogical and missiological 
intent underlying the concept. 
1. 3. 2. ETHICS IN EARLY BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE •. 
Before we take a detailed look at the Sidgalovada 
Suttanta, it is necessary to ask what the religio-
philosophical status of ethical injunctions is in Buddhism. 
Ethics is not the central concern of much of either Buddhist 
or Buddhological literature. Even Reynolds, in his 
bibliographical essay on Buddhist ethics (1979) is forced to 
admit that Buddhist ethics is an under-researched field, 
neglected by both ethicists and Buddhologists: 
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Western scholars engaged in the historical or 
systematic study of ethics have virtually ignored 
the Buddhist tradition. And, from their side, 
Buddhologists have devoted relatively little 
attention to the study of the ethical dimensions 
of Buddhist expressions (Reynolds 1979: 47 cf. p. 
40). 
In a similar vein, Steyn, in her examination of the 
relationship between Theravada Buddhism and the writings of 
Thomas Merton, writes the following: 
Seek 'n mens ... na verwysings in verband met die 
persoon se verpligtinge op sosiale vlak, raak 'n 
mens kort voor lank gefrustreerd ( Steyn 1988: 
177). 
There is, however, a growing awareness of this deficiency. 
One Buddhist writer suggests that "as Buddhism becomes more 
influential in the West, it will need to exq~ine, as 
carefully as have the Christians, where it stands in terms 
of the great social, economic, political and environmental 
questions ... " (K. Jones 1979: 85, emphasis in original). A 
similar awareness seems to have arisen among Buddhologists 
(Reynolds 1979: 47-48). 
One problem that confronts the western Buddhologist is that 
the most fundamental assumptions of oriental religious 
ethics are very different from those in the occidental 
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religious traditions and in the western intellectual 
atmosphere generally. As Wang (1975: 150-151) has put it: 
A predominant western view sees man as an evil 
creature who needs outside help; he has no thought 
that he should be able to save himself. The 
Eastern view is quite different, claiming that man 
is inherently good and leads a decent life simply 
because he's a decent human being ... In Oriental 
eyes, man does not really need a rigid ethic to 
keep him in line; he comes equipped with the 
Mahakaruna, the Great Compassion ... 
Although I believe this to be an overgeneralisation, which 
does not address such issues as the legalistic streak in 
much of Chinese religion and philosophy or even the rigidity 
of the Hindu caste system in its later developments, there 
is some truth in what she says. Indeed, the western 
Buddhologist is likely to encounter conceptual problems when 
investigating a foreign cultural product such as Buddhist 
ethics. 
One problem in particular stands out, and we shall examine 
it in some detail: as we have seen above, Buddhist 
philosophy denies the existence of an autonomous, 
substantial human "person" - human beings, like the rest of 
reality, are a temporary and ever-changing collection of 
factors (khandas), which interact according to well-defined 
laws of conditionality. This does not mean that people "do 
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not exist", any more than the scientific theory of atoms and 
molecules means any such thing: instead, it means that there 
is no permanence to our existence, that we may exist 
empirically, but that this does not support the hypothesis 
of a permanent substrate or basis that undelies our being. 
As Macy (1984: 119) puts it: "The staggeringly bold movement 
of the Buddha was to see that the real is what inheres in 
change rather than being removed from change; that it is 
found in the very dynamics of phenomenality". 
But the Si~galovada suttanta does not use this high 
philosophical understanding of reality: it speaks concretely 
of different persons like friends, parents, employers and so 
forth. How can these two views of reality be reconciled, and 
moreover, if we see friends, etc. as mere bundles of 
factors, how can we meaningfully talk of interpersonal 
relations with or ethical behaviour towards them? 
In the Mahayana tradition, and in the Theravada to a 
lesser extent, it was attempted to solve this problem by 
postulating a theory of "two levels of truth", a 
perspectivist view according to which one could view reality 
in two ways, "one of which was true in the ultimate sense 
(paramattha-sacca) the other only in the conventional sense 
(samutti-sacca)" (Sangharakshita 1966: 82) 44 • But such a 
44. See Eckel (1987) and Sprung (1973) for more information on the 
classical Mahayana "two-truths" theories. 
36 
solution, regardless of its logical validity and general 
philosophical acceptability, is religiously unfulfilling, 
and a number of attempts have been made to explain the 
ongoing necessity of ethical behaviour within the Buddhist 
lifestyle without making reference to the "two truths" 
theory45 • 
Some of these attempt to divorce ethics from the rest of 
Buddhist philosophy, for instance Obeyesekere, who states 
that the Buddhist five precepts, unlike the Christian ten 
commandments "are not rooted in the salvation ideology 
(soteriology) of the religion" (1968: 27) 46 • Other authors, 
however, try to demonstrate that there is indeed a close 
link between Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist ethics. In the 
next section I shall describe what is, in my opinion, one of 
the more successful of these. This is the ethical theory of 
bhikkhu Buddhadasa, particularly as it appears in the 
collection of his essays named Me and mine (·Buddhadasa 
1989) 47 and also as related and interpreted by Donald 
45. E.g. King (1989: 23-24); R. H. Jones (1979: 379); Reynolds (1985); 
Macy (1979). 
46. See also King (1964: 38), who states that " ... in common with 
atheistic humanism Buddhism proclaims that there is no metaphysical 
backing for moral values nor any great overall purpose by which man 
should be guided and to which he should conform his ways'. 
47. Some of the relevant essays have also been printed in Dhammic 
Socialism (Buddhadasa 1986). 
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swearer (1979), one of the most prominent western students 
of Buddhadasa's thought. 
1.3.2.1. BUDDHADASA ON ETHICS 
Firstly, Buddhadasa regards key Buddhist terms like 
suiifiata (being devoid of absolute self-nature), anatta 
(not-self), paticcasamuppada (dependent origination), 
dhammajati (nature), sila-dhamma (moral law) and sa~gama­
niyama (voluntarily restrained fellowship) as expressing 
different aspects of the same reality, which is the true 
nature of all existence (Swearer 1979: 57). To look at it in 
another way, 
Sila means normalcy, or [being] at equilibrium 
(pakati). If anything conduces to normalcy and not 
to confusion it is called sila, and the dhamma 
(truth) brings about that state is called 
siladhamma (Buddhadasa 1989: 159). 
This implies that "For Buddhadasa, sila (moral virtue) and 
anatta (not-self) are not contradictory. Quite the 
opposite, they are necessary corollaries" (Swearer 1979: 
57), for the "equilibrium" referred to here is the Buddhist 
"Middle Way" between extremes, not only philosophical 
extremes such as eternalism and nihilism, but also between 
such existential events as starvation and overeating 
(Buddhadasa 1989: 162). Swearer discusses three 
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applications of this conviction, which demonstrate how 
Buddhadasa understands the interaction between anatta and 
sila. 
The first application was described by Buddhadasa in an 
article named "Acting without attachment on behalf of 
society" 40 • Here it is said that the realisation of anatta 
results in non-attachment which is a freedom from the 
kilesas (moral "stains", such as greed, hate and delusion). 
The mind is therefore freed from blind passions. But this 
does not imply a total lack of feeling - the nonattached 
mind still has feelings 49 , but the overriding one is the 
feeling of total selflessness. It is our normal state of 
being preoccupied with "gain and loss, love and hate, anger 
and fear" (Swearer 1979: 58) that is contrary to the true 
nature of reality, which is anatta, and therefore also 
anicca and dukkha. How, Buddhadasa seems to ask, can we 
hope to be truly in contact with other human- beings when we 
are living our lives in contradiction to the true nature of 
things? Elsewhere, he states that: 
48. Discussed in Swearer (1979: 57-58). 
49. The same sentiment is expressed by Buddhadasa in the essay named 
The value of morality, where he writes that one should be "careful not 
to think of normalcy as being static like a stone. Otherwise you might 
sit as motionless as a stone without doing anything and call that having 
morality" (Buddhadasa 1989: 159). 
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Nature ... follows its own particular way. If we 
transgress its fundamental laws we are, in effect, 
transgressing natural morality; that is, we lack 
morality according to the dictates of nature. As a 
consequence, problems arise in the body, and even 
more so in the mind (Buddhadasa 1989: 161). 
Thus, we can see how Buddhadasa attempts to show that 
morality as seen by the Buddhist tradition is not a 
deontological process of doing one's duty for its own sake, 
but is closely tied up with the causal process that governs 
the universe, that is, with the niyamas, and with 
ka:mmaniyama in particular. Without wishing to reduce 
Buddhist ethics to either form of western utilitarianism50 , 
it must be said that it does seem to bear a kind of family 
resemblance to utilitarianist thinking, in that the focus is 
on the result of an act, and whether that act promotes 
happiness or suffering, rather than on the act itself. In 
other words, the justification given for acting in one way 
rather than in another is not intrinsic to that way of 
acting, but is extrinsic, that is, it is something beyond 
the act itself, although causally related to it. This, as we 
shall see, is also a feature of the ethics advocated in the 
Siftgalovada suttanta. 
50. Act utilitarianism and Rule utilitarianism - see Flew (1979: 361). 
The major problem in reconciling either of these with early Buddhist 
ethics is how one might go about incorporating the Buddhist teaching of 
rebirth into the utilitarianist world with its materialist bias. 
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The second application of Buddhadasa's understanding of 
ethics mentioned by swearer concerns the relationship 
between sila and paticcasamuppada (dependent 
origination). He uses the example of a child crying over a 
broken doll, which the child sees as an extension of itself, 
to demonstrate how the unenlightened mind follows the twelve 
steps of the traditional Buddhist formulation of 
paticcasamuppada discussed in section 1.3.1.4, which 
demonstrates the intricate causal relationship between 
ignorance and suffering. By becoming aware that the doll is 
not in fact an extension of the self (the particular 
manifestation of ignorance in this child), that there is in 
fact no self to extend, the child's consciousness is altered 
and the behaviour is modified (the child does not cry). The 
implication is that the most thoroughly moral act is to 
teach anatta and paticcasamuppada, as this will most 
completely eradicate suffering (Swearer 1979: 60). The other 
way in which paticcasamuppada acts as a moral concept is 
by its function as a golden mean between the philosophical 
extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. 
Paticcasamuppada represents a mutually and dynamically 
balanced position, in which everything is described in terms 
of its relationship to everything else, and the ethical 
ideal is not a mere increase of goodness but a dynamic 
equilibrium within the system: 
On the level of individual morality, the paticca-
samuppada nature of the world refers to the 
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teachings of non-attachment and not-self. In 
Buddhadasa's interpretation, there can be neither 
goal nor object for striving ... nor is there a 
separate subject which strives. This does not 
mean, however, that one does not act, that one 
sits quietly like a boulder in a field It 
means that one acts in terms of the knowledge of 
the economy of dependent origination, a middle way 
ethic of sufficiency, adequacy, appropriateness or 
normalcy. In short, to act without attachment is 
to act from the insight of dependent origination 
(Swearer 1979: 60). 
Buddhadasa's third application of his ethical theory 
mentioned by Swearer moves into the area of political 
philosophy. He advocates religious values generally, and 
Buddhist values in particular, as the most thoroughgoing 
solution to political crises: 
If we were to act according to the principles of 
religion, that is to say, to acknowledge that 
everyone exists in God, in the dhamma, in Tao, in 
nature, then our problems would disappear. There 
would be no illusion of "me" leading to mutual 
conflict, and the entire world would be peaceful. 
We would have peace on a smaller scale as well. 
Each person's problems would disappear, because 
every individual would be free from suffering that 
arises from attachment to the ego. 
(Buddhadasa 1989: 16951 ) 
51. In the essay Democratic Socialism. 
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Socialism, he declares, is preferable to capitalism as far 
as Buddhism is concerned since it downgrades the greed which 
drives the capitalist system52 • But modern socialism is too 
materialistic(Buddhadasa 1989: 174): he calls for a 
spiritualised socialism in which each person will deeply 
care for all others since in the final analysis they are all 
one "not in a static or absolute sense, but in the process 
of interdependent becoming" (Swearer 1979: 61). In fact, 
when Buddhadasa uses the term socialism, he is at pains to 
clarify that he does not use it in the normal, solely 
political sense of the word: 
We are, rather, speaking about socialism according 
to religious principles or norms, or even more 
fundamentally, according to the principles of 
nature (Buddhadasa 1989: 182) 53 • 
We should cease to define politics and economics in purely 
mechanistic terms and reintroduce the moral ·dimension which 
Buddhadasa believes these systems to have been originally. 
In fact, Buddhadasa idealises premodern society in much of 
his ethical writing, most noticeably in A dictatorial 
Dha:mmic socialism, where he states that 
Slaves did not want to leave [their masters] 
52. In Democratic Socialism (Buddhadasa 1989: 173) he goes so far as to 
suggest that all religions are inherently socialist in orientation. 
53. In the essay A dictatorial Dhammic socialism. 
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[rich men] during the Buddhist era treated their 
slaves like their own children. All worked 
together for the common good Slaves were 
recipients of love, compassion and care" 
(Buddhadasa 1989: 190-191). 
If so, why were they slaves at all? Is the very concept of 
slavery not inconsistent with these sentiments? I believe 
that it is. This question will be raised again in chapter 5, 
where the Singalovada suttanta's strictures concerning 
one's treatment of one's "slaves and servants" will come to 
the fore. 
Another contentious point in this essay is that while 
Buddhadasa seems to favour a "dictatorial" system based on 
the model of Asokan kingship, he still allows for the 
possibility that an evil government may need to be resisted. 
But in the absence of democratic conditions with its usual 
corollaries of freedom of speech and associq~ion, how is 
this judgement of the good or evil nature of a government to 
be made? 54 Still, while one could criticise him on this 
point, it does not lessen the impact of his critique of 
contemporary conditions. 
Perhaps we can translate Buddhadasa's thoughts into 
contemporary western terminology: what he appears to be 
54. A trenchant critique of Buddhadasa's political theory may be found 
in Jones (1989: 257-260). 
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saying is that the Buddhist theory of not-self is not a form 
of nihilism precisely because it emerges from the teaching 
of dependent origination, which is a philosophy of endless 
relationality. Thus, what emerges from a thorough 
realisation of not-self is an ecological55 understanding of 
reality, since it is by analogy to the processes of internal 
change that one can come to understand the nature of 
processes elsewhere. Ling (1979c: 96) suggests that: 
the notion of an un-soc ial Buddhist is a 
contradiction in terms. The Buddhist is one who 
has accepted, in theory at least, that the 
isolated individual is a fiction". 
In such an understanding, it is precisely the fact that I am 
composed of ever-changing factors which makes it possible 
for "me" to relate to the dynamic complexes of factors that 
comprise what we conventionally refer to as other people56 • 
In fact, the Buddhist might counter that it_js exactly the 
self-theory which makes interpersonal relations 
55. Although he himself tends to use the term socialist for this, as in 
the essay A socialism capable of benefiting the world (Buddhadasa 1989: 
202), in which he writes that "All aspects of nature combine in an 
interdependent relationship. Even an atom is a socialistic system of 
interdependent parts. A molecule also exhibits socialistic 
characteristics in that it is made up of several interdependent atoms". 
I believe it to be clear from this passage that his use of the term 
"socialism" closely approximates my use of "ecological". 
56. Cf. Reynolds (1979: 41-42). 
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problematical. How could self-existent entities ever become 
aware of anything outside themselves? This, of course is the 
basic problem of dualism57 • 
The ecological mentality engendered by Buddhist practice, 
moreover, does not merely explain how it is at all possible 
that we can relate to others, but also why we should treat 
them well. If we are all part of the same great ecological 
complex, then there can be no question of treating other 
persons well; what I am responding to positively is another 
temporary node in the great web of interrelatedness. More 
poetically, it is another aspect of myself, if "myself" is 
.understood to mean neither a self-existent monad nor as a 
spiritual "higher self" that is identical with the universe 
as a whole, but as the particular way that certain factors 
have combined to shape the universe at this particular point 
on the space-time continuum. Thus, the Golden Rule can be 
viewed in a new light: in treating others well, we are so 
treating ourselves, at least in a manner of speaking50 • 
That, then is Buddhadasa's understanding of the relation 
57. To put the same argument in other terminology, Buddhist ethics is 
closer to "postmodern" than to "modern" spirituality, as these are 
defined by Griffin, who explicitly acknowledges this link between 
postmodern philosophy and Buddhism (Griffin 1988: 3, 14, Falk 1988: 89). 
58. The possibility of constructing a Buddhist Golden Rule will be taken 
up in chapter 6. 
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between ethics and Buddhist philosophy as understood and 
interpreted by myself. Whether it is a satisfactory account 
is debatabl~, of course, and a thorough discussion of 
Buddhadasa's ethical philosophy would occupy more space 
than can be allocated to it here. For instance, it could be 
argued that Buddhadasa supports the Mahayana "intimacy" 
rather than the Hinayana "imprisonment" view of the (non-
)self59. 
Buddhadasa's writing, while by no means immune to 
criticism, does show the kind of argument that is advanced 
in Buddhist ethical philosophy to demonstrate the necessity 
for ethical behaviour and the maintenance of good 
interpersonal relations in the Buddhist tradition. Thus, in 
the eyes of practicing Buddhists, interpersonal 
relationships and ethical behaviour are quite definitely a 
part of their faith and are also compatible with the most 
fundamental Buddhist philosophical teachings-. Having 
established this, we can examine texts such as the 
59. Terminology from King (1989: 15), where it is argued that 
"Resultingly the self in Mahayana has a somewhat more intimate and 
positive relation to the cosmic process than in the Pali canon view. 
There the presence of self in its universe is an ineluctable 
imprisonment ... ; in Mahayana it is an intimate involvement". 
Buddhadasa's thinking resembles Mahayana philosophy in other respects 
too: for instance, one of the essays in Me and mine is named Nibhana 
exists in Srupsara (Buddhadasa 1989: 41-45), a statement that shows 
how close his thinking is to the Madhyamika school of Mahayana 
Buddhism, in particular. 
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Singalovada Suttanta for more precise guidelines to 
action. 
Other Buddhist thinkers have commented in a similar vein. 
Ken Jones (1979: 85) suggests that "social action is itself 
a meditation, and a great ripener of compassion and 
equanimity out of the bitterness of the experiences which it 
offers", while Philip Eden (1973) offers a Buddhist critique 
of Marxism and elsewhere (1975) presents an alternative 
diagnosis of societal ills, based on the Buddhist 
identification of egotism as the primary cause of 
alienation, and presents a corresponding Buddhist view of 
the social Summum Bonum to be striven towards. 
My use of Buddhadasa, despite his unorthodoxy, is based on 
the fact that his apparently radical view of the unity of 
the philosophical and ethical sides of Buddhism is eminently 
suitable as a philosophical framework for our examination of 
the Singalovada suttanta - he serves as a link between 
the ancient Buddhist world, symbolised by his position as a 
Theravadin monk, and the (post-)modern world of the late 
twentieth century, with which his writings, apart from their 
idealisation of early Buddhist society, are largely 
compatible. 
To summarise, then, I intend to employ Buddhadasa's 
understanding of Buddhist philosophy as supporting rather 
48 
than undermining interpersonal relationships and ethical 
behaviour as my basic philosophical framework in this 
examination of the Sidgalovada Suttanta. If Buddhist 
ethics is founded upon Buddhist philosophy, it should be 
possible to trace the philosophical influence on an ethical 
text by showing how the text uses the philosophical concepts 
to elucidate its ethical message. The implication of this is 
that throughout my examination of the Sidgalovada 
Suttanta, I shall attempt to discern the ways in which it is 
consonant with fundamental early Buddhist philosophical 
concepts and theories, as already indicated in my exposition 
of the problem in section 1.1.3. 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
Having described the philosophical framework of this study, 
I shall discuss the basic methodological considerations 
which will govern our examination of the Sidgalovada 
Suttanta in this section. 
Sensitivity to context is a definite requirement in Buddhist 
studies, for Buddhism, even prior to the development of the 
Mahayana two-truths theory, was ever reluctant to assign 
equal value to all canonical statements. Clearly, some 
discourses are more central to the Buddhist message, while 
others, including the one to be discussed here, are more 
peripheral. If the Buddha taught by "skilful means", then 
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perhaps we shall have to employ "skilful reading" to 
reconstruct the meaning of his teaching for our lives. This 
would imply an intelligent and discriminating reading that 
would yet allow the Buddha's teachings to shine through. 
Thus, the intention in this project is to research the 
Si~galovada Suttanta in a textually immanent way, letting 
this ancient document "speak for itself" with a minimum of 
twentieth-century interpretation. This does not imply a 
quasi-positivist insistence on so-called bare facts, but a 
conscious effort on the part of the researcher to ensure 
that the interpretation and explication eventually arrived 
at is consonant with what the text's original author, 
whoever this might have been, had intended it to convey, 
while simultaneously restating this message in terms that 
are intelligible to us who live many centuries later and in 
very different circumstances. The basic approach taken here, 
therefore, is closely associated with the phenomenological 
approach to the philosophy of science and the associated 
phenomenological approach to the study of religion60 , while 
not overlooking the drawbacks of this method, which is the 
danger of lapsing into an "essentialism" (Penner 1975: 53-
60. For more details on this paradigm in the humanities and social 
sciences, which is derived from the work of the philosopher Edmund 
Husserl, see Waardenburg (1978), Merleau-Ponty (1973) and Dhavamony 
(1973). 
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55) 61 that would be unacceptable to the Buddhist paradigm. 
But once the basic descriptive work has been done62 , the 
question arises what one should do with this information, 
and this is where the questions raised in section 1.2. come 
into effect. And answering such questions involves value-
judgements to an extent far greater than the first reading 
of a text does. I maintain that the involvement of such 
judgements is inevitable when one attempts to go beyond mere 
description and tries to apply ancient teachings to modern 
circumstances63 • In such a case, the important thing is for 
the scholar concerned to state his values unreservedly, 
rather than letting them operate as concealed premisses in 
the argument. When one has thus exposed one's personal 
commitments, it is possible for any influence they may have 
had to be brought to light under the strong light of public 
61. It could be questioned whether this danger, as stated by Penner, is 
inherent to the phenomenological method, or whether it represents a 
deviation from the original Husserlian form of phenomenology, wh~ch 
restricted itself to experience. 
62. As has been pointed out before, no positivist agenda should be read 
into my use of the word "before". The division of research activities 
into identifiable categories is here presented on a merely empirical 
basis, and is not intended to deny the role played by theory and 
evaluation even before the project commences. 
63. Not that this dilemma is restricted to this particular hermeneutic 
situation - it applies as well to the application of a modern text to 
modern circumstances. 
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scrutiny, and this counteracts the possibility of one's 
conclusions being based on nothing more than one's personal 
whims. As far as this study is concerned, I believe that the 
statements in section 1.1.1. suffice in this respect. 
The subject under scrutiny here is Buddhism, and to maintain 
the integrity of the project64 it may become necessary to 
use, or at least to take note of, specifically Buddhist 
hermeneutic approaches and interpretative categories. For 
Buddhism has evolved its own hermeneutical techniques and 
strategies, which Thurman {1978: 23-24) expresses as 
follows: 
1. Rely on the teaching, not the teacher('s 
authority). 
2. Rely on the meaning, not the letter. 
3. Rely on the definitive meaning, not the 
interpretable one. 
4. Rely on (non-conceptual) wisdom, not on 
(dualistic) consciousness. 65 
Although this hermeneutical system is primarily a Mahayana 
development for dealing with the differences between 
64. In other words, to read and interpret this text "Buddhistically", 
rather than phenomenologically or structuralistically, or by means of 
any other western methodology. Not that potentially valuable insights 
will be ignored, but where they are used, it will be only to augment the 
primary methodology, which is this "Buddhist reading". 
65. Cf. Lamotte (1988a). 
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Mahayana and Hinayana texts, it shows the non-dogmatic 
and intuitive spirit of Buddhist hermeneutics. On a more 
specifically Theravadin level, de Silva (1988a) has 
described how the authors of the Pali commentaries used 
specific exegetical techniques66 to interpret the Suttas. 
Bodhi (1978: 38-43) describes not one but two hermeneutic 
systems used by the commentators, one of which67 is 
described by him in some detail as consisting of a 
differentiation between the "phrasing" and the "meaning" of 
a text: 
The phrasing is handled by sixteen "modes of 
conveyance" (hara). These are techniques of 
verbal and logical analysis which can be applied 
to any specific passage to bring out the 
principles entering into the verbal formulations 
of its ideas and to explore the implications of 
the passage in the context of the doctrine as a 
whole. The meaning is handled by three methods or 
"guidelines" (naya). These, taking the_meaning to 
be the aim or goal of the doctrine ... , which is 
the attainment of nibbana, reveal how the Sutta 
points to this aim by countering the fundamental 
wholesome factors ... with a corresponding set of 
wholesome factors. The Netti then reverts to 
66. These are the use of synonyms; popular etymologies; multivalents; 
the distinctive approaches of the three Pitakas; the differences between 
the characteristic features, function, mode of manifestation and 
proximate causes of concepts; detailed explanations of difficult 
concepts; similes; and inter-Sutta coordination. 
67. The one found in the text named Nettipakarava. 
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another two methods concerned with phrasing, which 
handle the Sutta's terms in line with the methods 
explicating the meaning (Bodhi 1978: 39-40) 00 • 
It can be seen from this quotation how Buddhist 
philosophical concepts like nibbana are used as 
hermeneutical devices for the interpretation of Buddhist 
texts. While I do not aim to follow any of these methods to 
the last detail, I do intend to follow the intention 
underlying them, which implies using Buddhist concepts as 
hermeneutic "keys" to our understanding of the text. Thus, 
for instance, a fundamental Buddhist concept like "dependent 
origination" (paticcasamuppada) may be used as a 
fundamental interpretative category for the understanding of 
Buddhist interpersonal relationships. This will also feature 
in our determination of the internal coherence of the 
Singalovada suttanta and its relation to fundamental 
early Buddhist philosophy. The implication of this, when 
read together with what has been said above,·- is that we are 
here looking at a hybrid form of methodology, a "Buddhist 
phenomenology". I would maintain that this is an acceptable 
procedure, which is consonant with the basic impulse of the 
68. This method is explained more fully in Bond (1980a). For more 
information on Buddhist hermeneutics and also its possible relationships 
to the Christian hermeneutical tradition, see Bastow (1973), Werner 
(1973) and other contributors to Pye & Morgan (1973). 
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phenomenological study of religion69 , while also being 
acceptable to the Buddhist tradition. 
One possible source of information on the Suttanta which has 
deliberately been ignored is the Pali commentary on the 
Si~galovada suttanta, in the Digha-Atthakatha-
tika-Linatthavannana (PTS 1970). This is part of the 
classical Indian exegetical literature on the Pali canon. 
Opinions vary on the question of whether this is the correct 
way to approach Buddhist studies. Bond (1980b: 59) argues 
that the commentaries are the correct way to approach the 
Pali Canon and Theravada Buddhism. Hoffman (1987: 5) 
disagrees: 
Just reading the commentaries would be 
peculiar, since they presuppose knowledge of the 
texts to which they ref er. The converse, 
however, is not true. For reading early Buddhism 
without the commentaries enables one ,_to gain an 
understanding which would not be possible if the 
commentaries are taken into account. Of course, it 
is possible, alternatively, to gain an 
understanding of Buddhism by taking both the early 
Buddhist texts and the commentaries into account. 
One may take the former sort of understanding as 
valuable without saying that no one should attempt 
the latter. 
69. That is, the attempt to describe a given religious tradition in a 
way that would be acceptable to the followers of that tradition. 
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Moreover, Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids (1977: vol. III pp. 
169-170) maintain that the commentary is particularly 
unhelpful in explicating the Sidgalovada Suttanta, since 
the commentator lacked the historical insight which this 
text requires. Finally, the scope of this project did not 
allow the volume which a consideration of the commentary 
would require. 
We are fortunate in having at our disposal not just one but 
five versions of the Sidgalovada suttanta; one in Pali 
and four in Chinese70 • I intend to examine all five these 
documents in this dissertation, but this should not be seen 
as an attempt to reconstruct an Urtext71 , but rather in the 
spirit of the structuralist dictum that all versions of a 
text are important and should be taken into account72 • Not 
that this will be a structuralist interpretation in the 
strict sense of the term, but as Doty (1986: 193) has put 
it, any critical assessment presupposes some- sort of 
structure. On the other hand, the Pali version is favoured 
70. These will be examined in greater detail in sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
71. Although this is not the prime consideration of this dissertation, 
such observations, should they arise naturally, will not be ignored 
either. 
72. Levi-Strauss in Kirk (1986: SO), cf. Doty (1986: 201). See also 
Leach (1983: 29), who states his position as follows: "In the Middle 
Ages, Christians took one story with another without worrying about 
chronology or about so-called realism. I believe we should do the same". 
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to some extent by being used as the "key" version to which 
all the others are compared. Again, this should not be seen 
as an attempt to champion the Pali document and establish 
it as being somehow more "genuine" than the others. 
The decision to work primarily with the Pali document was 
partly based on the methodological consideration that 
comparative and evaluative work is facilitated if one of the 
items under scrutiny is regarded, for the purposes of that 
particular project only, as a standard to which the other 
items can be compared. The other reason for doing the 
project in this way has more to do with the history of the 
project: the translation of and research on the Pali 
document was well under way when the existence of the 
Chinese texts became known. Finally, more secondary material 
was found to exist on the Pali document than on the Chinese 
texts, which makes the proposed arrangement all the more 
reasonable. 
There are a number of omissions in Pannasiri's translations 
from the Chinese; for instance, a passage might read "What 
are the five factors of ... "and then proceed to name only 
four. All such instances will be pointed out at the 
appropriate point in the discussion, and while they will all 
be attributed to "typographical errors", it is not 
impossible that these omissions may have been made in the 
earlier translation from Sanskrit to Chinese, or at any 
57 
other stage in the transmission of these texts to us. 
Lacking the original Sanskrit texts and expertise in the 
Chinese language, this question will not be enquired into 
any further. 
1.4.1. WHAT IS A SUTTA? ON HISTORICAL ACCURACY AND SPIRITUAL 
TRUTH 
But before we start to examine this particular text, let us 
reflect: just what is a Sutta? The Si~galovada Suttanta 
purports to be a document which relates a historical event, 
but can we accept this at face value? Unless we can clarify 
this important methodological issue, confusion may ensue 
about the truth-value of some of the statements that will be 
made in the following chapters. 
The Theravadin writer Bodhesako (1984) maintains that the 
Pali Suttas are an accurate account of the Buddha's life 
and teaching and have undergone little or no distortion 
during the long period of oral transmission. Traditional 
learning, he maintains, emphasised feats of memorisation to 
an extent that guaranteed perfect transmission. Western 
scholars are more sceptical and largely adopt a historical-
critical approach to Buddhist literature. Geiger, for 
instance, writes that 
. 
Many peculiarities of the Pali canon may be 
understood only if the way in which it came about 
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is kept in view and it is remembered that it was 
handed down orally for nearly four hundred years. 
As the contributions to the canon came from 
different places at different times various 
contradictions could not be avoided We can 
thus also understand the schematic character of 
the canon and the numerous repetitions occurring 
in it .... None will claim today that all that is 
contained in it is derived from Buddha himself 
(Geiger 1978: 11-12). 
In this work, no final decisions or contentions will be made 
about the historicity of the Singalovada suttanta, but as 
the intention is to analyse it textually-immanently, the 
Suttanta's contents will, for purposes of analysis only, be 
taken at face value. I intend to determine and evaluate the 
ethical content of the Suttanta, not to engage in a debate 
on its historical veracity. And while religious and ethical 
teachings may need reinterpretation to apply to changed 
circumstances, they also contain a certain applicability to 
persons and circumstances other than the original regardless 
of where, when and by whom they were supposed to have been 
pronounced, a "timelessness" derived from the shared 
humanity of author and reader. As the structuralist scholar 
Edmund Leach (1983: 10) has written, 
"If a named individual 'X' really existed, so also 
did thousands of other individuals whose names we 
do not know. What interests us about 'X' is the 
role he is made to play in the sacred tale; this 
interest is not affected by the question of 
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historicity. In Tolstoy's novel War and Peace 
quite a number of the characters ... are genuine 
historical personages ... but the bearing of this 
fact on the novel is negligible." 
Thus, a phrase like "the Buddha said " will be used 
throughout this work to denote "According to the 
Siiigalovada suttanta, the Buddha said ..• ", without 
implying that the events described must really, historically 
have occurred. In other words, it will serve as a kind of 
convenient shorthand which does not indicate a hidden 
methodological bias in favour of a literal interpretation. 
1.5. NOTES ON TRANSLATION 
Like many other parts of the Pali canon, the Siiigalovada 
Suttanta states its message in both prose and verse 
passages. While no exact count is available, Warder (1984: 
354) estimates that there are between fifteen and twenty 
thousand verses in the Canon. The general pattern in the 
Siiigalovada Suttanta seems to be that the message is 
stated in prose, then repeated in verse, with only minor 
variations in emphasis. 
In translating the prose sections, I have attempted to err 
on the side of a literal translation, but in order to retain 
the poetic nature of the verse passages, and to keep 
something of their emotional intensity, these passages have 
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been reworked to sound more "poetic", with metre and rhyme 
that are more suited to the English language, while still 
reflecting the Suttanta's contents. This approach, I 
believe, does better justice to the Suttanta's intent than a 
literal translation of the poetry would. This is in 
accordance with at least one trend in contemporary 
translation theory: the chief task when translating poetry 
is "to make from the poem in the source language a poem in 
his own language which, while giving a maximum of the 
meaning of the original, also renders as much as possible of 
its sounds and its musical cadences •.• " (Bahler 1970: 
194) 73 • But"··· it is equally important that translation be 
a medium of literary transmission, not merely an empty echo 
trying to reproduce, more or less mechanically, the 
original's beat" (Raffel 1989: 34), and this is the tactic 
that will be adopted here. Any deficiencies in these 
passages can be attributed to my inadequacy where poetic 
expression is concerned. 
As far as the base text is concerned, the version of the 
Suttanta in the PTS edition of the Digha Nikaya (1976 
:Vol. III, pp. 180-198) will be deemed sufficient, although 
this edition is itself a composite work compiled from a 
number of Burmese, Thai and Sri Lankan manuscripts. Despite 
73. Compare Toury (1980: 115) who is even prepared to sacrifice 
"something of the semantics of the word" in order to preserve the very 
shape of the original word. 
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this, the alternative readings of some manuscripts mentioned 
in that work's footnotes will only be used when they 
illuminate the suttanta in a way that the standard PTS 
version does not, and all such instances will be duly 
pointed out. The various Chinese manuscripts will be named 
CI, CII, CIII and CIV, as in Pannasiri (1950: 151) 74 • 
In the translation, the male gender is used throughout, for 
two reasons. Firstly, this is true to the Pali original, 
which consistently uses this gender in its descriptions of 
persons which a contemporary view would phrase in inclusive 
language. Secondly, it suits the context better than 
inclusive language would, especially in the section on the 
various kinds of friends (chapter 4). The Buddha was here 
speaking to a young man, counselling him to be judicious in 
his choice of friends. In a patriarchal age, these friends 
were unlikely to be female. Naturally, in applying the 
sentiments expressed here to our own situation no such 
constraints should apply. 
One liberty that will be taken with the text is that the 
items which comprise the many lists of types of people and 
actions contained in the Suttanta will be numbered in order 
to assist the modern reader, who might be more familiar with 
this kind of presentation. 
74. See Chapter 2 for a description of the various versions of the 
Singalovada Suttanta. 
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A final point that should be noted is that it was decided to 
follow the practice, still common among Buddhologists, of 
indicating the plural of Pali terms within a block of 
English text by appending an -s to the singular stem form, 
rather than the more recent development of using the Pali 
nominative plural form of the word75 • In other words, I 
shall speak of dhammas rather than of dhamma. Certain words 
that have been known to the western world long enough to be 
regarded as English words in their own right will also be 
spelled accordingly76 • 
1.6. A PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE SIRG~V~A SUTTANTA 
The following is a thumbnail sketch of the Si~galovada 
Suttanta, supplied here to aid the reader in keeping sight 
of the whole during the course of the argument. 
The Si~galovada Suttanta opens with the meeting between 
the Buddha and a young man called Si~gala, who is 
performing a ritual that involves the worship of the six 
directions; east, south, north, west, below and above. Upon 
the Buddha's enquiry, Si~gala admits that the only reason 
he is performing this rite is that this was his father's 
75. E.g. McTighe (1988). 
76. i.e. Sangha instead of saipgha. 
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deathbed wish. The Buddha then says that the ritual is not 
the correct way to worship the directions, and upon 
Singala's prompting, he proceeds to preach the suttanta. 
First he enumerates the four active defilements, the four 
conditions of wrong actions and the six causes of loss of 
wealth. He then discourses on various types of friends, both 
false friends who are really "enemies disguised as friends" 
and true friends. All these types of friends are clearly 
defined in the text. 
Finally, he returns to the question of worshipping the six 
directions; this he declares to be a kind of metaphor for 
proper human relationships, built on a system of mutually 
reciprocal duties and responses. For instance, "worshipping 
the east" really means caring for one's parents and 
receiving their parental care in return. The other 
directions are equated with one's teachers, spouse, friends, 
servants and the religious professionals in society. 
Singala is overjoyed at having heard this Suttanta 
pronounced. He praises the Buddha effusively and becomes a 
lay Buddhist. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE SIRG.ALOV~A SUTTANTA - A TEXT IN CONTEXT. 
Like any other text, the Si~galovada Suttanta is embedded 
in a definite historical context. It is part of a wider 
literary corpus; it exists in certain languages rather than 
others and it has been perceived by its redactors and 
readers in certain ways. The purpose of this chapter is to 
describe this context and indicate how it might influence 
our assessment of the text's meaning. But there is also 
another kind of context to be taken into consideration; the 
text's own description of what its background is. 
The si~galovada Suttanta is known to and accepted as 
canonical by both the Hinayana (Theravada) and Mahayana 
schools of Buddhism (Dutt 1981: 56). This makes it a kind of 
pan-Buddhist scripture, a fact which alone makes it 
worthwhile to look into it, since it indicates that any 
valid conclusions that might be drawn from it would be 
applicable, or at least acceptable, to Buddhism as a whole, 
not just to this or that Buddhist sect. 
2.1. THE THERAV~A CANONICAL CONTEXT. 
In the Theravada tradition the Si~galovada Suttanta is 
part of the literary corpus known as the Pali Canon or 
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Tipitaka. This is the sacred scripture of Theravada 
Buddhism, the conservative Southern school which is by and 
large the sole surviving school of the Hinayana branch of 
Buddhism77 • It is written in Pali, a Prakrit language that 
is widely thought by scholars to have been closely 
associated with the ancient Magadhi tongue (Banerji 1964: 
14-15). There is no unanimity on the Magadhan origin of 
Pali, though: scholars like Pande (1974: 573-4) believe 
that a central Indian origin is more feasible 70 • 
Traditionally, the Theravada Buddhist canon is thought to 
have been fixed at the First Council, held immediately after 
Gotama Buddha's death. Modern scholars have called this 
notion of an early closure of the canon into question too, 
and have even queried the historicity of the First council 
itself (Upadhyaya 1983: 43 ff.). 
The canon is divided into three Pitakas or parts: 79 
(i) The Vinaya Pitaka - this section describes the code of 
conduct expected of those who had renounced the mundane 
77. A small Hinayana sect known as the Ritsu (Japanese for Vinaya) 
exists to this day in Japan (Humphreys 1981:167,170), but little is 
known about it and it has not had the tremendous impact on Japanese 
society that the Theravada had on south-east Asia. 
78. Cf. the discussion in Geiger (1978: 1-7). 
79. See Lamotte (1988b: 141-191) for a more detailed exposition of 
Indian Buddhist canonical writings. 
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world and adopted the monastic life-style which received 
much emphasis in early Buddhism. Generally, the rules are 
accompanied by an explanation of how the Buddha came to 
promulgate them, thus casting much light on conditions 
prevailing at the time. 
(ii) The Sutta Pitaka - this section relates stories from 
the Buddha's life. It contains much information on social 
circumstances at the time, but is mainly concerned with the 
teaching career of the historical Buddha. 
(iii) The Abhidha:mma Pitaka - this section is composed of 
more philosophical reflections on the teachings presented in 
the other two Pitakas. It is thought by many, perhaps most, 
scholars to be a later development, not attributable to the 
Buddha himself. 
As the Si~galovada Suttanta is contained in the Sutta 
Pitaka, I shall concentrate on this part of the canon -
more information on the other Pitakas can be found in 
Kruger (1991: 73-77). 
The Sutta Pitaka consists of five Nikayas or collections: 
(i) The Digha Nikaya - the collection of long discourses, 
comprising 34 discourses (Pali: Suttas or Suttantas). 
(ii) The Majjhima Nikaya - the collection of medium-length 
discourses, which contains 152 suttas. 
(iii) The Sa~yutta Nikaya - the collection of 'connected' 
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or 'kindred' sayings, containing 2889 Suttas. 
(iv) The Atlguttara Nikaya - the collection of 2308 suttas 
grouped according to the number of things which are 
enumerated therein. 
(v) The Khuddaka Nikaya - this collection contains a 
miscellany of Buddhist texts which range from the wisdom 
literature of the Dha:mmapada and Sutta Nipata to the 
fabulous tales of the Buddha's previous lives in the Jataka 
tales. 
As before, I shall concentrate on the part of the canon in 
which the Si~galovada suttanta is to be found. This is 
the Digha Nikaya mentioned above. Like most of the other 
Nikayas, the Digha Nikaya is subdivided into vaggas 
(sections), three in this case: 
(i) Silakkhandavagga (Suttas 1-13) 
(ii) Mahavagga (14-23) 
(iii) Patikavagga (24-34)(Geiger 1978: 17) 
The Si~galovada Suttanta, being sutta number 31, falls 
within the latter of these three vaggas. 
The Si~galovada Suttanta's position within the canon may 
give us a clue to its age, for as has been implied above, 
Buddhologists have long maintained that the various 
canonical texts are unequal in their respective antiquity 
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(Upadhyaya 1983: 39). While we have no way of knowing 
exactly which parts of the canon can be attributed to the 
historical Buddha, it is, as Ling (1980: 18) puts it, "more 
certain ... that the system of belief and practice reflected 
in these texts is the Buddhism which flourished in India in 
the Ashokan period". This idea is confirmed by Tambiah 
(1977: 61), who points out that many of the Ashokan rock 
edicts " echo the sentiments expressed (in the 
Si~galovada Suttanta)". But of course there is the 
question whether Asoka's patronage might in fact have 
influenced eur understanding of Buddhism. As Lamotte (1988b: 
XXII) has put it, "Without the favours of an Asoka, how 
would the disciples of the Sakya00 have ever been 
distinguished from the MUI)Qasavakas, Jatilakas, 
Magaugikas, Tedaugikas, Aviruddakas and other obscure 
sects only the names of which are known to us today?" In 
other words, the links between the historical Buddha's 
teachings and the Asokan Buddhism of a few centuries later 
are as obscure as ever. 
Generally speaking, the sutta Pitaka is regarded as 
containing the earliest material in the canon, and the 
Digha Nikaya is thought to contain some of the oldest 
material in the Sutta Pitaka (Upadhyaya 1983: 49, Hoffman 
80. That is, the Buddha. 
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1987: 1, Pande 1974: 13) 01 • But within the Digha Nikaya, 
it is the most recent of its collection of Suttas which are 
believed to comprise the Patikavagga (Banerji 1964: 34), in 
which we find the Sidgalovada suttanta. If this chain of 
reasoning is substantially correct, it would place the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta among those discourses which were 
finalised at a fairly early stage, though not among the very 
earliest. 
The verse sections of the canon are of particular interest 
to the historian, since they show a certain stylistic 
similarity to similar passages in Upani~adic scriptures. 
This would place Pali poetry, of which we find several 
examples in the Sidgalovada suttanta, a little later than 
the formation of the bulk of the Upanisadic literature, 
though before the creation of the Brhaddevata, Mahabharata 
and Ramayana (Warder 1967: 16). 
According to Pande (1974: 28 ff.), the dating of a discourse 
is done according to specific rules. To summarise five of 
these: 
(1) An increase in philosophical and metaphysical subtlety 
81. Warder (1967: 16) has also pointed out the close stylistic 
similarities between the Digha Nikaya and certain of the Upanisads. If 
correct, this would also point to an early date for this part of the 
Buddhist canon. 
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may be regarded as a sign of lateness. 
(2) An older style shows simplicity, spontaneity and 
earnestness. 
(3) Many discourses show signs of having been added to at a 
later stage. This tends to confuse the issue, since it leads 
to late features existing within an early text. 
(4) Certain words demonstrate the age of the text in which 
they occur because of lexicographical shifts of meaning and 
(5) Lateness may be assumed if a discourse shows much 
geographical knowledge of southern and western India and the 
regions beyond. 
Using these criteria, Pande's comment on the Si~galovada 
Suttanta is that "Sutta 31, addressed to the laity and 
interpreting the six quarters 'Buddhistically', does not 
contain any marked late features. It may be early" (Pande 
1974: 112). This comment by Pande would reinforce the 
general impression of relative earliness which we obtained 
from the Suttanta's placement within the canon, as discussed 
above. Rhys Davids {1978: 387) too believes this text to be 
early, though her reasons for this belief are less precise 
and exacting than Pande's and seem to be predicated on a 
theory that early Buddhism was less monastic and ascetic 
than its later developments. If this theory is substantially 
82. Cf. the list of these key terminological markers in Pantle (1974: 35-
44). 
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correct, then it would be reasonable to assume an early date 
for a text like the Si~galovada suttanta, which deals 
with ethical precepts for the lay Buddhist follower. But the 
majority opinion in modern Buddhological scholarship seems 
to indicate the exact opposite: the history of Buddhism, it 
is maintained, is precisely a relaxation of the strict 
monastic ideals of its origins03 • 
2.2. THE MAHAYXNA CANONICAL CONTEXT. 
No fewer than four versions of the text exist in the Chinese 
Tripitaka: these have been translated into English and 
discussed by Pannasiri (1950) and all information in this 
section is from Pannasiri's work, except where indicated 
otherwise. It is possible that a Tibetan version of the text 
might exist, given the retentive nature of the canonisation 
process of Buddhist sacred texts, but I have been 
unsuccessful in my search for such a document. Similarly, if 
an indigenous Japanese translation from the Sanskrit ever 
existed, it may have been lost; Apart from a mention by 
Mikkyo Niwano04 , the only reference to the text in a 
Japanese context which my research has produced is to a 
83. See, for instance, Conze's (1982: 53) explanation of the rise of the 
Mahayana as a slow diffusion among the laity of information that had 
previously been reserved for the monkhood. 
84. Niwano (1980: 201). 
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modern translation from the Pali05 • 
Pannasiri ranks the four Chinese documents according to 
their putative ages, that is, their date of translation, and 
calls them CI, CII, CIII and CIV. The same system will be 
used in this work. 
Pannasiri (1950: 163-4) believes the oldest of the Chinese 
texts to be the oldest of all five versions. He bases this 
conclusion mainly on the fact that CI is the most compact of 
the five, lacking both the advice on six ways of dissipating 
wealth and the verse sections found in the other versions of 
the text, as well as on certain inconsistencies in the 
arrangement of verse passages in the Pali text. As 
explained above, I do not intend to become involved in a 
debate on the age and development of the Si~galovada 
Suttanta, but it is worthwhile taking note here of the 
possibility that the Pali version might not be the closest 
to the original. A study which has as its working hypothesis 
that one of the Chinese versions is the "key" version of the 
text, to which other documents should be compared, might 
well lead to radically different conclusions than those 
presented in this dissertation. 
A detailed discussion of the differences between the five 
85. Mentioned in Nakamura (1980: 34). 
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various versions of the Si~galovada Suttanta will follow 
below and in succeeding chapters. Here, I shall restrict 
myself to a summary of the four Chinese versions as stated 
in Pannasiri (1950: 150). 
(CI) She-kia-lo-yue liu fang li king 
translated by Ngan She-kao (148-188 CE). 
(CII) Shan-Sheng tseu king 
translated by Che Fa-tu in 301 CE. 
(CIII) Shan-Sheng king 
translated by Gautama Sanghodeva in 397-398 CE. 
(CIV) - Sheu-Sheng king 
translated by Buddhayasas in 412-413 CE. 
Table 2.1. The four Chinese manuscripts of the 
Si~galovada suttanta 
If this chronology of translations is substantially correct, 
it should be noted that all four of the Chinese translations 
prect=de Buddhagosa's influential commentary (PTS 1970) on 
the Pali text, which is thought to have been written in 433 
CE (Pannasiri 1950: 152). Thus, the translators could not 
have consulted that influential text, which implies that 
similarities between the five documents would tend to 
enhance the value of the similarities between the documents 
and increase the probability that all were derived from an 
original Urtext. As has been explained in section 1.4. I 
shall take all the available versions of the text into 
consideration, but with a methodological emphasis on the 
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Pali edition. 
2.3. THE INTERNAL CONTEXT 
Above, we have seen that the Si~galovada Suttanta exists 
within a specific historical context. But besides this, 
there is also an internal literary context, that is, the 
Suttanta's own explanation of what it is about. In this 
case, we do not have to guess at or use much extraneous 
material to determine this context, for the first two verses 
of the Suttanta describe the main characters, the place 
where the Suttanta originated and the reason why it was 
preached in the first place. This section will therefore 
concentrate on the context supplied in these two verses. 
Evam me sutaIJl 
1. EkaIJl samayaIJl Bhagava Rajagahe viharati Vetu-
vane Kalandaka-nivape. Tena kho pana samayena 
Singalako gahapati-putto kalass' eva vutthaya, 
Rajagaha nikkhamitva alla-vattho alla-keso 
pafijaliko puthudDisa namassati puratthimaIJl DisaIJl 
dakkhinaIJl DisaIJl pacchimaIJl 
DisaIJl uttaraIJl DisaIJl hetthimaIJl DisaIJl uparimaIJl 
DisaIJl. 
2. Atha kho Bhagava Pubbaoha-samayaIJl nivasetva 
patta-civaram adaya RajagahaIJl piogaya 
pavisi. Addasa kho Bhagava singalakam gahapati-
puttaIJl kalass' eva vutthaya Rajagaha 
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nikkhamitva alla-vattha~ alla-kesa~ panjalika~ 
putthuddisa namassanta~ puratthima~ disa~ 
dakkhina~ disa~ pacchima~ disa~ uttara~ disa~ 
hetthima~ disa~ uparima~ disa~. Disva 
Sihgalakam gahapati-putta~ etad avoca: 
'Kin nu tva~ gahapati-putta kalass' eva 
vutthaya Rajagaha nikkhamitva alla-vattho 
alla-keso pafijaliko puthuddisa namassasi 
purattima~ disa~ ... pe ... uparima~ disan ti?' 
'Pita ma~ bhante kala~ karonto avaca - "Disa 
tata namasseyyasiti." So kho aha~ bhante pitu 
vacana~ ~akkaronto garu-karonto manento pujento 
kalass' eva vutthaya Rajagaha nikkhamitva 
alla-vattho alla-keso pafijaliko puthuddisa 
namassami puratthima~ disa~ 
disan ti.' 
pe . . . uparima~ 
'Na kho gahapati-putta Ariyassa vinaye eva~ 
chaddisa namassitabb~ ti.' 
'Yatha katha~ pana bhante Ariyassa vinaye chaddisa 
namasitabb9? S9dhu me bhante Bhagav9 tatha 
dhamma~ desetu yatha Ariyassa vinaye chaddisa 
namassitabba ti.' 
'Tena hi gahapati-putta su~ahi sadhukam manasi-
karohi, bhasissamiti.' 
'Evam bhante ti' kho Sihgalako gahapati-putto 
Bhagavato paccassosi. Bhagava etad avoca: 
1. Thus have I heard. 
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At one time the Blessed one was dwelling near 
Rajagaha, in the bamboo-grove where the squirrels 
are fed. In due course, Singala the householder's 
son, having risen early and left the city, his 
clothes and hair streaming wet, raised his hands in 
salute and veneration to the various directions: to 
the east, south, west, north, below and above. 
2. Just that morning, the Blessed one, having 
dressed and taken his bowl and robe, went towards 
Rajagaha on his alms-round. The Blessed one saw 
Singala who, having risen early and left the city, 
his clot~es and hair streaming wet, was raising his 
hands in salute and veneration to the various 
directions: to the east, south, west, north, below 
and above. Having seen Singala the householder's 
son, the Blessed one said: "Why, o householder's 
son, do you, having risen early and left the city, 
your clothes and hair streaming wet, raise your 
hands in salute and veneration to the various 
directions: to the east, south, west, north, below 
and above?" 
"My father, when he was dying, told me; 'dear one', 
I wish you would venerate the directions' . Indeed 
then, sir, I, holding my father's words in honour, 
respect, reverence and worship, having risen early 
and left the city, my clothes and hair streaming 
wet, raise my hands in salute and veneration to the 
various directions: to the east, south, west, north, 
below and above". 
"But, o householder's son, thus are the six 
directions not worshipped in the discipline of a 
noble one." 
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"How then, sir, are the six directions to be 
venerated in the discipline of a noble one? It would 
be to my benefit, sir, if the Blessed one would 
explain the teaching of how the six directions are 
to be venerated in the discipline of a noble one." 
"Certainly, o householder's son, listen thoroughly 
and pay attention; I shall speak." 
"Just so, sir" assented Siflgala the householder's 
son to the Blessed one. The Blessed one spoke as 
follows: 
2.3.1. THE PEOPLE 
The first two stanzas of the Singalovada suttanta 
introduce us to the two persons involved and the locale in 
which the Suttanta was pronounced. Of the texts principal 
characters, one is Siddhatta Gotama, the historical Buddha, 
about whom enough has been written to make further comment 
unnecessary. He is here described as "Bhagavant" usually 
translated as "the Lord" or, as is done here, as " the 
Blessed one", one of the classical epithets of the Buddha06 • 
86. See Kruger (1991: 42) for more of these traditional appellations of 
the Buddha. 
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The other person involved is a young man named Si~gala07 • 
The name literally means "jackal", and while it does occur 
elsewhere in the Pali canon (e.g. Theragatha I. 25), he 
is the only person of this name mentioned in Malalasekera's 
Dictionary of Pali proper names (1974) 00 • The word does 
occur in the Jataka tales09 , but there it refers to real, 
animal jackals, each one generally a previous birth of 
either the bodhisatta90 or of his evil cousin Devadatta. In 
CII, CIII and CIV his name is given as Sujata (well-born) 
or sujata-putra (son of sujata). As Pannasiri (1950: 
151) states, this is a very common name in the Pali Canon' 
too: Malalasekera (1974 vol. II: 1182-1187) names no fewer 
than 13 persons named Sujata and 10 with the feminine 
version Sujata, as well as three Jatakas and a sutta 
named after various persons with this name. For the sake of 
consistency, I shall refer to the Buddha's interlocutor in 
87. Or Sigala, or Sigalaka - all these are variants of the same word. 
88. Although Malalasekera's book will be extensively used in this 
chapter, it should be noted that his analysis of proper names in the 
Pali canon lacks the kind of historical and critical awareness that 
western scholars look for. For instance, he discusses Tusita "the fourth 
of the six deva worlds" (Malalasekera 1974: vol. 1, p. 1033) in the same 
tone as the historical city of Rajagaha. 
89. J. 113, 142, 148 and 152 are all known as the Sigala-Jataka; see 
Cowell 1981: vol. I & II 
90. Bodhisatta (Skt. Bodhisattva) The Buddha in a previous incarnation 
or in his last life, but before his enlightenment. 
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the Si~galovada suttanta as Sihgala throughout this 
dissertation, except, of course, in direct quotations. 
Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids (1977: 169) state that 
"(Sihgala) was probably no brahmin, or we might have found 
him tending Agni's perpetual fire or bathing his conscience 
clean in some stream of symbolic efficiency". But, while he 
might well technically have been a brahmin, this was not his 
primary social position; he is consistently referred to as a 
"son of a householder" (gahapati-putta). The gahapatis were 
members of a distinct socio-economic class that was emerging 
as the dominant economic force in the region. They dominated 
the "economic domain generally and •.. the agrarian system 
particularly" (Chakravarty 1986: 204). The general pattern 
was for a king to donate a piece of land to a person, often 
but not necessarily a brahmin, who would then work it with 
the help of slaves and servants (dasa-ka:mmakara) 91 • Thus, 
a system of economic stratification arose which was parallel 
but not identical92 to the religion-based fourfold social 
91. The relationship between master and servant in Buddhist India is 
described in verse 32 of the Singalovada Suttanta, and explicated in 
chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
92. Cf. McTighe (1988:32), who specifically mentions the existence of 
"brahman householders". Considering that in classical Vedic varna-
theory, the brahmins were regarded as a specialist priestly social 
grouping, this would indicate the rift existing in the Buddha's time 
between the class system decreed by religious orthodoxy and the one 
created by economic reality. 
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stratif ication93 that would later develop into the caste 
system (Chakravarty 1986: 204-7) 94 • The gahapatis were quite 
aware of their economic power - a case is on record of one 
such householder, a rich merchant, who turned down a king's 
request for his daughter on the grounds that she was too 
young (Horner 1975b:29) 95 • Thus, regardless of whether or 
not he was a brahmin, Siftgala was a member of the 
bourgeois class of his time - which largely explains the 
preponderance of economic concerns in the Suttanta, for 
instance in verse 7, where the "causes of loss of wealth" 
are discussed. Furthermore, as I shall explain below, there 
are good reasons for believing that Siftgala's ritual did 
involve immersion in or at least self-libation from a stream 
or pond. 
We are not told just how the Buddha recognised Siftgala's 
socioeconomic status. Unless we are willing to accept the 
93. That this sytem of social classification was also known to the 
Buddha and his contemporaries can be seen from texts such as the 
Ambattha Sutta (Digha Nikaya, Sutta 3 - see Rhys Davids & Rhys 
Davids 1977: 114). 
94. See Kloppenborg (1974: 18-19) for an example of how this fourfold 
system was eventually reabsorbed into Buddhism and reflected in the 
theory of the differential levels of enlightenment attained by the 
buddha, paccekabuddha and chief disciple. 
95. Gahapatis feature elsewhere in the Pali Canon as well - McTighe 
(1988: 28) mentions that there are seven occasions in the Mahjjhima 
Nikaya alone where they form the Buddha's main interlocutors. 
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supernatural cognitive powers attributed to the former by 
tradition, the safest supposition is probably that Sihgala 
was so categorised by the specific clothing or jewellery 
that he wore. 
No other persons are named directly, although reference is 
made to Singala's father. He is unlikely to have been the 
Sigalakapita Thera ("Venerable father of Sigalaka") 
mentioned by Malalasekera (1974: vol. II; 1133), since that 
person is described as being a householder of the city of 
savatthi prior to his ordination, while singala is 
clearly described as a resident of Rajagaha. In addition, 
Sigalakapita Thera is described by Malalasekera as having 
been a monk and having attained arahantship, which makes it 
less likely that he would have been able to give the 
deathbed instructions described by Sihgala in the 
Singalovada suttanta. Not only were the early bhikkhus 
peripatetic, which would make it unlikely that 
Sigalakapita Thera and his son would even be together at 
the Elder's deathbed, but one would hardly expect an arahant 
to give anyone instructions to worship the six directions! 
As we shall see, this probably was an existing pre-Buddhist 
ritual, and the main thrust of the Singalovada suttanta 
is precisely to reinterpret this ritual into its new, 
Buddhistic meaning of maintaining harmonious interpersonal 
relations. 
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Malalasekera (1974: vol. II; 1133) does mention Si~gala's 
mother; "According to the Apadana she was the mother of 
Sigala(-ka), to whom the Buddha preached the sutta 
regarding the worship of the directions96 • She heard the 
sermon and became a sotapanna1197 • If she did hear the 
Buddha speak this Suttanta, it was not recorded in the 
Si~galovada Suttanta itself: perhaps her son went home 
after his encounter with the Buddha and related his 
experience to her. She later became a nun and was known as 
Sigalakamata Theri ("Venerable mother of Sigalaka"). 
Eventually,-she attained arahantship (full sainthood) and 
"was declared chief of nuns who had attained release by 
faith" (Malalasekera 1974: vol. II; 1133). 
The Suttanta, like the majority of Theravada Suttas, starts 
with the words "Thus have I heard". The speaker is 
traditionally said to be .Ananda, the Buddha's cousin and 
personal attendant, who attained enlightenment after the 
Buddha's parinibbana and was regarded, because of his close 
association with the Buddha, as the chief authority on what 
the latter had or had not said (Kruger 1991: 66). It is 
interesting to note tha~ th~ entire Suttanta, after the 
introductory verse, is presented as a dialogue: CIV mentions 
96. Evidently the Siiigalovada Suttanta. 
97. Sotapanna - a "stream-enterer", the first stage identified by the 
Buddha in the career of a Buddhist saint on his or her way to the 
attainment of nirvana. 
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that the Buddha had a retinue of 1250 monks 90 , but there is 
no evidence that they were present at the actual discussion. 
If this is the case, and there were no witnesses present at 
the discussion between Si~gala and the Buddha, it might 
well be that even Ananda, or whoever actually recited this 
text at the first council, might have received this tale 
already at second hand. The implications of this possibility 
will be raised again in chapter 6. 
2.3.2 THE SETTING - TIME AND PLACE 
The setting of the suttanta is just outside the city of 
Rajagaha99 , the capital of the state of Magadha, in 
northern India. This state would serve as the nucleus for 
the later Mauryan empire (Durrans & Knox 1982: 44). The 
city, which was surrounded by five hills that are the "most 
northerly offshoot of the Vindhya mountains" (Subasinha 
1982: 65), was also known as Giribbaja100 , after the older 
part of the city. Its fortifications still stand, from which 
it can be seen that its perimeter was twenty-five miles 
(forty kilometers) long (Basham 1963: 200). A traditional 
account holds that this city is only inhabited during the 
98. Pannasiri (1950: 204); on p. 155, he describes this as a later 
addition to the text. 
99. Skt. R.ajagrha - lit. "king's home". 
100. Lit. "mountain stronghold" 
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reign of a universal monarch or the career of a Buddha. This 
tradition may have arisen as an attempt to explain the 
city's decline shortly after the Buddha's death 
(Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 721-724). Today it is known as 
Rajagir or Rajagriba, in the province of Bihar, India 
(Subasinha 1982: 65). It may be found 11 19 km south of 
Nalanda towards Gaya" (Crowther, Raj & Wheeler 1984: 300). 
The Buddha had been residing in one of his favourite places 
of residence, a park or grove of bamboos (veiuvana) outside 
the city. This was the first monastic residence accepted by 
the Buddha, shortly after his enlightenment. Numerous 
Suttas, Vinaya rules and Jatakas were first pronounced 
there (Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 936-939). It should not be 
confused with two other veiuvanas, in Kaja~gala and 
Kimbila respectively, which each visited by the Buddha only 
once, nor with two monasteries by the same name, one in 
India, the other in Sri Lanka (Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 
939). 
Within the bamboo-grove, there was a wooded spot where food 
was placed for the squirrels who lived in the trees 
(kalandakanivapa), since local legend told of certain 
squirrels which had woken a sleeping king101 to warn him of 
an approaching snake (Malalasekera 1974 vol. I: 534, 
101. Identified by Tibetan sources as Bimbisara, who reigned during the 
Buddha's life-time. 
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Subasinha 1982: 65-66). This feeding-ground was the Buddha's 
usual place of residence within the bamboo-grove 
(Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 937). This is Malalasekera's 
explanation; Subasinha(1982: 65) disagrees, and believes 
that the veiuvana was a small grove within a larger park- . 
complex called kalandakanivapa. 
The Chinese versions of the sutta disagree on the locale of 
the text. CI places the Buddha at Kukkutagiri 102 , which may 
correspond to the village of Kitagiri, near Rajagaha, 
mentioned in the Pali canon (Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 
724). CII and CIV give the place as G~dhrakuta or 
Grdhrakut, or Vulture's Peak. This was one of the five 
hills surrounding Rajagaha103 and a common residence of the 
Buddha in many Mahayana Sutras. It is by no means 
impossible that the veiuvana described in the Pali text 
was situated on this hill, which would remove the apparent 
contradiction, but there is no textual evidence for this. 
CIII names the site as "tne wood of the frog's feeding 
ground" (Pannasiri 1950: 173, 187, 204). How squirrels and 
frogs became mixed up here is a mystery, but Pannasiri 
{1950: 154) notes that the Chinese translations of 
kalandakanivapa are quite diverse. While there are a number 
102. Pannasiri (1950: 165); cf. his comment on p. 154. 
103. Pali: Gijjhakuta - see Malalasekera (1974 vol. II: 721). 
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of Sanskrit words for "frog"104 , none is sufficiently close 
to the Pali kalandaka to have been confused with it. 
Perhaps this just a question of errors creeping during the 
period of oral transmission or in the Sanskrit/Chinese or. 
Chinese/English translations. All sources, however, agree 
that the Suttanta describes events which occurred in or near 
the city of Rajagaha. 
The Suttanta does not tell us when the action took place. We 
do know that the Buddha's ministry took place during the 
rule of the·Magadhan kings Bimbisara (r. 543-491 BCE) and 
Ajatasattu (r. 491-459 BCE), as these are mentioned in the 
Buddhist texts. If we accept the traditional Sinhalese "long 
chronology", according to which the Buddha was born in 566 
BCE, attained enlightenment in 531 BCE and died in 486 BCE, 
(Kruger 1991: ix), and if we further accept the traditional 
account that the vetuvana was given to the Buddhist sangha 
by king Bimbisara (Malalasekera 1974 vol. II: 936), the 
events described in the Suttanta could have occurred at any 
time between 531 and 486 BCE, the full span of the Buddha's 
public ministry. 
2.3.3. EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE SUTTANTA 
Si~gala's hair and clothing are described as being 
"streaming wet" (alla-vattha alla-kesa). This implies that 
104. E.g. bhekaQ and mandakaQ. 
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the rite which he was performing involved immersion in or 
self-libation with water or another liquid. Water, of 
course, is a symbol of central importance in many religious 
traditions (Eliade 1959: 129-132) and was an important 
symbol of purification in the Vedic religion. A bath, for 
instance, was taken at the conclusion of the Dik~a rite 
(Oldenberg 1988: 222-224; cf. pp. 229-230). Ritual contact 
with water is an important part of Hindu ritual to this day, 
and "It is common practice among Hindus to perform tarpaQa 
by offering water immediately after the bath with wet hair 
and wet garments, i.e. just before a change of dress" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 159. cf. Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids 1977: 
170). In Buddhist circles, the pouring of water, that is, a 
symbolic immersion, seems to have been more popular than 
full immersion; king Bimbisara presented the veluvana to 
the Buddha by pouring water over the latter's hand 
(Mala~asekera 1974 vol. II: 936 n. 2). The An~ttara 
Nikaya105 also records an instance of a man about to enter 
the order of Buddhist monks transferring his wife to her new 
husband by this ceremony and among Sinhalese Buddhists, 
libations of water are part of the wedding ceremony and the 
merit transfer ceremony on bereavement to this day (Gombrich 
1971: 209). 
105. Aiiguttara Nikaya, Book of the eights, Ch. III, v. I (21) - see 
Hare (1978, vol. IV: 144) for an English translation. 
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The Chinese manuscripts off er slightly different 
perspectives on this aspect of the text. CI states that "He 
would rise early, dress his hair, and after bathing and 
wearing chequered clothes, would offer worship ... " 
(Pannasiri 1950: 165). CIII's version is that "He bathed 
early morning, wore fresh garments of k~auma cloth106 , and 
with kusa grass in hand, came to the side of the water, and 
with his clasped hands, worshipped the six directions 
••• "(Pannasiri 1950: 188): the same phrase, slightly 
abbreviated, is found in CII. CIV reads as follows; "Early 
in the morning he came out of the city and took a stroll in 
the park. He then finished his bath and with his wet body 
worshipped all the directions •.. (he said) 'Therefore, 
finishing my bath I, with clasped and uplifted hands, facing 
the eastern direction, worship the east. The south, (the 
west,) the north, the zenith and the nadir are all 
worshipped'" (Pannasiri 1950: 204). Clearly the bath was an 
important part of the ritual, for even if the Pali version 
does not mention it, all four the Chinese manuscripts do. 
The Chinese texts are also more informative on how the 
directions were actually worshipped: While the Pali text 
states only that he "raised his hands in salute and 
veneration to the various directions: to the east, south, 
west, north, below and above", CI states that s·iflgala 
106. Interpreted by Pannasiri (1950: 156-7) as silk. 
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worshipped each direction four times, substituting the sky 
and the earth for the upper and lower directions. In CII he 
recites the following words; " With the greatest respect, I 
worship all beings in the eastern direction so that they may 
return their salutation to me'. CIII expands this to; "If 
there are any beings in the eastern direction, with full 
reverence and regard I pay my worship to them. As I, 
already, with full reverence and regard, have paid my 
worship to them, they also should reverence, regard, pay 
their worship to me"(Pannasiri 1950: 165, 174, 188). The 
ritual that-is described in CIV has been fully explained in 
the previous paragraph. 
Considering all the above information, we can reconstruct 
more or less what transpired that morning: Si~gala left 
the city early that morning, dressed in his best clothes, 
and walked to a stream or pond in or near the ve+uvana107 • 
He then bathed in this stream, either by full immersion or 
symbolically by pouring the river-water over himself. While 
his hair and garments were still wet, he turned towards the 
east, stood by the side of the river, and uttered words 
somewhat like those in CII or CIII, perhaps repeating them 
four times. He then turned to the north, repeated the 
ritual, and so forth. The texts are divided on whether his 
107. Perhaps we can now see some significance in the fact that CIII 
named the scene as "the wood of the frog's feeding ground" - if correct, 
it would confirm the presence of a large body of water. 
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hands were clasped or upraised; perhaps they alternated 
between those positions, or they may have been combined into 
some now-forgotten mudra. He may also have held a tuft of 
ku~a grass in his hands, but Pannasiri (1950: 157) suggests 
that this detail may have been inserted by the translator to 
demonstrate the religious nature of the rite. 
2.3.4. BACKGROUND TO THE RITUAL 
But who or what was Singala worshipping by performing this 
ritual? The-words "If there are any beings in the eastern 
direction " in CIII suggest that he was addressing all 
beings in that direction in the manner of prescribed in the 
Metta Sutta100 where the meditator is enjoined to: 
... let him then for every living thing 
Maintain unbounded consciousness in being, 
And let him too with love for all the world 
Maintain unbounded consciousness in being, 
Above, below and all round in between ••. 
(Nanamoli 1981: 20). 
And more specifically in the Patisa:mbhidamagga that: 
The heart-de 1 i verance of loving-kindness is 
practised with unspecified extension, with 
specified extension and with directional extension 
. . . That with directional extension is practised 
108. Sutta Nipata, i, 8. 
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in ten ways as follows: May all creatures in the 
eastern direction be freed from enmity, distress 
and anxiety, and may they guide themselves to 
bliss ... (Nanamoli 1981: 20-21). 
Here the basic six directions are as we find them in the 
Siiigalovada Suttanta but the "eastern intermediate 
direction" 109 and so on are added to make a total of ten 
directions. 
But when we consider that Singala was not yet a Buddhist 
lay follower at this stage - as we shall see in chapter 5, 
this would only come to pass at the very end of the 
Siiigalovada suttanta - we would be better advised to seek 
a pre-Buddhist context for Singala's ritual. While there 
are scattered references to worship of the directions110 in 
other sources, the most likely text to provide such a 
context is the Atharva Veda, Book III, Hymns 26 and 27 
(Chand 1982: 92-94) where the inhabitants of the six 
directions are clearly described: 
o learned persons, who dwell within this eastern 
region. ye are the pacifiers of the turbulent. 
your knowledge cf annihilating the sinners 
constitutes your fiery arrows. Be kind and 
gracious unto us, and instruct us. To you be 
109. I.e. the southeast 
110. E.g. Yajurveda VII. 42, quoted in Pannasiri (1950: 158). 
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reverence, to you be welcome! 111 ••• 
A commander, expert in the science of fiery 
instruments is regent of the East, its warder is a 
man of independent nature, free from shackles, men 
of glory, knowledge, eloquence, self-respect are 
its arrows. Worship to these the regents, these 
the warders, and to the arrows. Yea, to all these 
be worship. Within your jaws of justice we lay the 
man who hateth us and whom we dislike112 • 
The references to fire in these passages makes it clear that 
the "commander" of the eastern direction is Agni, the Vedic 
--
fire-god. Similarly, each of the other directions is 
associated with a particular Vedic deity (Pannasiri 1950: 
158; Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids 1977: 170), as in the 
following table: 
East ---------------- Agni 
south --------------- Indra 
West ---------------- Varuua 
North --------------- Soma 
Below --------------- Vif?DU 
Above --------------- B~haspati 
Table 2.2. The relationships between 
the directions and the Vedic Gods. 
In this respect, it is interesting to note that Singala's 
111. Hymn 26. v. 1. 
112. Hymn 27. v. 1. 
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ritual occurred in the early morning, close to or at dawn. 
u~as, the Indian goddess of dawn113 was said to be the wife 
of either Surya, the sun god, or Agni, the god of fire 
(Hillebrandt 1980 vol. I: 29). She was at the very least 
closely connected to Agni, "appearing before or with or 
after him as the fire lit for the morning sacrifice" (Keith 
1971: 120). This may be the significance of starting the 
ritual by facing the east, Agni's direction. 
The practice of associating specific divinities to the 
various directions can be found in other religious 
traditions as well: Campbell (1969: 114; cf. p. 116) relates 
the followinq vision related by the renowned native American 
warrior and shaman Black Elk, an Oglala Sioux: 
The pair of spearsmen walked with their charge to 
a cloud that changed into a tepee, and a rainbow 
was its open door, through which could be seen the 
six grandfathers sitting in a row: like hills, 
like stars - so old They were the Powers of the 
West, North, East, South, Sky and Earth; and each 
- to an accompaniment of many marvelous signs -
presented tokens to the boy. 
Similarly, among the Lenape (or Delaware) tribe of native 
Americans, gratitude was expressed to the four cardinal 
directions (Harrington in Eliade 1977:159) and each was 
thought to be inhabited by three manitu (divine powers) 
113. Perhaps etymologically related to the classical Greek goddess Eos. 
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whose faces were carved on the wall posts of the Lenape 
cultic "Great House" (Speck in Eliade 1977:161). 
Even without such specific divine designations, the points 
of the compass play an important role in contemporary Hindu 
ritual; Penner (1975: 61; cf. the diagram on p. 62), for 
instance, points out the following correlations between the 
four cardinal points and various beings and times of day: 
East ---------------- gods, daytime 
South---------------- ancestors, twilight 
West ---------------- demons, night 
North --------------- man, dawn 
Table 2.3. Various relations of the four 
cardinal points according to Penner. 
Penner (1975) also describes the precise spatial orientation 
during a rite of passage (upanayana) by which a brahmin boy 
becomes a fully fledged member of his caste. The actor's 
orientation to the cardinal points during the different 
stages of this rite takes on a quite remarkable importance. 
Sinclair Stevenson (1971: 344) gives an alternative 
correlation between the four compass points and religious 
reality which is actualised in a ritual: 
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East ---------------- Atharva Veda 
South --------------- Yajur Veda 
West ---------------- ~g Veda 
North --------------- Sama Veda 
Table 2.4. The four cardinal points 
and the four Vedas 
Once, again, there is a connection to be discerned - if the 
East symbolises the Atharva Veda and if the divinities 
mentioned ip table 2.2 were in fact worshipped by Singala 
in his ritual, then there may be some significance in the 
fact that he commenced by worshipping the eastern direction. 
Das (1982: 92) emphasises the importance of spatial 
directions in Hinduism by stating that no rebel sect has 
ever challenged it. This may be true from a contemporary 
perspective, from which position Buddhism and Jainism are 
sufficiently different from Hinduism to be counted as 
religions in their own right rather than as "rebel sects", 
but as we shall see in chapter 5, the ethical redefinition 
of direction-worship is exa~tly what takes place in the 
Singalovada suttanta. Incidentally, Das (1982) seems to 
attempt to reduce the four-direction symbol system to a more 
fundamental left/right dichotomy; an explanation of his 
theory, however, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, this project supplies us with yet another 
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correlation (Das: 107 -108): 
East -----right hand 
South ----left hand, death 
West -----left hand, ancestors, prosperity, 
fertility 
North ----right hand 
Table 2.5. The four cardinal points and their 
correlations according to Das. 
It is interesting to note that the contemporary Hindu 
correlations mentioned here only deal with the four 
horizontal directions, while both the Vedic and Buddhist 
documents incorporate the directions above and below, or the 
zenith and nadir, as they are often translated. Given the 
evolutionary relationship between the Vedic scriptures and 
contemporary Hinduism, this may indicate a consolidation or 
simplification of symbols on the latter's part. Early 
Buddhism, as I shall indicate in chapter 5, was not really 
interested in such symbol systems at all, and redefined the 
six directions as representing human relationships, thus 
subverting the system entirely. Even so, there are a few 
references to direction-worship in the Pali canon other 
than in the Si~galovada Suttanta, though these are 
neither prominent nor meant to be taken literally (Pannasiri 
1950: 159-161). 
In later Buddhist traditions, various Buddhas were 
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identified as having established "Buddha-Fields", and these 
were clearly identified as being in this or that direction. 
The best-known of these is the Western pure land of 
Amitabha Buddha (Conze 1982: 87-88). 
If we accept the above analysis, we may need to modify our 
description of Siftgala's ritual: he may have named the 
Vedic divinities by name while he was worshipping the 
"directions". There is one problem, though. The Atharva Veda 
is the most recent part of what we now call the fourfold 
Veda. It probably did not yet exist as a single collection 
in the Buddha's lifetime - where references to preBuddhist 
scriptures consistently refer to the Tevijja, that is, to 
the three Vedas, for instance, in the name of the Tevijja 
Sutta. But even so, as Keith (1971: 18-19) argues, it must 
be based on much older material: 
the Atharvaveda reflects the practices of the 
lower side of religious life, and is closer to the 
common people than the highly hieratic atmosphere 
of much of the ~gveda (it) is certainly the 
youngest of all in its redaction, though it is 
doubtless in part old in material. 
Thus, we have reason to believe that the theological 
theories and sentiments described in it, as described above, 
were in existence already at the time that the Buddha 
delivered this discourse to Siftgala. Furthermore, 
Siftgala, as we have already mentioned and shall expand 
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upon below, was very much part of the "lower side of 
religious life", in that he was both socially (as a 
gahapati) and personally alienated from the mainstream 
religion of his day. If there was indeed an "underground" 
religious movement among the common people that would 
eventually attain Brahmanic respectability as the Atharva 
Veda, this would be the only form of religious expression 
with which he would likely be familiar. 
Why, then, did Si~gala perform this ceremony? The various 
manuscripts-are unanimous on this score: he had been asked 
to do so by his dying father. CII and CIII differ from the 
others in that they describe this before they relate 
Si~gala's meeting with the Buddha. The father, of course, 
occupied a position of great power in traditional, 
hierarchical Indian society, if only in theory (Crawford 
1982: 12), and a deathbed request from one's father would 
not be taken lightly. 
Subasinha (1982: 1-3) relates a traditional account of why 
si~gala's father made this deathbed request which does not 
appear in any of our manuscripts: si~gala's parents, it 
appears, had already taken refuge in the Buddha, Dhar:ma and 
Saipgha, thereby becoming Buddhist lay disciples114 • In 
fact, they had both attained the status of sotapanna 
114. The same ceremony which Singala performs in the very last verse 
of this Suttanta, as described in chapter 5. 
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(stream-enterer), the first stage on the road to 
enlightenment. When Singala's father asked his son to 
visit the Buddha or any of his eighty chief disciples, 
Singala invariably refused. He would cite a lot of reasons 
for his refusal, such as that he would soil his clothes 
while squatting on the ground listening to the Buddha. 
Considering the advice he was later to receive in verse 33 
of the Si~galovada suttanta, it is interesting to note 
that one of his objections was that conversation would lead 
to friendship, which would place an obligation on him to 
supply the monks with alms and other requisites. To get hold 
of these, he maintained, he would have to neglect his work 
and spend a lot of money on the monk's upkeep. It is then 
stated that he became "quite indifferent to religion" 
(Subasinha 1982: 2). This might well have been a common 
trait among his social class and generation - Chakravarty 
(1986: 216) mentions that no gahapati is recorded in the 
Canon as having joined the Buddhist monastic order, although 
many, like Singala's parents, became lay followers. 
Singala's father, aware of his own impending death, then 
asked Singala to vow that he would worship the six 
directions after his father's death. What the father had in 
mind here was that Singala, "unmindful of the figurative 
meaning therein embodied", would begin to worship the 
directions in the way described in the preceding paragraphs, 
and might coincidentally meet the Buddha, who would then 
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explain the true import of the father's instructions, and 
thus convert Singala to a more religious way of life 
(Subasinha 1982: 1-3). 
One could easily dismiss this story as a pious gloss, but I 
am inclined to think that there might well be a measure of 
truth behind it. The description of both of Singala's 
parents as already sotapannas conflicts with Malalasekera's 
(1974: vol. II; 1133) description of Singala's mother as 
becoming converted and attaining this initial step towards 
sainthood only after hearing the si~galovada suttanta, 
but in broad outlines, it is not implausible that 
Singala's father might have extracted a promise from his 
son in the hope that the latter might meet some monks or 
ascetics while performing the ritual. He might not formally 
have been a Buddhist, but perhaps he was aware of the 
Buddha's personal habits and where he might be found at a 
given moment. Thus, the probability of the Buddha seeing 
Singala would be quite good. 
The Buddha, seeing Singala performing his ritual, asked 
him why he was doing this. Having heard the story, he 
declared that this was not the proper way to worship the six 
directions. Singala then asked him to explain the proper 
way of doing so, to which request the Buddha assented; he 
then proceeded to preach the sermon which has come down to 
us as the Si~galovada Suttanta. But apart from a brief 
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mention in verse 3, the next reference to the six directions 
will only occur in verse 27. This, in my opinion the main 
focus of the Suttanta, will be dealt with in chapter 5. But 
first, we shall encounter more general ethical prescriptions 
(chapter 3). Then will follow an important section on 
friendship (chapter 4). Chapter 5 will discuss the Buddhist 
interpretation of the six directions and then conclude this 
section of the dissertation with a brief discussion of the 
final verse of the Suttanta. This division of the Suttanta 
is neither arbitrary nor imposed from without: the text is 
punctuated by verse passages which summarise what has been 
said before, and the division into chapters of this 
dissertation follows this pattern. 
2.4. CONCLUSION 
To summarise this section, it can be stated that the 
Siflgalovada Suttanta is common to the Theravada and 
Mahayana branches of Buddhism. Five slightly different 
versions of the text have been found to exist, one in Pali 
and four in Chinese, and while this reading will focus on 
the Pali version, the Chinese versions will be described 
and evaluated for their possible contribution to the entire 
text. 
These introductory verses introduce us to the people 
involved, the setting and the context in which the rest of 
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the text must be understood. This will be of vital 
importance to our understanding of the rest of the Suttanta, 
for it is here made very clear that the Buddha was not 
speaking ex cathedra, as it were, but that he was rather 
conversing with a specific individual, Si~gala the son of 
a householder. This strongly contextualised nature of the 
Suttanta will have to be kept in mind when we examine the 
specific ethical advice offered, for in a nonKantian, 
nondeontological system of ethics like the Buddhist dhamma, 
one cannot simplistically apply advice given to a specific 
individual universally. Some interpretation, some adaptation 
to other people in other circumstances will be necessary. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GENERAL ADVICE. 
In this chapter, I shall discuss the second part of the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta, that is, verses 3 to 14. This 
section of the text deals with ethical interpersonal 
behaviour on a broadly general level. It explains the four 
active defilements, the four conditions of wrong actions and 
the six causes of loss of wealth. 
Stylistically, it could be noted that a general pattern 
exists in which an introductory verse to a section of the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta asks a rhetorical question and then 
supplies a list of possible answers to this question. The 
same pattern applies to the verses which follows such an 
introductory verse, and which are further elucidations of 
the possibilities suggested there, but this pattern is then 
augmented by a reiteration of the initial question, which is 
recast as a statement. The section is then closed by a 
poetic verse. This pattern recurs throughout the Suttanta 
with only minor variations. It could be schematised as 
follows: 
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"What are the [number] kinds of X? 
They are A, B, c ... 
What is A? 
A is (i), (ii), (iii) ... 
That is A. 
What is B " 
Poem 
Table 3.1. Schematic representation of the 
Si~galovada Suttanta's stylistic pattern. 
3.1. THE FOUR ACTIVE DEFILEMENTS 
3. 'Yato kho gahapati-putta ariya-savakassa 
cattaro kamma-kilesa pahina honti, catuhi ca 
thanehi papa-kamma~ na karoti, cha ca bhogana~ 
apaya-mukhani na sevati, so eva~ cuddasa papaka 
'pagato, chaddisa paticchadI, ubho-loka- ·· 
vijayaya patipanno hoti, tassa ayafi c'eva loko 
araddho hoti paro ca loko. Kayassa bheda param 
mara~a sugati~ sagga~ loka~ uppajjati. 
'Katam' assa cattaro kamma-kilesa pahina honti? 
PaDatipato kho gahapati-putta kamma-kileso, 
adinnadana~ kamma-kileso, kamesu micchacaro 
kamma-kileso, musa-vado kamma-kileso. Imassa 
cattaro kamma-kilesa pahina hontiti.' 
Idam avoca Bhagava. 
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4. Ida~ vatva Sugato athapara~ etad avoca 
sattha: 
'Panatipato adinnadana~ musa-vado ca 
vuccati, 
Para-dara-gamanafi c'eva nappasa~santi pauQita 
ti., 
3. "O householder's son, it is through abandonment 
of four active defilements, non-performance of the 
four causes of evil, non-practicing of the six 
causes of loss of riches, that the noble disciple 
embraces the six directions, becomes a conqueror of 
both worlds, is established in this world and in the 
world beyond. At the dissolution of the body after 
death, he is reborn in a heavenly world. " 
"What are the four active defilements which are to 
be abandoned? 
(1) The defilement of taking life; 
(2) The defilement of taking what is not given; 
(3) The defilement of sensual misconduct; 
(4) The defilement of false speech; 
These, o householder' s son, are the four active 
defilements that are abandoned." 
Thus spoke the Lord 
4. After the Well-farer, the Teacher had spoken 
thus, he continued: 
"Slaughtering life, 
Taking with strife. 
Speaking in lies, 
Adulterous vice. 
To these comes no praise 
from those who are wise." 
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In these verses, the Buddha describes the four most 
fundamental ethical prescriptions for the Buddhist. Here I 
differ from both Walshe (1987: 461) and from Rhys Davids and 
Rhys Davids (1977: 174) in translating kamma-kilesa as 
"active defilements" rather than as "defilements of action" 
or "vices in conduct". Walshe's "defilement of action" seems 
incongruous, since each of the elements in the following 
list is itself an action. In my opinion, the intention here 
is to distinguish these from mental defilements, which in 
the normal course of events would have been stressed by the 
Buddha as the preeminent source of disharmony115 • The Rhys 
Davidses' "vices in conduct" contains condemnatory 
connotations which I do not discern in the o~iginal. The 
stains or defilements (kilesas) in Buddhism are largely a 
technical matter, things to be accepted as facts and removed 
or, even better, avoided altogether. In other words, I feel 
that the English term "vice" is too strongly loaded with 
emotional connotations to reflect the Buddhist use of the 
term. 
By abandoning these four defilements, the "noble disciple 
115. Viz. Upali Sutta in Horner (1975a, vol. II: 36 ff). 
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embraces the six directions". In chapter 5, we shall see in 
greater detail just what this embracing of the directions 
entails in the Buddhist view of direction-worship. It is 
also stated that he "becomes a conqueror of both worlds, is 
established in this world and in the world beyond". This 
idea of conquering both worlds (ubho-loka-vijayaya) refers 
primarily to this world and post-mortem existence, as we can 
see in the very next sentence of the text, but we might 
speculate that this statement also conceals a reference to 
the dual ideal of Buddhahood and universal kingship 
(cakkavattiraja), or at a more mundane level the 
dichotomy between temporal and spiritual achievement, two 
ideals between which the Buddha had to choose when he 
renounced the world and a distinction which is an equally 
pressing problem in religious traditions other than 
Buddhism. 
If such a reading is accepted, this text could be taken to 
suggest that these ideal states are not incompatible, but 
that both are attainable simultaneously, which would amount 
to a Mahayanist interpretation. In fact, this issue of the 
relationship between monastic and lay Buddhist practice is a 
key question to be considered in our interpretation. After 
all, we here have the Buddha advocating certain actions that 
are stated to lead to rebirth "in a heavenly world". But 
these heavenly worlds are not the ultimate ideal of Buddhism 
- nibbana is. Why did he not propound the teaching of 
108 
ultimate salvation through radical renunciation? 
One way to resolve this problem is to propose a radical 
discontinuity between the "nibbanic" Buddhism of the monks 
and the "kammatic11116 Buddhism of the laity. This would 
suggest that when the Buddha spoke to Si~gala, he 
expounded the kammatic or worldly teaching, thus adapting 
his message to his audience, which all observers of and 
participants in the Buddhist tradition seem to agree is a 
cardinal attribute of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas117 • One 
should also take account of King's (1964: 76) statement that 
Buddhism frankly acknowledges that most of us will fail to 
reach nibbana, at least in this life110 • The implication 
would then be that a secondary system needed to be set up 
for those whose aspirations fell short of complete 
enlightenment. 
But while the nibbanic/kammatic distinction is founded on 
empirical sociological and anthropological observations, and 
116. Terms suggested by Spiro (1982); King (1964) and Hick (1991: 148-
150) follow a similar line of reasoning, although Hick continues by 
suggesting that the philosophical problem can be solved with reference 
to the Mahayana Trikiya doctrine (Hick 1991: 150-152). 
117. Traditionally called "skilful means" - see section 1.3.1.5. 
118. Cf. Hick (1991: 149). 
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is relevant and valuable on that level 119 , scholars who are 
more interested in the philosophical and theological aspects 
of Buddhist ethics have pointed out the shortcomings of this 
approach. Aronson calls the distinction "doctrinally 
unfounded". He continues: 
Practitioners of insight, the so-called nibbanic 
Buddhists, are still very much working within the 
laws of cause and effect. The cultivation of 
virtuous activities ... ensures good rebirth, but 
more importantly creates the nexus within which a 
practitioner can cultivate concentration and 
insight into the present A fully liberated 
individual has destroyed the seeds of future 
rebirth; furthermore, his intentions no longer 
have the ability to entail rebirth, technically 
speaking, his actions are no longer karmic. This 
liberated condition, however, is obtained by 
working within the context of wholesome intentions 
and deeds ( kamma) and it is thus misleading to 
contrast 'kammatic Buddhism' with 'nibbanic 
Buddhism' . Medi ta tors seeking nirvana· engage in 
activities similar to those undertaken by those 
seeking high rebirth - correct conduct, generosity 
and cone entrati on and in addition cultivate 
insight. They do not constitute a different kind 
of Buddhism, rather a more complete level of 
practice (Aronson 1980a: 79-81) 120 • 
119. In the sense that it shows how Buddhism, like other religions, has 
a "big" and a "little" tradition. 
120. Cf. Aronson (1979), Swearer (1979: 63). 
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Elsewhere, Aronson (1979: 35-6) points out that even the 
withdrawal from the world by the bhikkhu is not absolute. 
The monk, too, is obliged to alternate introspection and 
social concern and active ministry. Thus, while there may be 
some empirically verifiable distinctions between the 
religious practices of monks and laity, this need not be 
construed as indicating an ontological or soteriological 
difference within Buddhist religious philosophy. 
Even so, one must agree with King (1964: 116) that "The 
flavour of most of the Suttas that deal with lay life is 
somewhat casual, as befits dealing with the mundane world 
and its ways, rather than being indicative of a matter of 
first importance" - such is certainly true of the 
Si~galovada Suttanta. This is a complex debate, and one 
for which we shall not be able to supply a final answer in 
this dissertation121 , but the strategy in this work will be 
to point out those instances where the Si~galovada 
Suttanta does demonstrate linkages to other Buddhist texts 
and to Buddhist philosophy generally, thus acting in 
accordance with and supporting my general philosophical 
framework, which is that Buddhist ethics is the logical and 
existentially necessary result of Buddhist philosophy, as 
described in section 1.3.2. 
121. A summary of this debate may be found in Katz & Sowles (1987: 415-
420). 
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Perhaps the problem could be addressed at least for our 
purposes by pointing out that at the very least, the 
"kammatic" form of Buddhism is not incompatible with the 
"nibbanic", in the sense that it does not render one unfit 
to strive towards "nibbanic" goals at a later stage or even 
simultaneously. Whether it is a prerequisite for the latter 
is a question that has not yet been resolved within Buddhism 
as a whole. Thinkers like Buddhadasa seem to suggest that 
it is, that in fact there is no essential difference between 
striving for ethical perfection and reaching for the 
meditative heights of nibbana, since both involve acting in 
accord with the true nature of the universe. 
Thus, there is no unanimity on the respective worth of the 
monastic and lay lifestyles even in the more monastically-
inclined Theravada tradition; Rahula (1962: 77), for 
instance, states that while 
It may be agreeable for certain people to live a 
retired life in a quiet place ... it is certainly 
more praiseworthy and courageous to practise 
Buddhism living among your fellow beings, helping 
them and being of service to them. 
Or, as Kalupahana (1977: 430} has put it, "The renunciation 
that is spoken of in Buddhism is not a mere physical 
renunciation, but the ability to be involved with the world 
without being smeared by it ... ". Still, we are left with 
the situation that in the Sidgalovada suttanta, blessings 
112 
in this life and the next, and not the attainment of 
nibbana, are held out as the reason for behaving ethically 
towards others. 
Another question that could be asked about the that one 
"becomes a conqueror of both worlds, is established in this 
world and in the next", is whether such a positive statement 
is at all Buddhist in tone. What can words like "conqueror" 
and "established" mean in a Buddhist context, where one 
would expect negative terms like "renouncer" and 
"disestablished"? 
"Conqueror of both worlds" (ubho-loka-vijayaya), as 
explained above, generally means one who has conquered both 
this world and that of the next incarnation. ~addha can 
mean "established", but more literally "begun, started, bent 
on, undertaking, holding on to, resolved, firm" (Rhys Davids 
& Stede 1986: 107). One is sorely tempted to-allegorise 
these sentences into some kind of symbolic "conquest" of, 
say, the body and mind, but the last sentence in this verse, 
which clearly states that such a person will be reborn in a 
heavenly world makes this impossible. We shall have to take 
this section at face value and accept that a happy, 
prosperous life and a favourable rebirth is here presented 
as the goal for the noble disciple122 to work towards. Thus, 
122. Who, in this context, need not be a monk. 
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to some degree this Suttanta supports the Spiro/King thesis 
of a radical soteriological split within Buddhism. 
Even so, this does not preclude salvation through insight; 
but it does imply that the ultimate salvation of nibbana is 
not to be advanced as the goal for everyone. But let us not 
forget that Buddhism supports the idea of reincarnation or 
rebirth: the notion that a definite (and definitive) choice 
between two religious paths must be made now would be quite 
foreign to a paradigm that accepted the idea of thousands 
upon thousands of lives. In other words, the attempt to see 
various kinds of Buddhist practise as evidence of a 
philosophical split between "kammatic" and "nibbanic" 
Buddhisms may be the result of the (western) Buddhological 
researcher's paradigm, rather than an integral part of 
Buddhism. 
The four "defilements" which are mentioned here are 
restatements of the first four of the fivefold-morality 
(pafica sila), the general precepts which every Buddhist 
undertakes to carry out (R. H. Jones 1979: 372) 1 ~ 3 , and I 
shall describe them in those terms124 • As usual, the 
123. Compare the exposition of these infractions Saleyyaka Sutta 
(.Majjhima Nilcaya Sutta 41, see Horner 1975a, vol. I: 344). 
124. Dutt (1981: 54) points out that the Buddhist five precepts were 
suggested, "no doubt, by the five .Mahapatakas or heinous crimes of the 
Hindu law books ... " 
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injunction against imbibing alcohol is deleted when the 
formula is shrunk to this smaller size (J. G. Jones 1979: 
50) - it will, however, be thoroughly dealt with in Verse 8. 
Between them, the four injunctions mentioned here are parts 
of the "right speech" (sa:mma vayama) and the "right 
action" (samma ka:mmanta) aspects of the Noble eightfold 
path, which shows that the suttanta is in accord with 
Buddhist ethical theory elsewhere in the canon and 
tradition. The Chinese manuscripts are unanimous in 
describing the same four unpraiseworthy acts, although err 
reverses the positions of the third and fourth element 
(Pannasiri 1950: 174) 
3.1.1. THE DEFILEMENT OF TAKING LIFE 
Firstly, then, one is to refrain from taking life. Piyadassi 
(1979: 145-6) adopts a near-Jain stance by insisting that 
this implies an abstention from killing any kind of living 
being: 
Killing is killing whether done for sport, for 
food or - as in the case of insects - for health. 
It is useless to try to def end oneself by saying 
'I did it for this good reason or that'. It is 
better to call a spade a spade. If we kill we must 
be frank enough to admit it and regard it as 
something unwholesome" (Piyadassi 1979: 147). 
Bodhi agrees with Piyadassi that the injunction includes all 
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living beings, but points out that there are degrees of 
responsibility within the ambit of the injunction: "··· 
there is a difference between killing a human being and 
killing an animal, the former being kammically heavier since 
man has a more developed moral sense and greater spiritual 
potential" (Bodhi 1984: 59). This raises a question: does 
this hierarchical arrangement include the plants? To the 
best of my knowledge, no classical Theravada text extends 
the principle this far125 , but modern scientific knowledge 
and the principle involved would almost demand that we 
include the vegetable kingdom in the category of "sentient 
beings". 
If so, we cannot live without committing murder or causing 
murder to be committed. Even vegetarians can only 
approximate full compliance with this rule.Thus, moral 
perfection, as defined by this injunction, is unattainable. 
This, perhaps, is why the eating of flesh was only forbidden 
to monks if they had reason to believe that an animal had 
been especially slaughtered for them (Piyadasi 1979: 147-
125. A possible exception is mentioned by Tachibana (1975: 59) but it is 
unclear whether he is discussing Buddhism or Jainism in the passage 
concerned. Harris (1991: 107-109) states that trees, though apparently 
not lesser plants, " ... were regarded as single facultied life forms ... 
and as such were protected from harm", but adds that this reflects an 
early element of nature mysticism within Buddhism, which was never the 
main trend and was not to endure, while LaFleur (1990) describes the 
integration of vegetable life into the system by the Mahayana. 
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8) 126 • Vegetarianism was never prescribed for the laity, but 
it is clearly in harmony with the wider Buddhist ethos of 
respect for all life127 • 
As far as the contemporary application of the precept 
concerning the taking of life is concerned, Sivaraksa (1988: 
66) would even take chemical and nuclear pollution and its 
links to the military-industrial complex under this heading. 
In practice, even the conventional interpretation of this 
precept is frequently evaded120 in Buddhist societies, but 
"nevertheless it has had an important influence upon their 
dominant ethos" (King 1989: 20). 
3.1.2. THE DEFILEMENT OF TAKING WHAT IS NOT GIVEN 
Secondly, we are told not to take "what is not given". In 
the first place, this is an injunction against all kinds of 
theft. Certainly theft existed in ancient India: thieves 
even formed Mafia-like guilds and religious societies of 
their own (Banerji 1972: 75). Sivaraksa (1988: 66) would 
126. Cf. Harris (1991: 106). 
127. See also Ruegg's (1980) article on the subject of vegetarianism in 
Buddhism. 
128. One example of such evasion is the rationale that one may eat fish, 
for fish are not actively killed, they are merely removed from the 
water, whereupon they asphyxiate without further action taken by the 
fisherman (in King 1989: 20). 
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also include a consideration of "appropriate and 
inappropriate development models, right and wrong 
consumption, unequal and just marketing, leading to 
dilapidation and degradation of natural resources and the 
way to cure them" as examples of adherence or not to this 
precept. 
The precept can also be extended to such everyday practices 
as "using false weights and measures to cheat customers" 
(Bodhi 1984: 61), for an employee to take full wages for a 
half-done job, or conversely, for an employee to fail "to 
pay adequate wages" (Piyadasi 1979: 148). This concern for 
the relationship between employer and employee recurs in 
verse 32 of the Sidgalovada Suttanta, where the ideal 
relationship between them is described in greater detail. 
The principle involved here seems to be that one should keep 
to one's word after an agreement has been made - in the case 
of theft, this would imply a social contract-such as that 
described in the Agafifia sutta129 • If so, this precept • 
overlaps to a large degree with that of abstaining from 
false speech. 
3.1.3. THE DEFILEMENT OF SENSUAL MISCONDUCT 
Thirdly, abstinence from sensual misconduct is prescribed. 
This is perhaps an over-literal translation of "micchacara 
129. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 27. 
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kamma-kilesa" on my part, for this precept is traditionally 
understood as referring exclusively to sexual misconduct 
(viz. Bodhi 1984: 62-64; Piyadasi 1979: 148-150). When one 
considers the entire Buddhist ethos of renunciation, it 
seems odd that other sensory enjoyments, like tasty food and 
drink, although they are discussed in other Suttas, were 
never subsumed under this prec~pt. Be that as it may, I 
shall not deal with this precept extensively, since I have 
discussed it, and more particularly its contemporary 
interpretation by leading Buddhist figures in the Theravada 
and Zen traditions, elsewhere130 • Suffice it to say that it 
calls for a sober and restrained attitude to sexual 
behaviour among the laity, a stance which is operationalised 
by lists of people with whom one is not allowed to have 
sexual relations, while simultaneously refusing to condemn 
anyone who fails to live up to the standard set by these 
documents. 
Sivaraksa (1988: 67) again applies this ancient precept to 
modern circumstances. He maintains that the restrictions on 
possible sexual partners do not exhaust the spirit 
underlying this precept, but that it should also be seen as 
a guideline in questions concerning birth control, abortion 
and the role of women. 
130. For further details, see Clasquin (1992b) or Stevens (1990). 
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3.1.4. THE DEFILEMENT OF FALSE SPEECH 
Lastly, then, we find the injunction to refrain from false 
speech (musa-vada). According to J. G. Jones (1979: 88-
89), who quotes Jataka 431 in support, this is the most 
important of all the five precepts, and in a sense it is, 
for speech is somehow a more unmistakable, if less direct, 
expression of the underlying mental states to which Buddhism 
attaches such importance than physical action. Of course the 
ethical injunction as described here is only a part of the 
full content of Right speech (samma-vaca). According to 
Bodhi (1984: 53 ff.) the latter also includes abstinence 
from slanderous speech, harsh speech and from idle chatter. 
It is speculative, yet not impossible that the original 
discourse to Sihgala contained one or more of these 
aspects as well, but that abstention from false speech was 
gradually used as a kind of oratorical shorthand for the 
entire complex of inadmissible forms of speech during the 
period of oral transmission, and that this was how it 
assumed its present form. If we accept this argument, it 
behooves the Buddhist not merely to refrain from telling 
lies, but also to speak in a kind and purposeful way. We 
might do well to keep this in mind, for references to speech 
recur time and again in the Si~galovada suttanta, for 
instance in verse 17, where the big talker is identified as 
an enemy disguised as a friend, or in verse 23, where one of 
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the characteristics of a type of true friend is his 
discretion in divulging or concealing secrets. This fact 
alone should alert us that more is expected from us in our 
vocal behaviour than merely sticking to the truth. Sivaraksa 
(1988: 67) also counsels us to keep the role of mass media 
and education in mind in this respect. 
3.1.5. THE VERSE SUMMARY 
The first verse passage in the suttanta is introduced by the 
formula "After the Well-farer, the Teacher, had spoken thus, 
he continued". This may sound as if there were two people 
involved here, but in fact both "well-farer" (Sugata) and 
"teacher" (Satthar) are appellations of the Buddha. 
As far as the poem in verse 4, which is not contained in CI 
and CIV (Pannasiri 1950: 166, 207), is concerned, it merely 
recounts the four acts mentioned above and states their 
blameworthiness. It is noteworthy that no intrinsic moral 
odium is laid on the acts mentioned; the motivation for 
ethical behaviour is extrinsic, for it is simply stated that 
these actions are not praised by the wise. Such an appeal to 
external authority initially seems anomalous in a Buddhist 
context - how can one reconcile it with the call for self-
reliance in religio-ethical matters in such documents as the 
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Kalama Sutta?131 Perhaps one should here consider the 
specific context in which the Si~galovada suttanta was 
pronounced: let us recall that Si~gala, while perhaps 
somewhat of an irreligious young man, was yet susceptible to 
the demands of traditional authority, as can be seen from 
his obedience to his father's deathbed request. As always, 
the Buddha skilfully adjusted his message to his audience's 
capacity to understand. Moreover, it does demonstrate the 
non-deontological nature of Buddhist ethics. 
3.2 THE FOUR CONDITIONS OF WRONG ACTIONS 
5. 'Katamehi catuhi thanehi papa-kamma~ na 
karoti? Chandagati~ gacchanto papa-kamma~ 
karoti, dosagati~ gacchanto papa-kamma~ karoti, 
mohagati~ gacchanto papa-kamma~ karoti, 
bhayagati~ gacchanto papa-kammam karoti. Yato kho 
gahapati-putta Ariya-savako n'eva chandagati~ 
gacchati, na dosagati~ gacchati, na mohagati~ 
gacchati, na bhayagati~ gacchati, imehi catuhi 
thanehi papa-kamma~ na karotiti. 
Idam avoca Bhagava. 
6. Ida~ vatva Sugato athapara~ etad avoca 
sattha: 
131. Aiiguttara Nikaya, Tika Nipata, chapter 7, verse 65. See the PTS 
edition of the Aiiguttara Nikaya, vol. I, pp. 189 f. for the Pali 
text, and Woodward (1979: vol. I, pp. 170-175) for an English 
translation. 
'Chanda dosa bhaya moha 
yo dhamma~ ativattati, 
Nihiyati tassa vaso 
Kala-pakkhe va candima 
Chanda dosa bhaya moha 
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yo dhamma~ nativattati, 
Apurati tassa yaso 
sukka-pakkhe va candima ti.' 
5. "Which are the four conditions of wrong actions 
from which one refrains? 
(1) The practice of desire leads to the performing 
of evil actions. 
(2) The practice of anger leads to the performing of 
evil actions. 
(3) The practice of delusion leads to the performing 
of evil actions. 
(4) The practice of fear leads to the performing of 
evil actions. 
Since the Noble disciple, o householder's son, does 
not practice desire, does not practice anger, does 
not practice delusion and does not practice fear, he 
refrains from the four conditions of wrong actions." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
6. After the Well-farer, the Teacher had spoken 
thus, he continued: 
"Desire, anger, delusion, fear. 
Ignore this lesson and soon, 
One's authority so dear 
Declines like the waning moon. 
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Desire, anger, delusion, fear. 
Heed this lesson and soon, 
One's reputation so clear 
Grows like the waxing moon. 
3.2.1. THE PROSE DESCRIPTION 
The most important term in verse 5 is "thana" (condition). 
Although this is not a central technical term in the 
Buddhist philosophy of causality, like paccaya or hetu132 , 
it carries much of the same connotations. Derived from a 
root meaning "to stand", it has the literal meaning of 
"place, region, locality, abode". From this derives its 
figurative meaning of "ground for (assumption), reason, 
supposition, principle" (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 289-290), 
that is, in this context, motivation. This shows a link, 
however tenuous, with one of the central concerns of early 
Buddhism - its theory of causality. We shall have reason to 
return to this link between the Sidgalovada suttanta and 
Buddhist philosophy and discuss it more expansively in 
chapter 5. 
Thus, having laid down the ground rules of ethical 
interpersonal relations, the Buddha now inquires into the 
132. See Kalupahana (1975: 54-66) for a detailed examination of these 
two terms. 
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motivations that underlie its converse. The first three are 
familiar: chanda, dosa and bhaya (desire, anger and 
delusion) are known in Buddhism as the "three unwholesome 
roots", that is, as the three psychic factors which prevent 
meditators from achieving ever-higher levels of 
attainment133 • Buddhaghosa uses these three factors (and 
their converse; faith, intelligence and discursiveness) as 
the basis for a differentiated system of meditative 
instruction (in Conze 1983: 98, 116-121). 
I believe that the addition ot fear to these three 
traditional adverse factors in Buddhist psychology 
constitutes a more rounded approach to human psychopathology 
than the traditional formulation. Fear is not something 
discussed at great length in Buddhist texts, except where 
the fearlessness of the Buddha or his disciples is 
described134 • Given the psychological orientation of the 
tradition, this seems anomalous, considering· how fear 
underlies so many of our phobias and neuroses (Carson, 
Butcher & Coleman 1988: 148, 183-189). 
133. These three are represented as a pig, a snake and a rooster, 
respectively, in the hub of the well-known traditional Tibetan pictorial 
design of the "wheel of becoming" (Sangharakshita 1966: 143, 102). 
134. One exception is the Bhayabherava Sutta (Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 
4), in which fear is discussed and brought into the context of other 
adverse factors, including chanda, dosa and bhaya. 
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In the Chinese manuscripts, CI supplies a different list, 
namely, "(1) desire, (2) lust, (3) hatred and (4) 
ignorance". If we view lust as a synonym or specialised 
application of desire, this list actually comes closer to 
the traditional list of three factors, and it may well have 
been influenced by the latter. CII lists the four factors as 
"desire, anger, stupidity and fear", which corresponds to 
the Pali version. CIII and CIV name the same four factors 
as the Pali version and CII, but interchange the position 
of the third and fourth factors (Pannasiri 1950: 166, 174, 
190, 205}. The fact that four of the five extant versions do 
mention fear in this context leads me to believe that the 
addition of fear in the Pali version of the suttanta is a 
legitimate and valuable extension to the usual three-factor 
theory of unwholesome roots. 
3.2.2. THE VERSE SUMMARY 
The poem at the end of this section underscores what was 
said earlier in this chapter: once again, an external reward 
(increase or decrease in authority and repute) is used to 
motivate Si~gala's ethical behaviour. Here I differ from 
other translators in differentiating between "authority" 
(vasa) and "repute" (yasa) in the two verses, as in the 
standard PTS version of the Suttanta, but it should be noted 
that one of the Burmese manuscripts uses yasa in both verses 
(PTS 1976: vol. III p. 182 n. 5). Thus, the first verse 
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could also r~ad 11 ••• One's repute so dear declines II . . . . 
As far as the Chinese versions of the poem are concerned, CI 
incorporates it in its prose section (Pannasiri 1950: 166). 
The other Chinese manuscripts generally correspond to the 
Pali. 
3.3. THE SIX CAUSES OF LOSS OF WEALTH 
7. 'Katamani cha bhogana~ apaya-mukhani na 
sevati? Sura-meraya-majja-pamada-
tthananuyogo kho gahapati-putta bhogana~ 
apaya-mukha~. Vikala-visikha-cariyanuyogo 
bhogana~ apaya-mukha~. Juta-ppamada-
tthananuyogo bhogana~ apaya-mukha~. Papa-
mi ttanuyogo bhogana~ apaya-mukha~. 
Alassanuyogo bhogana~ apaya-mukha~. 
8. Cha kho 'me gahapati-putta adinava sura-
meraya-majja-pamada-tthananuyoge: 
sanditthika dhanafijani, kalaha-ppavaQQhani, 
rogana~ ayatana~, akitti-sanjanani, kopina-
nidda~sani, pafifiaya dubbali-karaQi tv eva 
chattha~ pada~ bhavati. Ime kho gahapati-putta 
cha adinava sura-meraya-majja-pamada-
tthananuyogo. 
9. Cha kho 'me gahapatti-putta adinava vikala-
visikha-cariyanuyoge: atta pi 'ssa agutto 
arakhitto hoti, putta-daro pi 'ssa agutto 
arakhitto hoti, sapateyyam pi' ssa agutta~ 
arakkhita~ hoti, sa~kiyo ca hoti papakesu 
thanesu, abhuta~ vacanafi ca tasmi~ ruhati, 
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bahunnan ca dukkha-dhammana~ purakkhato hoti. 
Ime kho gahapati- putta cha adinava vikala-
visikha-cariyanuyoge. 
10. Cha kho 'me gahapati-putta adinava 
samajjabhicaraoe: "kuva~ nacca~, kuva~ 
gita~, kuva~ vadita~, kuva~ akkhana~, 
kuva~ panissaram, kuva~ kumbhathilnan ti?" Ime 
kho gahapati-putta cha adinava 
samajjabhicaraoe. 
11. Cha kho 'me gahapati-putta adinava jilta-
ppamada-tthananuyoge: jaya~ vera~ pasavati, 
jino vittam anu- socati, sanditthika 
dhananjani, sabha-gatassa vacana~ na rilhati, 
mittamaccana~ paribhilto hoti, avaha-
vivahakana~ apatthito hoti, akkha-duttho 
purisa-puggalo nala~ dara- bharaoayati. Ime 
kho gahapati-putta cha adinava jilta-ppamada-
tthananuyoge. 
12. Cha kho 'me gahapati-putta adinava papa-
mittanu-yoge: ye dhutta, ye sooga, ye 
pipasa, ye nekatika, ye vancanika, ye 
sahasika, tyassa mitta honti, te sahaya. Ime 
kho gahapati-putta cha adinava papa-mittanu-
yoge. 
13. Cha kho 'me gahapati-putta adinava 
alassanuyoge: "Ati-sitan ti" kamma~ na karoti, 
"Ati-uohan ti" kamma~ na karoti, "Ati-sayan ti" 
kamma~ na karoti, "Ati-pato ti" kamma~ na 
karoti, "Ati-chato 'smiti" kamma~ na karoti, 
"Ati-dhato 'smiti" kamma~ na karoti. Tassa eva~ 
kiccapadesa-bahulassa viharato anuppanna c' eva 
bhoga n'uppajjanti, uppanna ca bhoga 
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parikkhaya~ gacchanti. Ime kho gahapatti-putta 
cha adinava alassanuyoge ti.' 
Idam avoca Bhagava. 
7. "And what are the six causes of loss of wealth 
with which he does not associate himself? Indeed, 
o householder's son, 
( 1) Careless addiction to liquor and drugs is a 
cause of loss of wealth. 
(2) Being about on the street at night is a cause 
of loss of wealth. 
(3) Frequenting fairs is a cause of loss of 
wealth. 
( 4) Careless addiction to gambling is a cause of 
loss of wealth. 
( 5) Joining evil friends is a cause of loss of 
wealth. 
(6) Being idle is a cause of loss of wealth. 
8. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the 
dangers of careless addiction to liquor and drugs; 
(1) Tangible loss of wealth; 
(2) The breaking out of quarrels; 
(3) The increase of diseases, 
(4) Loss of reputation; 
(5) Shamelessness; 
(6) and the sixth is the decline of intelligence. 
These indeed, 
dangers of 
drugs." 
o householder's son, are the 
careless addiction to liquor 
six 
and 
9. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the 
dangers of being about on the street at night; 
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(1) He himself is unguarded and unprotected, 
( 2) His wife and children are unguarded and 
unprotected; 
(3) His property is unguarded and unprotected; 
(4) He is suspected of evil behaviour; 
(5) False rumours about him abound; 
(6) And he is visited by great suffering. 
These indeed, 0 householder's son, are the 
dangers of being about on the street at night. 
10. Six indeed, 0 householder's son, are 
dangers of visiting fairs; 
( 1) 'Where is the dancing?'; 
( 2) 'Where is the singing?'; 
( 3 ) 'Where is the orchestra?'; 
(4) 'Where is there oratory?'; 
(5) 'Where are the cymbals?'; 
(6) 'Where are the drums?' 
These indeed, 0 householder's son, are the 
dangers of visiting fairs. 
" 
six 
II 
the 
six 
11. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the 
dangers of careless addiction to gambling; 
(1) In victory he produces hate; 
( 2) He mourns the possessions he has lost to the 
winner; 
(3) His present wealth is wasted; 
(4) His words are ineffective in the assembly; 
( 5) His friends and companions treat him with 
contempt; 
(6) And he is not sought after as a spouse, since 
a gambler cannot support a wife. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six 
dangers of careless addiction to gambling." 
12. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the 
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dangers of Joining evil friends. Any and all (1) 
rogues, (2) drunkards, (3) gluttons, (4) cheats, 
( 5) swindlers and ( 6) men of violence are his 
friends and companions. These indeed, 0 
householder's son, are the six dangers of joining 
evil friends." 
13. "Six indeed, 0 householder's son, are the 
dangers of sloth; one says, 
(1) 'It is too cold' and does not work; 
( 2) 'It is too hot' and does not work; 
( 3 ) 'It is too late' and does not work; 
( 4) 'It is too early' and does not work; 
(5) 'I am too hungry' and does not work; 
(6) 'I am too full' and does not work. 
Those abundant tasks of his that need doing stay 
undone, riches do not arise, and existing riches 
diminish. These indeed, o householder's son, are 
the six dangers of sloth." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
Initially, it is a little unsettling to find a radical 
world-renouncer like the Buddha giving advice on how to 
avoid losing one's wealth. However, when we look at the word 
"bhoga", which is translated here, as in other translations, 
as "wealth", we see that it is derived from the stem bhunj 
and therefore related to the verb bhunjati. Now, the first 
meaning of bhufijati is "to eat ... , to enjoy, make use of, 
take advantage of". But it also has the secondary meaning of 
"to purify, cleanse, sift". When we take into consideration 
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that all these words are derived from the root bhuj, meaning 
"to bend", and that all these connotations would be 
accessible to the original listener, it becomes clear that 
we cannot read "wealth'' too literally as meaning only the 
possession of material goods (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 506-
510). 
Wealth, then, taken more figuratively, is that which allows 
one to bend to the prevailing winds, that by means of which 
one eats and enjoys, but also that which purifies135 • In 
this Suttanta, it serves as a metaphor for a generally 
improved way of life (cf. Rahula 1962: 81), a metaphor, 
moreover, which would have been immediately clear, or at 
least intelligible, to si~g~la, the "son of a 
householder", and a member of the economically dominant 
force in the region136 • As we look at the various 
misfortunes that the Buddha says will befall those who 
indulge in the various behaviours listed here, we can see 
that some, but by no means all of them are directly related 
to economics. Thus, material well-being, which, as Macy 
(1979: 46) and Gombrich (1978: 109) emphasise, was always 
respected by the Buddhist tradition, is integrated into a 
larger picture of the good life by means of this 
metaphorical reference to wealth. The close causal 
135. Cf. Slater (1981: 10-11). 
136. See section 2.3.1. 
132 
connection between material welfare and morality in Buddhism 
is indicated by the following statement by Buddhadasa 
(1989: 158): 
Let's ask a simple question, "If a village does 
not have roads, is this because the village is not 
moral?" Those who would answer "yes" realize that 
villagers lack roads because they are too selfish 
to cooperate or too lazy to do the work, and that 
selfishness and laziness are moral issues. 
While such a view could be challenged from, say, a Marxist 
perspective, it demonstrates two things: firstly, that 
material welfare and prosperity is by no means frowned upon 
in Buddhism and, secondly, that the connection between this 
prosperity and morality is seen as a causal one; yet another 
indicator of the link between morality and philosophy in 
Buddhism. 
Of the six causes of loss of wealth listed here, three are 
also named as such in the Vyaggapajja sutta137 , which gives 
the following list: 
137. In Subasinha (1982: 58-63). This may be a peculiarly Sri Lankan 
appellation for an otherwise obscure part of the Pali canon; it is not 
named as such in Webb's (1975) Analysis of the Pali canon, but may be 
found under the name Longknee the Koliyan in the PTS English translation 
of the Aiiguttara Nikaya, Atthaka Nipata ch. vi, verse 53. The Sutta 
is also discussed in Saddhatissa (1987: 132-133). 
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( 1) Indulgence in unlawful sexual intercourse. 
(2) Indulgence in the use of intoxicating liquors. 
( 3 ) Indulgence in gambling. 
(4) Indulgence in associating with unrighteous 
friends. 
The Vyaggapajja Sutta also states that the abstention from 
these four factors would tend to "increase and save" wealth 
(Subasinha 1982: 61). 
the term "adinava", which will occur frequently in the 
following verses, is here translated as "danger". While this 
is certainly one acceptable translation, it could be said 
that this leads to too strong an interpretation. Originally, 
the term meant "full of wretchedness", from which the 
standard meanings of "disadvantage" or "danger" were derived 
(Rhys Davids 1986: 99). Since disadvantage is a considerably 
"weaker" term than danger, it could be surmised that the 
meaning and emotional colouring that the term "adinava" 
has in Pali lies between these two English terms. Moreover, 
when we look at the various "dangers" in context, it becomes 
clear that they are also "consequences". For instance, the 
ingestion of intoxicating substances is not described as 
evil per se, but is evil because it leads to "tangible loss 
of wealth" and so on. In other words, the disadvantages of 
such behaviour are described in causal terms. 
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3.3.1. CARELESS ADDICTION TO LIQUOR AND DRUGS 
In verse 8, we find as clear a case against the abuse of 
intoxicating substances as can be found anywhere. As was 
mentioned in our discussion of verse 3, the injunction 
against drinking alcohol and other intoxicants is one part 
of the fivefold morality to which lay Buddhists are expected 
to subscribe. A number of alcoholic beverages were available 
to the ancient Indian: Basham (1963: 216) mentions beers 
brewed from rice or flour, wines made from wood-apples and 
from raw sugar, tree-bark and pepper, and a spirit of mango 
juice. Although the term is not used here, it is possible 
that majja here also implies soma, the hallucinogenic used 
in certain Brahmanic ceremonies (Ragozin 1984: 168-175). 
Technically, meraya means fermented and sura distilled 
liquor, while majja (intoxicant) can be seen as either 
adjectival to these two or additional to them (Bodhi 1981: 
69), but I agree with Bodhi that it is in either case 
acceptable to extend the principle put forward here to more 
contemporary mind-altering and addictive substances such as 
cocaine, LSD and indeed tobacco. 
Whether the injunction against the abuse of alcohol and 
other drugs was ever intended to be comprehensive, as it is 
for instance in Islam, is unclear, depending much on the 
emphasis placed by the particular translator. My translation 
above stresses the term pamada (carelessness), and could 
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therefore be interpreted as an injunction against abuse or 
excessive rather than moderate use of intoxicants, an 
interpretation which is strengthened by the term 
tthananuyoga130 , meaning addiction rather than use. A 
translation that puts less emphasis on this word would tend 
to lead to a stricter interpretation of this precept and 
this, in fact, is the traditional assessment: 
The precept, it must be stressed, does not 
prohibit merely intoxication but the very use of 
intoxicating substances. Though occasional 
indulgences may not be immediately harmful in 
isolation, the seductive and addictive properties 
of intoxicants are well known. The strongest 
safeguard against the lure is to avoid them 
altogether. (Bodhi 1981: 71 cf. Piyadasi 1979: 
133) 
The question to be asked, though, is whether Buddhism would 
support the kind of legalism found in religi9us traditions 
as diverse as Islam and Confucianism, where precepts and 
proscriptions are laid down as inviolable laws to be obeyed 
at all cost139 • Many writers (e.g. King 1989: 22) deny that 
138. Lit. the condition of being yoked to something. 
139. I am aware that this is an oversimplification of these traditions 
and that tendencies towards a more flexible position exist in both. 
However, the contrast between these traditions, with their extensive 
legal systems, and Buddhism is sufficiently clear to warrant such 
treatment. 
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this is the case and emphasise the subtle interplay between 
free will and determinism in Buddhist philosophy in this 
respect. Premasiri (1989: 57), for instance, writes: 
Since Buddhism does not subscribe to a 
deontological system of ethics, moral action is 
not looked upon as mere obedience to sacred 
commands. There is enough room for independent 
deliberation on moral matters and flexibility in 
moral choices, depending on the peculiarities of a 
specific situation. 
R. H. Jones (1979: 381-382) points out that in the Jatakas 
the Buddha's previous incarnations are depicted as "breaking 
all the five precepts except lying", and that his use of 
"skilful means" elsewhere in the Canon is technically 
speaking the telling of lies. This, I believe, strengthens 
the case for the argument that the Buddhist precepts should 
not be understood as absolute and universalisable commands, 
but as guidelines for indi victual behaviour. ·· 
Indeed, the voluntaristic nature of Buddhist ethics can be 
seen in this very section of the Si~galovada Suttanta 
itself. Observe how the Buddha does not say; "Do not ingest 
liquors and intoxicants". What he does do is to explain the 
dangers of pursuing certain paths of action. The listener 
(or, in our case, the reader) is then left to draw his or 
her own conclusion. Note that even Bodhi, cited above, 
justifies the total ban on liquor with the concept of a 
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"safeguard", rather than with an authoritative fiat. As ever 
in the Buddhist tradition, the individual is at all times 
free to do as he or she likes - but there will be 
consequences. In other words, Buddhist ethical theory 
accords with the Buddhist philosophical theme of 
impermanence, causality and interrelatedness. 
As is usual in the Buddhist tradition, the exposition is 
phrased in the negative - the dangers of intoxication rather 
than the joys of sobriety are emphasised. This can be 
explained by ref erring to the Buddhist understanding of all 
suffering as being attributable to desire (tar.)lla). If 
intoxication is something to be avoided, this does not imply 
that we should cling to sobriety. Neither of these is 
consonant with the Middle Way between extreme positions, 
which was perhaps best summed up by Dhiravamsa (1973: 127), 
in a related context140 , with the words; "We have to move 
towards this, but not with any feeling of compulsion to give 
it up. Just let it happen naturally11141 • 
140. Although Dhiravamsa is here discussing the sexual relation as seen 
in a Buddhist context, it admirably summarises the entire Buddhist 
ethos, including, as here, its stance on intoxicating substances. 
141. Sivaraksa (1988: 68) takes a more activist stance when he writes, 
"The usual religious preachings against intoxicants do not get us 
anywhere. We must examine the whole beer, wine, spirit and drug industry 
to identify their power base". One might suggest that he is exploring a 
hybrid Buddhist/Marxist approach in such a statement. 
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In the light of the above, we may summarise the Buddhist 
position on intoxicants as one which proposes complete 
abstention from mind-altering substances as the ideal, but 
which does not place an absolute prohibition on such 
behaviour, since this would be contrary to the Buddhist 
belief in the importance of personal responsibility for 
one's own salvation. The status of the injunction against 
intoxicating substances, therefore, is one of a warning 
against its adverse effects, rather than one of an absolute 
prohibition. This position would also describe the Buddhist 
position on ethical behaviour generally. As I have described 
elsewhere, for instance (Clasquin 1992b), it is true of the 
Theravada attitude towards sexuality. This principle should 
be kept in mind when reading the rest of the Suttanta. 
The dangers of addiction to intoxicating substances are 
described in graphic detail; shorn of the monkish redaction, 
they can be paraphrased as follows; "you will become poor, 
you will get into fights, you will get sick, people will 
despise you, you will become shameless and you will lose 
your wits". A dire warning indeed! Of these warnings, it 
should be noted that kopina-niddaipsani (shamelessness) 
literally means "one who removes the loincloth" (Rhys Davids 
& Stede 1986: 229), and therefore refers to public nudity. 
Whether this was meant to be a cautiously slighting 
reference to the nudity adopted by various Brahmanic and 
Jain ascetics, such as we can find in verse 141 of the 
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Dhanunapada142 1 is unclear. The wealth referred to in the 
first danger should be seen in this case as being material 
prosperity, not the figurative meaning described above. This 
is shown both by the term sandhittika (tangible) and the 
use of the term dhana rather than bhoga, the former being a 
term with more definite material connotations (Rhys Davids & 
Stede 1986: 335). 
3.3.2. BEING ABOUT ON THE STREET AT NIGHT 
In verse 9, we are told of the dangers of roaming the 
streets at night. Here the dangers of an excessively literal 
interpretation become even clearer. The Buddha is surely not 
prescribing some kind of self-imposed curfew. What we see 
here is a warning against habitual absence from the home. 
The first three dangers described, of the exposure to danger 
of one's person143 , dependents and property, have 
unfortunately become all too relevant again in our own time. 
The fourth and fifth describe the effect such behaviour has 
on one's reputation (as in verse 6), and are near-
synonymous. There might be a link between the first three 
dangers and the fourth and fifth - in the first three, one 
142. Khuddaka Nikaya. See Kalupahana (1986: 126) and Mascaro (1983: SS) 
for English translations. 
143. "Atta" should here be seen as having a purely reflexive function; 
it certainly cannot mean "his soul is unguarded and unprotected" in a 
Buddhist context! 
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is exposed to brigands, while in the fourth and fifth, one 
is suspected of being just such a person. If ancient Indian 
dacoits were mostly active at night during the period of the 
Suttanta, as is intimated by the 2nd century CE Tamil poem 
"The garland of Madurai" (quoted by Basham 1963: 206), this 
would be a logical assumption on the peoples' part. 
The sixth danger of being about on the street at night ("and 
he is visited by great suffering") appears to be rather 
generalised. Perhaps it was inserted merely to fill up the 
required six dangers in this category and thus preserve the 
symmetry of the suttanta. Alternatively, it serves to 
accentuate the negative impact of the first five dangers 
without adding any new information. If so, this is not a 
pattern repeated in the other causes of loss of wealth. 
3.3.3. FREQUENTING FAIRS 
It is interesting to note that the six dangers of visiting 
fairs (dancing, singing, etc.) in verse 10 are phrased in 
direct speech. There is no closely argued position here: 
apparently, the Buddha felt that the mere mention of these 
things and events which were to be found at fairs would be 
sufficient to show the demerits of such practices. To us, 
who live in a society which according to social commentator 
Neil Postman (1986: 64 ff.) is obsessed with entertainment, 
this might not be immediately apparent, but the importance 
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in traditional Buddhism of abstention from such affairs is 
shown by the fact that such abstention was incorporated in 
the higher precepts observed by many Theravada laymen on 
uposatha days, that is, twice every lunar month, in addition 
to the regular five precepts (Bodhi 1981: 71-72; Tachibana 
1981: 65-66). Certainly these occasions would be 
aesthetically and morally offensive to ascetics and monks 
who had devoted their lives to quiet contemplation. Krishna 
Murthy (1982: 58) mentions that 
The festivals of the Vedic period were full of fun 
and frolic. On such festive occasions, archers 
exhibited their mastery. Horse and chariot races 
were conducted. It was the time for poets to earn 
their laurel by reciting their compositions144 • 
The women, both young and elderly, sought there to 
find husband and courtisans making profit of the 
occasion [sic]. 
An alternative explanation of this passage would be that it 
represents an existing form of folk-wisdom, which the Buddha 
was merely quoting. One could also suggest that, 
stylistically speaking, the rapid naming of such 
distractions would suggest just how much these things are 
counter to the Buddhist ideal of an equanimous, even-minded 
existence - that is, the attractions of the fair are here 
used to demonstrate the so-called "monkey mind". Naturally, 
144. This probably was the "oratory" mentioned in the Singalovada 
Suttanta. 
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such an interpretation would only be evident to those who 
were already Buddhist insiders, which Singala was not yet 
at this stage. 
3.3.4. CARELESS ADDICTION TO GAMBLING 
The warning on the dangers of gambling in verse 11 show that 
the Buddha had a good intuitive understanding of the laws of 
probability. Of the six dangers mentioned in this passage, 
only one mentions the possibility of victory, while three 
show the direct results of losing a wager. The remaining two 
results145 are indirect results of losing. The most common 
form of gambling in ancient India seems to have been dice-
play: dice made from clay and ivory have been discovered 
even in the Indus civilisation cities of Mohenjodaro and 
Harappa. Other dice were made from small nuts. The earliest 
Indian dice, it would appear, were elongated bars with four 
marked sides, unlike our modern cubical dice· with their six 
marked sides which were introduced later146 • If the four-
sided bars were used in the Buddha's time, as seems likely, 
this would explain the ratio of three possibilities of 
losing to one of winning mentioned above. Gambling was under 
145. "His words are ineffective in the assembly" and "his friends and 
colleagues treat him with contempt". 
146. This chronology of ancient Indian gambling techniques is according 
to Krishna Murthy (1982: 68-70). See Basham (1963: 209) for a dissenting 
opinion. 
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strict state control, being confined to state-run casinos, 
and was subject to a gambling tax (Basham 1963: 210). 
Why the gambler would be met with derision in the assembly 
and by his friends is unclear - this could be caused either 
by the gambler's loss of wealth (a term which here again we 
can take quite literally) or as a more abstractly moral 
aversion to gambling itself. But perhaps the latter is a 
modern interpretation, since contemporary western objections 
to gambling tend to be based on monotheistic arguments about 
predetermination, free will and the possibility of invoking 
God's favour. Si~gala's religious environment was a 
polytheistic one with an emerging current of monism, and it 
seems unlikely that the same kind of argument could have 
been raised there. Thus, the most likely interpretation 
seems to be that contempt would be the gambler's lot simply 
for having squandered his wealth. 
3.3.5. JOINING EVIL FRIENDS 
To some extent, the six dangers of joining evil friends in 
verse 12 pre-empts the discussion in verses 15 to 20. But 
this verse is more general in tone. It also amounts to a 
tautology: all that is said in this verse is that it is 
dangerous to join evil friends because evil friends tend to 
be rogues, drunkards, gluttons, cheats, swindlers and men of 
violence. Therefore, while this passage has a certain 
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emotive and persuasive power, it does not supply us with any 
new information. This may be intentional; the Buddha may not 
have wished to detract from the discussion of evil friends 
in verses 15 to 20. 
3.3.6. IDLENESS 
Verse 13, resembles verse 10 in that it is phrased at least 
partly in direct speech. But in this case, all six the 
dangers of sloth amount to the same thing: for one reason or 
another, work does not get done and wealth does not come 
one's way. One imagines that this kind of ethic would have 
impressed a gahapati like Si~gala most deeply. 
At first sight, this may look like a Weberian "Protestant 
work ethic" to our twentieth-century eyes. But the very next 
sentence shows that the work is not valued for its own sake 
(Weber 1989: 157-159), but for the wealth which it would 
have brought in, had it been performed. This is the only 
verse in the entire section on the causes of loss of wealth 
to include such a further explanation - which suggests that 
the Buddha must have thought it an important point to be 
made. 
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3.3.7. THE VERSE SUMMARY 
14. IdalJl. vatva Sugato athaparalJl. etad avoca 
sattha: 
'Hoti pana-sakha nama 
hoti sammiya-sammiyo, 
Yo ca atthese jatesu, 
sahayo hoti, so sakha. 
UssUra-seyya para-dara-sevana 
vera-ppasango ca anatthata ca, 
Papa ca mitta su-kadariyata ca, 
ete cha thana purisalJl. dhalJl.sayanti. 
Papa-mitto papa-sakho 
papacara-gocaro, 
Asma loka paramha ca 
ubhaya dhalJl.sate naro. 
Akkh-itthiyo varUoi nacca-gitalJl. 
diva-sappalJl. paricariya akalalJl., 
Papa ca mitta su-kadariyata ca, 
ete cha thana purisalJl. dhalJl.sayanti. 
Akkhehi dibbanti, suralJl. pivanti, 
yant 'itthiyo paDasama paresalJl., 
Nihina-sevi na ca vuddha-sevi, 
nihiyati kala-pakkhe va cando. 
Yo varuDi adhano akificano 
pipaso pibam papagato, 
Udakam iva iDalJl. vigahati, 
akulalJl. kahati khippam attano. 
Na diva suppana-silena 
ratti-n-utthana-dassina 
NiccalJl. mattena SODQena 
sakka avasitulJl. gharalJl.. 
"Ati-sitalJl. ati-uDhalJl. 
ati-sayam," idalJl. ahu, 
Iti visattha-kammanto, 
attha accenti manave. 
Yo ca sitafi ca uohafi ca 
tioa bhiyyo na mafifiati 
Kara~ purisa-kiccani, 
so sukha na vihayatiti.' 
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14. After the Well-farer, the Teacher had spoken 
thus, he continued: 
(i)"One is called a drinking mate 
One professes friendship. 
But he who cares for your fate, 
he is your friend indeed. 
(ii) Sleeping late, perhaps with another's wife, 
Nursing and spreading grudges, 
Evil friends and stinginess: 
These six destroy a man. 
(iii) Evil friends, evil mates, 
Delighting in evil behaviour, 
Both in this world and the next, alas! 
This man destroys himself. 
(iv) Gambling, wenching and drinking, 
Dancing and singing, then 
Basking by day like a snake. 
Untimely prowling, evil friends and stinginess: 
These six destroy a man. 
(v) They throw the dice, they fill the cup. 
They lie with others' dearly loved wives. 
He who serves the low and not the high 
Fades like the waning moon. 
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(vi) Thirsty while drinking, 
Having no wealth, having nothing, 
He enters debt like going 
To a well for water. 
No family will be his. 
(vii) Not by habitually sleeping late, 
Nor by using the night to roam, 
Nor by constant drunkenness and intoxication 
Can one support one's home. 
(viii) 'Too cold', 'too hot' 
'Too late'; so they cry. 
Labour having been left to its lot 
Advantages pass the youngsters by. 
(ix) But he who hot and cold 
Considers no more than the grass; 
Who does the duties of a man, 
For him will happiness never pass." 
Verse 14 consists of a poem, much of which replicates 
what has been said in verses 7 to 13. Since this is a 
long poem, its stanzas have been numbered in lowercase 
Roman numerals to facilitate the discussion. 
Stanza (i) describes false and true friends. As such, 
it seems more appropriate to the discussion in verses 
15 to 26 of the Suttanta and may well have been 
transposed from there. The same is true, though to a 
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lesser extent, of stanza (ii), which covers a large 
area within the Suttanta. In the first line, "Sleeping 
late" clearly refers to the excuses for slothful 
behaviour mentioned in verse 13, while the mention of 
adultery refers back to "the defilement of sensual 
misconduct" in verse 3. The reference to "nursing and 
spreading grudges" seems at first not to relate to 
anything else in the Suttanta, but it can be seen as a 
contrast to the poem in verse 34, where it is said of 
the wise man that: 
He makes friends and keeps them, 
He is approachable and without envy. 
Stanza (iii) is mainly a reference to the undesirability of 
associating with evil friends, as described in verse 12. 
Stanzas (iv) to (viii) are very clearly associated with the 
preceding prose section, since they describe the very 
behaviours discussed in verses 8 to 13. The metaphor 
"Thirsty while drinking" in (vi) strikingly describes the 
Buddhist understanding of all desire as being ultimately 
insatiable and invariably leading to suffering. 
The ninth and final stanza of the poem differs from the 
preceding ones in that it does not describe the hazards of 
unethical behaviour, but changes the perspective to the 
benefits of behaving properly. While this is not expanded on 
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to the same extent as the negative descriptions, it 
nevertheless adds an important balancing element to the 
poem. Formally, its reference to thinking little of heat and 
cold is a rejoinder to stanza (viii), where extremes in 
temperature are offered as an excuse for sloth. However, the 
positioning of this stanza at the very end of the poem makes 
it possible for us to see it as a counterbalance to all 
eight preceding verses. 
As far as the Chinese manuscripts are concerned, CI has only 
the equivalent of the Pali version's verse 7, without 
further elucidation. The six causes of loss of wealth listed 
there differ slightly in both content and arrangement, to 
wit: 
"(1) Being addicted to intoxicating liquors, 
(2) being infatuated with gambling, 
(3) being fond of sleeping early and rising late, 
(4) being fond of entertaining others and wishing 
to be invited by others, 
(5) being fond of keeping company with evil 
friends, and 
(6) being vain and looking down on others" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 166) 
The situation in CII is more complicated, due to a 
typographical error in Pannasiri's (1950: 175) article, 
which causes this paragraph to enumerate only five causes, 
despite clearly saying that there are six. This text does, 
however, include elucidatory paragraphs equivalent to the 
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Pali version's verses 8 to 14. Using these to reconstruct 
CII's section on the causes of loss of wealth, we can 
discern that they are the following: 
(1) Drinking wine 
(2) Lust 
( 3 ) Gambling 
(4) Fondness for dancing and music 
(5) Having evil friends and 
( 6) Idleness (after Pannasiri 1950: 175-176) 
CII's poetic section, equivalent to verse 14 in the Pali 
text, differs considerably from the Pali poem described 
earlier in this chapter. It consists of fifteen stanzas 
rather than nine, and while correspondences do exist (the 
Chinese stanza 8, for instance, which is very similar to the 
Pali stanza 9), the differences between the two are large 
indeed. 
In CIII, the six causes are said to be the following: 
(1) being infatuated with gambling 
(2) prowling around at unseemly hours 
(3) being addicted to intoxicating liquors 
(4) being intimate with evil companions 
(5) being always fond of music and dancing and 
(6) the habit of idleness (after Pannasiri 1950: 
190-191) 
The poem in CIII consists of thirteen stanzas, and is 
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similar to the one in CII. 
CIV differs from the other Chinese versions in that it has 
verses equivalent to the Pali text's verses 8 to 14, but no 
introductory paragraph that could act as a counterpart to 
the Pali verse 7. This may have been lost in the process of 
transmission. Its list of six causes can be reconstructed 
from the elucidatory paragraphs as follows: 
(1) drinking intoxicating liquor 
(2) gambling 
(3) indulgence (dissipation) 
(4) haunting places of dancing and music 
(5) associating with evil friends and 
(6) idleness (after Pannasiri 1950: 206-207) 
When we look at the results of these "indulgences", we see 
that they are nearly identical to those described in the 
Pali text under the rubric of "being about on the street at 
night". Similarly, the "places of dancing and music" 
mentioned here are identical to the "fairs" of the Pali 
text. Thus, CIV is the most nearly related to the Pali text 
of all the Chinese manuscripts, differing from the latter 
only in the order the six causes are listed. This 
resemblance to the Pali Suttanta holds true for its twelve-
stanza poem as well. 
What we have here, then, is a situation in which no two of 
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our five manuscripts agree entirely on what the six causes 
of loss of wealth are, or how they should be enumerated. 
Above, I suggested that the first three stanzas of the Pali 
poem in this section might have been a later innovation. 
Here, I shall go further and ask whether the diversity of 
the contents of the five manuscripts are not too great to be 
due to differences in translation or the occasional loss of 
a phrase from one or another manuscript; in fact, this 
diversity creates the suspicion that this entire section of 
the suttanta might be a later importation from a separate 
text which had already undergone an evolutionary 
diversification of its own. Naturally, to prove su~h a 
thesis decisively would require an in-depth linguistic study 
of both the Pali and the Chinese versions (as well as any 
others that might be found) which is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
What can however be said against this hypothesis at this 
stage is that a clear reference to this section is made in 
verse 19, where the spendthrift is described as "an enemy 
disguised as a friend11147 , because "He is a friend while you 
are carelessly ingesting liquor and intoxicants; he is a 
friend while you go about on the street at night; he is a 
friend when you visit fairs; he is a friend when you 
carelessly gamble". In other words, the spendthrift's 
147. See section 4.1.4. 
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friendship is rejected because he exhibits precisely the 
kind of behaviour already renounced here. Thus, if this 
section is a late import, then the section on friendship 
must be too. But a further cross-reference to that section 
is made in verse 31, in the section on reciprocal 
relations140 , where the friend is said to reciprocate a 
person's good offices by guarding that person's life and 
possessions, just as the helping friend is said to do in 
verse 22. Moreover, both those verses can be seen as the 
converse of verse 9 in this section, where one of the 
results of being about on the street at night is said to be 
that one's person, dependents and possessions are 
unguarded149 • Thus, unless in-depth linguistic analysis 
suggests otherwise, the divergences between our various 
manuscripts will have to be explained another way. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
Such technicalities apart, what can we learn from this 
section of the Suttanta? What kind of lifestyle does it 
suggest we follow? The answer would seem to be that it 
proposes a sober, disciplined, almost puritanical lifestyle, 
centred on the home and family rather than on public 
148. See section 5.5. 
149. These and other thematic interconnections between verses are 
depicted graphically in Appendix C. 
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entertainment or nocturnal socialising. Gambling and 
intoxication are frowned upon since these activities tend to 
dissipate wealth, in the sense that they are incompatible 
with the pursuit of Buddhist ideals of unimpassioned 
activity. The discussion of the dangers of sloth show a kind 
of prosperity ethic, rather than a work ethic, emerging from 
the Suttanta, which we shall have opportunity to mention 
again in chapter 5. As Gombrich (1978: 109) has put it, " 
... the Buddhist ethos has a distinct flavour of what one 
might loosely call 'middle-class values'"· 
This "middle-class" flavour includes the use of the term 
bhoga as metaphor for a generally improved way of life that 
includes, but also transcends, material welfare. In this, we 
can see the way in which the Buddha uses already existing 
structures and personal desires and instead of rejecting 
them, adapts them to convey its message. Traditionally, we 
have thought of "skilful means" as a Mahayana teaching, 
and it is true that is stressed far more there than in the 
Theravada tradition, but here one can see that it has been 
part of Buddhism from its very inception. 
Does the conservative tenor of this part of the text mean 
that the Buddha is here prescribing a monotonous, joyless 
existence? I believe not. As we shall see in the next two 
chapters, the variety of friendships and other interpersonal 
relationships described in the rest of the Suttanta supply 
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the Buddhist layperson with a rich variety of experiences to 
savour. 
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CHAPTER 4 
FALSE AND TRUE FRIENDS 
In this chapter, we shall look at verses 15 to 26, in which 
a distinction is made between false and true friends. Apart 
from its intrinsic significance, this section is also 
important insofar as it contains certain themes that will 
recur in verses 27 to 34. Other items mentioned here can be 
seen as reiteration of items in verses 3 to 14. Thus, this 
can be seen as a "bridging" section of the Suttanta, one 
which links the general ethical admonishments discussed in 
chapter 3 with the specific instructions on how the six 
directions should be properly revered, to be discussed in 
chapter 5. 
But why such a sizeable section on friendship in this 
Suttanta? No reason is given in the text, but one might 
speculate that, although this discourse is directed to the 
laity, it originated in a monastic environment and was 
transmitted by monks. Friendship was and remains the most 
intimate relationship allowed to the bhikkhus150 , and the 
tendency to stress this aspect of life would follow 
naturally. A symbolic expression of the importance of 
friendship and friendliness in Buddhism can be seen in the 
150. In fact, friendship was said to be the "whole of the holy life" 
(Sutta Nipata I 87-9, quoted in Collins 1988: 114). 
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fact that the name of the future Buddha, Metteya (Skt. 
Maitreya) is derived from the word mitta (Skt. mitra), 
meaning "friend'' (Conze 1983: 237). The widespread 
significance of this symbolic expression can be seen in the 
fact that Metteya is the only Bodhisattva revered by both 
the Hinayana and Mahayana schools (Sangharakshita 1966: 
349; Williams 1989: 228). 
4.1 THE FALSE FRIENDS 
15. "Cattaro 'me gahapat-putta amitta mitta-
patir~paka veditabba. Afifiadatthu-haro amitto 
mitta-patirupako vedi-tabbo: vacI-paramo amitto 
mitta-patirupako veditabbo: anuppiya-bhaoi 
amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo: apaya-sahayo 
amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. 
16. Catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi afifiadatthu-
haro amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. 
Afifiadatthu-haro hoti: appena bahum icchati: bhayassa 
kicca• karoti: sevati attha-karaoa. Imehi-kho 
gahapati-putta catuhi thanehi afifiadatthu-haro 
amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. 
17. Catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi vacI-
paramo amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. Atitena 
patisantharati: anagatena patisantharati, 
niratthakena sa.gaohati: paccuppannesu kiccesu 
vyasana• dasseti. Imehi kho gahapati- putta catuhi 
thanehi vacI-paramo amitto mitta-patirupako 
veditabbo. 
18. Catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi anuppiya-
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bhaDi amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. 
Papakam p'issa anujanati: kalyaDam p'issa 
nanujanati: sammukha 'ssa vaDDa~ bhasati: 
parammukha 'ssa avaDoa~ bhasati. Imehi kho 
gahapati-putta catuhi thanehi anuppiya-bhaoi 
amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. 
19. catuhi kho gapati-putta thanehi apaya-
sahayo amitto mitta-patirupako veditabbo. Sura-
meraya-majja-pamada-tthananuyoge sahayo hoti 
vikala-visikha-cariyanuyoge sahayo hoti: 
samajjabhicaraoe sahayo hoti: juta-ppamada-
tthananuyoge sahayo hoti. Irnehi kho gahapati-
putta catuhi thanehi apaya-sahayo amitto mitta-
patirupako veditabbo ti." 
Idam avoca Bhagava. 
20. Ida~ vatva Sugato, athapara~ etad avoca 
sattha: 
"Afifiadatthu-haro mitto, 
yo ca mitto vaci-paro, 
Anuppiyafi ca yo aha, 
apayesu ca yo sakha, 
Ete amitte cattaro 
iti vififiaya paDQito 
Araka parivajjeyya 
magga~ patibhaya~ yatha ti." 
15. "These four, o householder's son, are to be 
known as enemies disguised as friends. 
(1) The ever-taking man is to be known as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
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( 2 ) The big talker is to be known as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
( 3 ) The flatterer is to be known as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
( 4) The spendthrift is to be known as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
16. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding the ever-taking man as an 
enemy disguised as a friend. 
(1) He is always taking; 
( 2) He desires much for very little; 
( 3 ) He performs his duty out of fear; 
(4) He only performs those duties that benefit him. 
These indeed, 0 householder's son, are the four 
reasons for regarding the ever-taking man as an 
enemy disguised as a friend. 
17. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding the big talker as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
(1) He discourses on the past; 
(2) He discourses on the future; 
(3) He takes up with useless people; 
(4) If present obligations should arise, he pleads 
misfortune. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for regarding the big talker as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
18. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding the flatterer as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
(1) He is familiar with evil; 
(2) He is unfamiliar with the good; 
(3) In one's presence he discusses one's beauty and 
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virtue; 
(4) Behind one's back he talks about one's faults. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for regarding the flatterer as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
19. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding the spendthrift as an enemy 
disguised as a friend. 
(1) He is a friend while you are carelessly 
ingesting liquor and intoxicants 
(2) He is a friend while you go about on the street 
at night; 
(3) He is a friend when you visit fairs; 
(4) He is a friend when you carelessly gamble. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for regarding the spendthrift as an enemy 
disguised as a friend." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
20. After the Well-farer, the Teacher had spoken 
thus, he continued: 
"The self-seeking friend, the big-mouth, 
The sycophant and the friend in wastage; 
These four are no friends at all. 
Having perceived this, may the wise man 
Avoid them like the plague." 
Four kinds of companion are here identified as false friends 
or, as it is phrased here, as "enemies disguised as 
friends". There is a certain correspondence between this 
list and the four "active defilements" listed in section 
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4.1. The ever-taking man corresponds to the defilement of 
taking what is not given. The big talker and the flatterer 
are both defiled by the defilement of false speech, if this 
is taken more broadly to include malicious speech, as 
discussed in section 4.2. As we shall see below, the 
spendthrift is more closely associated with the six causes 
of loss of wealth than with the four active defilements. 
Verses 16 to 19 give us more precise definitions of what 
these four false friends are. Let us examine these 
definitions and see whether any ethical prescriptions can be 
deduced from them, working from the assumption that whatever 
an "enemy disguised as a friend" does must be unpermitted 
behaviour. 
4.1.1 THE EVER-TAKING MAN 
The first defining characteristic of the ever-taking man 
(verse 16) is tautologous - he is merely identified as one 
who "is always taking". The second characteristic, that of 
desiring much for very little, follows from the first - the 
ever-taking man wishes to take things, not buy them. Thus, 
even if he does make some restitution, he would try to limit 
this as much as possible. What he is being accused of here 
is that he does not make fair restitution for services 
rendered. This is contrary, for instance, to the recommended 
relationship between the employer and employee (verse 32). 
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The third and fourth characteristics relate to the social 
structure and our relationship to it. The ever-taking man, 
it appears, only performs his duties under duress or if he 
can be persuaded that doing so will be to his advantage. It 
is not explained what these duties are - could they be the 
duties prescribed in the Hindu varuadharma (caste-based) 
and a~ramadharma (developmental) concepts (Crawford 1982: 
54-74) or is the term used more broadly? Perhaps we can look 
at the language used in this passage. The term used in the 
third characteristic of the ever-taking man is kicca, 
meaning "that which ought to be done, that which is to be 
performed duty, obligation, service, attention, 
ceremony, performance ... " (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 213). 
The common factor here would seem to be a sense of ethical 
requirement. In the fourth characteristic, the second term 
which is here translated as "duty" is "karaua", the 
primary meaning of which is "an act imposed or inflicted 
upon somebody by a higher authority", with possible 
subsidiary connotations of torture (Rhys Davids & Stede 
1986: 210). Thus, I would interpret the third and fourth 
defining characteristics of the ever-taking man as follows: 
when it is said that he performs his duty (kicca) out of 
fear, the intention is to refer to those obligations he has 
freely taken upon himself, such as obligations under a valid 
contract. The fear referred to would then be a fear of 
social opprobrium and ostracism. But the duties (karaua) 
mentioned in the fourth characteristic refers to the laws of 
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the land, or perhaps to entrenched customs. What the ever-
taking man is accused of here is twisting the law to his own 
benefit. This should not necessarily be seen as an 
injunction to obey the law under all circumstances. A 
Buddhist case could be made for civil disobedience, as was 
in fact done in Burma early in the twentieth century151 ; but 
in the case of the ever-taking man, the motivation behind 
his behaviour is self-interest only, rather than moral 
conviction. 
4.1.2. THE BIG TALKER 
Why the big talker (verse 17) should be censured for 
discussing the past and future is a little mystifying. 
Perhaps it is because he does not speak about the present; 
this would imply that the big talker avoids concentrating on 
important issues. Certainly, these definitions cannot be 
taken simplistically as injunctions against reminiscence or 
anticipation. The Buddha himself discoursed on the past -
what else are the Jatakas purported to be? The fact that 
such discourses are seen by us as mythical rather than 
historical is irrelevant. They were seen as historical data 
by the Buddha's audience, and thus constituted their past. 
The same is true of prophetical discourses which predict the 
coming of the future Buddha, Metteya (Skt. Maitreya), such 
151. Ling (1979b: 84). See also Amunugama (1991) for a discussion of 
Buddhist monks' involvement in recent uprisings in Sri Lanka. 
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as the Cakkavatti Sihananda Sutta152 , which tells a myth 
of the moral decline and revival of the human race. 
The definition of the big talker also picks up the theme of 
performing one's duties, already seen in the definition of 
the ever-taking man. Here, however, it is not so much a case 
of self-interest as of sloth, since the big talker does not 
try to bend his duties to his own advantage, but tries to 
evade them instead. 
4.1.3. THE FLATTERER 
Not much can be said about the contents of the fourfold 
definition of the flatterer (verse 18). The first two 
characteristics tell us that he is familiar with evil and 
unfamiliar with goodness. But such general remarks could 
with equal ease be made of the other kinds of false friends. 
The third property of the flatterer, that he· discusses one's 
beauty and virtue in one's presence, is true by definition, 
while the fourth makes it clear that his cardinal fault is 
engaging in malicious speech, which, as we discussed above, 
is an aspect of the "defilement of false speech", one of the 
defilements of action named in verse 3. 
Structurally, the four characteristics named in verse 18 are 
152. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 26, translation in Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids 
(1977: vol. III, pp.59-76). 
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arranged into two pairs of statements. Within each pair, the 
second strengthens the first by being its converse. For 
instance, the flatterer is not merely "familiar with evil''; 
he is also "unfamiliar with the good". The same kind of 
arrangement can be seen in verse 17, where the big talker is 
said to discourse on both the past and the future, but in 
this verse, the pattern is maintained throughout. 
~.1.4. THE SPENDTHRIFT 
Previous verses in this section have made more or less 
indirect allusions to the sections discussed in chapter 3, 
but in verse 19, the link is clear and explicit. The four 
kinds of behaviour which the spendthrift is said to indulge 
in are four of the six causes of loss of wealth named in 
verse 7. Furthermore, these four are mentioned in three of 
our Chinese manuscripts153 • Thus, there is a certain 
internal consistency to this part of the Suttanta, for it is 
logical that behaviour that causes a loss of wealth should 
be attributed to the spendthrift. 
4.1.5. THE VERSE SUMMARY 
The poem in verse 20 repeats the four types of false friends 
first mentioned in verse 15, and counsels Siftgala to avoid 
153. CI is a little more obscure than the others, but does include the 
descriptions of addiction to intoxicants and gambling. 
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these kinds of people. The last line, "avoid them like the 
plague" is a deliberate mistranslation: the original read 
"avoid them like a way of terror", clearly a Pali idiom 
meaning "avoid them as much as possible", which has here 
been rephrased into its English equivalent. 
To summarise this section, then, we can draw up a table of 
acts which are subject to disapproval, once the tautologous 
and repetitive elements have been removed. 
(1) Not making fair restitution for services rendered 
(3) Performing his personal obligations only out of fear 
(4) Twisting the law to one's own benefit. 
(4) Attempting to shun one's responsibilities. 
Table 4.1. Characteristics of the false friends that 
are unique to this section of the Suttanta. 
4.1.6. THE CHINESE VERSIONS 
Again, there are some differences between the Pali and the 
various Chinese versions of the Suttanta. The Chinese 
descriptions of the types of false friends can be summarised 
as follows: 
CI: Although CI does not classify the false friends in 
distinctly named groups as the Pali version does, it does 
contain three verses each naming four kinds of false 
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friends. These verses are interspersed between four other 
verses detailing the kinds of good friends. This unequal 
distribution leads me to believe that another verse about 
the false friends may have been lost. 
The first group: 
(1) One who inwardly has enmity and outwardly 
pretends to be a friend. 
(2) One who speaks good words in the presence of 
another and speaks ill of him behind his back. 
(3) One who, in bad times, shows sorrow in the 
presence of another and feels happy afterwards. 
(4) One who is very intimate outwardly and is 
plotting against [his friend] inwardly. 
The second group: 
(5) One who is difficult to be convinced by 
advice, in spite of the advice to improve, he 
follows evil friends. 
(6) One who, although he is advised not to 
associate with those who are addicted to drinks, 
yet he keeps company with them. 
(7) One who, although advised to guard himself, 
goes out, all the more, and gets [himself 
entangled] in many affairs. 
(8) One who, even though advised to be a friend of 
the noble ones, still becomes intimate with 
gamblers 
The third group: 
(9) One who gets highly provoked in slight 
contentions. 
(10) O~e who refuses to go, when called, in 
matters of urgency. 
(11) One who, seeing the other's hour of need 
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forsakes him. 
(12) One who, seeing others dying, callously runs 
away from them (Pannasiri 1950: 166-167). 
CI has no poem with which to conclude this section. 
CII: This document is structured like the Pali text, with 
the descriptions of false and good friends separated by a 
poetic section. It lists the following four types of false 
friends: 
_ ( 1) He who takes different things [from you]. 
( 2 ) He who flatters [you]. 
( 3 ) He who loves [you] only outwardly. 
(4) He who teaches [you] to do evils (Pannasiri 
1950: 178). 
The first type is the equivalent of the Pali "ever-taking 
man" and is described in similar terms. The flatterer in CII 
is equivalent to the Pali flatterer, as can be seen from 
the fact that the third and fourth characteristics in both 
texts are identical, but the Chinese text is more explicit 
than the Pali, since instead of the broad generalities in 
the Pali text, the first two properties in CII are "(l) One 
who lets out others' secrets; (2) one who hides his own 
secrets" (Pannasiri 1950: 179). The other two types of false 
friends are described as follows: 
The friend who has outward love should be known as 
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of four types. Which four? 
(1) One who speaks of other's shortcomings; 
(2) one who secretly finds out others' past and 
future; 
(3) one who undervalues the gifts given by his 
friends; 
(4) one who wishes others to have troubles 
The ill-advising friend should be known as of four 
types. Which four? 
(1) One who encourages the destruction of life; 
(2) One who encourages stealing of others' 
property; 
(3) One who encourages lustful pursuits; 
(4) one who encourages cheating and deceiving 
others (Pannasiri 1950: 179). 
The statement that the friend who has outward love "secretly 
finds out others' past and future" may clear up the problem 
of the big talker (verse 17) in the Pali text speaking of 
the past and future, mentioned above. If we use CII as a 
hermeneutical key to the Pali version, we can say that the 
big talker is censured for speaking about the past and 
future because he is using secretly obtained knowledge of 
other people's past experiences and future plans for the 
purpose of embarrassing or even blackmailing them. 
CII also differs from the Pali in that each of the false 
(as well as the true) friends is described in both prose and 
verse terms, the poem about each type of friend following 
each prose description, rather than describing all of them 
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at the end of the section. The same is true of CIII, which 
is very similar to CII in this section of the text, although 
its section on the ever-taking man seems to have been lost. 
CIV is closer to the Pali: although it names the first type 
of false friend as "One who, out of fear, is submissive" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 209), the descriptive paragraph makes it 
clear that the person described here is equivalent to the 
Pali ever-taking man. 
4.2. THE TRUE FRIENDS 
21. "Cattaro 'me gahapati-putta mitta suhada 
veditabba. Upakaro mitto suhado veditabbo: 
samana-sukha-dukkho mitto suhado veditabbo: atth-
akkhayI mitto suhado vedi-tabbo: anukampako mitto 
suhado veditabbo. 
22. catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi upakaro 
mitto suhado veditabbo. Pamatta~ rakkhati: 
pamattassa sapa-teyya~ rakkhati: bhitassa_ 
saraDa~ hoti: uppannesu kicca-karaDiyesu tad 
diguDa~ bhoga~ anuppadeti. Imehi kho gahapati-
putta catuhi thanehi upakaro mitto suhado 
veditabbo. 
23. catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi samana-
sukha-dukkho mitto suhado veditabbo. Guyham assa 
acikkhati: guyham assa pariguhati: apadasu na 
vijahati: jivitam pi 'ssa atthaya pariccatta~ 
hoti. Imehi kho gahapati-putta catuhi thanehi 
samana-sukha-dukkho mitto suhado veditabbo. 
24. catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi atth-
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akkhayi mitto suhado veditabbo. Papa nivareti: 
kalyaDe niveseti: assuta@ saveti: sagassa 
magga@ acikkhati. Imehi kho gahapati-putta catuhi 
thanehi atth-akkhayi mitto suhado veditabbo. 
25. Catuhi kho gahapati-putta thanehi anukampako 
mitto suhado veditabbo. Abhaven' assa na nandati: 
bhaven' assa nandati: avaDDa@ bhaoamana@ 
ni vareti: vaDDa@ bhaDamaria@ pasa@sati. Imehi 
kho gahapati- putta catuhi thanehi anukampako 
mitto suhado vedi- tabbo ti." 
Idam avoca Bhagava. 
26. Ida@ vatva Sugato, athapara@ etad avoca 
sattha: 
"Upakaro ca yo mitto, 
yo ca mitto sukhe dukhe, 
Atth-akkhayi ca _yo mitto, 
yo ca mittanukampako, 
Ete pi mitte cattaro, 
iti vififiaya paDQito 
Sakkacca@ payirupaseyya 
mata putta@ va orasa@. 
Paogito sila-sampanno 
jala@ aggiva bhasati. 
Bhoge sa@haramanassa 
bhamarass 'eva iriyato, 
Bhoga sannicaya@ yanti, 
vammiko v' upaciyati. 
Evam bhoge samahantva, 
alam-attho kule gihi. 
catudha vibhaje bhoge, 
save mittani ganthati, 
Ekena bhoge bhufijeyya, 
dvihi kamma~ payojaye, 
catutthafi ca nidhapeyya, 
apadasu bhavissatiti." 
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21. "Four indeed, o householder's son, are those to 
be known as true friends. 
(1) The helper is to be known as a true friend. 
(2) He who is constant in happiness and in adversity 
is to be known as a true friend. 
(3) He who speaks with one's welfare in mind is to 
be known as a true friend. 
(4) He who is compassionate is to be known as a true 
friend. 
22. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding the helper as a true friend. 
(1) He guards the unwary; 
(2) He guards the property of the unwary; 
(3) He gives refuge when you are in dire straits; 
(4) When troublesome matters arise, he presents 
twice as much [as you need]. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for regarding the helper as a true friend. 
23. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding he who is constant in 
happiness and in adversity as a true friend. 
He knows which hidden things to ( 1) divulge and 
which to (2) conceal; 
(3) He does not forsake you in times of trouble; 
(4) He will abandon the care of his own life. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for seeing he who is constant in happiness 
and in adversity as a true friend. 
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24. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding he who speaks with one's 
welfare in mind as a true friend. 
(1) He restrains you from evil; 
(2) He instructs you in goodness; 
( 3) He causes that which has not been heard to be 
heard; 
(4) He explains the way to the life hereafter. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for seeing he who speaks with one's welfare 
in mind as a true friend. 
25. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the 
reasons for regarding he who is compassionate as a 
true friend. 
(1) He does not rejoice in your adversity; 
(2) He rejoices in your prosperity; 
(3) He restrains [one] ~ho speaks ill [of you]; 
(4) He encourages [one] who speaks well [of you]. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four 
reasons for seeing he who is compassionate as a true 
friend." 
Thus spoke the Lord 
26. After the Well-farer, the Teacher had spoken 
thus, he continued: 
"The helping friend, 
The friend for better or worse 
The friend who says what one should hear 
And the compassionate friend; 
These four friends are to be known as such by the 
wise. 
He should honour and respect them 
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As a mother cares for her own child. 
The virtuous and wise man 
Speaks words like drops of fire. 
He gathers possessions just as the bee does. 
Riches continue accumulating like an anthill. 
Having thus accumulated riches, 
Householders can tend to their families. 
If these riches are divided into four 
He binds the friends to him. 
With one part of this wealth let him enjoy; 
With two may he do business 
And may he hoard the fourth 
That it may be there in misfortune." 
Although there are four kinds of true friends as there are 
four kinds of false, there is no formal correspondence 
between the two groups, in the sense that (1) in verse 21 is 
not the converse of (1) in verse 15 and so on. The only 
exception is (3), where "he who speaks with one's welfare in 
mind" could perhaps be seen as the converse of "the 
flatterer". I am inclined to see this as mere coincidence, 
since the other three types of true and false friend do not 
form this kind of relationship. The theme of ethical action 
in both speech and action recurs in that "he who speaks with 
one's welfare in mind" pertains to Right Speech, while the 
other kinds of good friend are more closely associated with 
Right Action. 
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4.2.1. THE HELPER 
Regarding verse 22, the properties of the helper are 
described in fairly materialist terms, which were no doubt 
appropriate to a discussion between the Buddha and the "son 
of a householder". The helper's guarding of the unwary and 
the unwary's property recalls verse 9, where three of the 
six "dangers of being about on the street at night" are that 
the nocturnal roamer's person, family and property are left 
unguarded. The family is not mentioned here, but after an 
explicit association between it and the two factors named 
here such as that in verse 9, we may safely assume that the 
Suttanta does intend this to be implicitly included. This 
theme will recur once more in verse 31. 
The statement that the helping friend gives refuge (or, more 
literally translated, is a refuge; "saranalJl hoti") could be 
construed as a reference to the wider Buddhist framework. 
"Going for refuge" is an important symbolic structure in 
Buddhism, since this formula describes the traditional way 
of joining the Buddhist tradition - one goes for refuge to 
the Triple Jewel (Tiratana) which is comprised of the 
Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha (Bodhi 1981: 1-45). In verse 35 we 
can see that Si~gala was aware of this custom, for he took 
the appropriate refuges without needing to be prompted. 
Thus, when the Suttanta says that the help~ng friend is a 
refuge, this implies that the Triple Jewel, as the ultimate 
176 
refuge, is the ultimate helping friend. Thus, this sentence 
may be a subtle way by which the Buddha is recommending his 
own teaching to singala. 
The statement that the helper supplies twice what he is 
asked for shows that such persons are not miserly. Both 
miserliness and stinginess are disapproved of in Buddhism, 
as is evidenced by this Suttanta, for while the spendthrift 
may be classified as a false friend, stinginess is warned 
against in verse 14 as well as in verse 22. This should not 
be seen as a contradiction, but rather as an example of the 
Buddhist Middle Way between extremes. 
4.2.2. HE WHO IS CONSTANT IN HAPPINESS AND IN ADVERSITY 
The first two properties of the friend who is constant in 
happiness and in adversity (verse 23) show this person's 
discretion in deciding whether secrets should be divulged or 
concealed. This kind of friend is aware of one's situation, 
and is tactful and considerate in his appraisal of the 
situation. This demonstrates once again the flexibility and 
scope for individual judgement built into Buddhist ethics. 
Furthermore, this friend is said to be so dedicated to one's 
welfare ("he does not forsake you in times of trouble") that 
he would even be prepared to sacrifice his own life. As we 
shall see, some of the Chinese manuscripts elaborate on 
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this, insisting that certain kinds of friend would sacrifice 
their lives, wealth and family. Although such emphasis on 
sacrificing oneself for the sake of others is not a central 
concern in Buddhist soteriology as it is in certain other 
religions154 , it is not entirely unknown. It can be seen, 
for instance, in the Jataka tale of the k~antivadin 
(teacher of patience) who did not give way to anger even 
when horribly mutilated by a king (in Tachibana 1975: 134-
135, Sangharakshita 1966: 480-481). But this should not be 
interpreted as a doctrine of vicarious redemption: the 
k~antivadin's sacrifice is a passive one in that he does 
not unleash the full force of his yogic powers against his 
persecutors, as a certain attendant of the king feared he 
might do (Tachibana 1975: 135), but remains patient and 
equanimous. 
I would speculate that this verse is structured around its 
reference to happiness and adversity. The first two 
characteristics, which should really be seen as a unit, are 
concerned with Si~gala's needs when in a state of 
happiness. In such conditions, the friend would know when to 
bother him with news and when not. In times of adversity, on 
the other hand, would bring into play the third and fourth 
characteristics, which also form a kind of unit, though a 
less cohesive one than the first two. 
154. Even the Mahayana understanding of the Bodhisattva should rather 
be seen as a self-perfection for other's sake. 
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4.2.3. HE WHO SPEAKS WITH ONE'S WELFARE IN MIND 
The first two characteristics of the friend "who speaks with 
one's welfare in mind" (verse 24) are that he restrains one 
from evil and instructs one in goodness. In itself, this 
does not tell us much, but the next line informs us that "he 
causes that which has not been heard to be heard". One must 
presume, given the general tenor of this text, that this 
would refer not to idle gossip, but to explanations of 
dhamma such as this suttanta itself. Couple this with the 
fourth property of this kind of friend, that he "explains 
the way to the life hereafter" and we see that the Buddha 
fits this definition perfectly. In pronouncing the 
Si~galovada Suttanta, he is causing that which has not 
been heard to be heard, and in doing so he is explaining the 
way to the life hereafter155 • 
This reinforces the notion, first mooted above in connection 
with the discussion of the helping friend, that the Buddha's 
discussion with Sihgala might not be quite as neutral and 
dispassionate as it appears at first glance; in fact, it 
appears as if the Buddha is here subtly promoting his own 
teaching and leadership. This leads to the entire area of 
missiological theory and praxis in Buddhism, beyond the 
155. Rather than the way to nirvana (cf. verse 3). 
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scope of this dissertation, but an enormous and potentially 
rich area of research in its own right. 
4.2.4. HE WHO IS COMPASSIONATE 
The qualities of the compassionate friend (verse 25) do not 
add much information to our know~edge of friendship in early 
Buddhism. Structurally, we are reminded of verse 18, where 
the flatterer was described in two pairs of statements in 
which the second member of each pair strengthened the first: 
(1) He is familiar with evil; 
(2) He is unfamiliar with the good; 
(3) In one's presence he discusses one's beauty 
and virtue; 
(4) Behind one's back he talks about one's faults. 
A similar structure can be found here, where the second 
statement in each pair is the converse of the first, and 
thereby strengthens the general impression of this kind of 
friend presented by the first statement. Thus, the 
compassionate friend does not rejoice in ones adversity and 
rejoices in one's prosperity, restrains those who speak ill 
of one and encourages those who speak well of one. 
Nevertheless, I would hesitate to postulate the 
compassionate friend as the direct positive counterpart of 
the flatterer. There is no immediately-apparent structure of 
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binary oppositions between any of the other six false and 
true types of friends. Also, while there seems to be a 
relationship between properties (3) and (4) of the two types 
of friend, in that the compassionate friend would tend to 
reproach or encourage the flatterer's habits mentioned in 
these points, the relation between the first two 
characteristics of the compassionate friend and the 
flatterer is less clear-cut. 
4.2.5 THE VERSE SUMMARY 
Verse 26 consists of a poem, the first stanza of which 
recapitulates the material presented in verses 21 to 25. The 
four kinds of true friend are named once again, and it is 
stated that the wise person should recognise them to be true 
friends, and cherish such friends "as a mother cares for her 
own son", a stock expression for loving care in the Suttas 
(Horner 1975b: 13). 
The second stanza has no direct relationship to what came 
before it. It describes the good effects of being a 
"virtuous and wise" person. His speech is effective, unlike 
the speech of the gambler in verse 11; he "speaks words like 
drops of fire". Here, my translation differs from both 
Walshe (1987: 466) and Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids (1977: 
179), both of which translations use the Commentary to 
translate "jala:ip aggi" as "a beacon-fire" and "a fire ... 
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[on the hill]". Both then use the verb "he shines", or "he 
blazes", which indeed is one of the meanings of bhasati. I, 
on the other hand, prefer to translate bhasati in the more 
common form "he speaks" (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 503), 
ignore the connection to jalati ("to glow" - Rhys Davids & 
Stede 1986: 280) and translate "jala" as "water" (Rhys 
Davids & Stede 1986: 279). Furthermore, since jala is 
etymologically connected to gala (drop) (Rhys Davids & Stede 
1986: 279), my translation of this section is that the wise 
and virtuous person "speaks words like drops of fire". 
The significance of this lies in the previously-established 
fact that Si~gala's early-morning ritual involved 
immersion in or self-libation with water150 • This stanza 
could then be regarded as a subtle reproach to Si~gala 
who, it will be remembered, was "dripping wet". It is an 
example of the redefinition of the ritual which typifies 
this Suttanta. What the Buddha is saying here is that virtue 
lies not in the drops of water which fell from Si~gala's 
body during and after the ritual, but in the "drops" of wise 
words which issue from the virtuous person's mouth. The 
"fire" aspect would then be a mere hyperbolic strengthening 
of the basic metaphor, not the central concern as it is in 
the two translations mentioned above. If this interpretation 
is acceptable, it is yet another example of the 
156. See the discussion of verses 1 to 3 in chapter 2. 
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hermeneutical approach of the Suttanta, which here as ever 
attempts to promulgate its ethical truths in a form that 
would be both familiar and acceptable to the listener. 
Apart from this emphasis on the veracity and power of the 
sage's words, it is stated that such persons tend to 
accumulate riches as quickly and easily as the bee or the 
ant. This, it is said, makes it possible for householders to 
support their families. 
In the third stanza, some economic advice is offered. 
Si~gala is advised to divide his wealth into four parts, 
as this "binds the friends to him11157 • Who these friends are 
is obscure: it may be a stock expression for "this will be 
to your advantage", which is how Walshe (1987: 466) 
interprets it150 • Alternatively, it may refer to the true 
friends described above, although the logical connection is 
obscure. 
It is then stated that one part should be used for personal 
enjoyment, two should be reinvested into the business, and 
157. Sace mittani ganthati - the alternative reading sace is used 
instead of the standard save; see PTS 1976: vol. III p. 188 n. 8. 
158. Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids (1977: vol. III, p. 180. n.2) mentions 
that mittani is explained by the commentary as equivalent to mitte, 
"friends". 
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the last quarter should be set aside for emergencies159 • 
Again, we can see how the Buddha's message is tailored to 
the audience he addresses - this advice is clearly aimed at 
a member of an entrepreneurial class, that is, a gahapati. 
It is interesting to note that there is no mention here of 
the proportion of one's income to be spent on d~na to the 
monks and other religious wanderers, recluses, etc. 
Evidently, this was meant to be a matter of conscience,. not 
prescription. 
4.2.6. THE CHINESE TEXTS 
Structurally, the discussions of the types of true friends 
in the four Chinese manuscripts mirror the respective 
sections on false friends, as discussed above. CI lists 
sixteen kinds of true friends in four verses: 
The first group: 
(1) One who is outwardly inimical [but] has 
friendly thoughts inwards. 
(2) One who admonishes in front of you but outside 
speaks good of you to others. 
(3) One who is anxious about you in your sickness 
159. Buddhist economics is a vast field in its own right, on which much 
could be said. For some preliminary information, one could look at De 
Silva (1988b), Alexandrin (1988) and Pfanner & Ingersoll (1962), or to 
my own essay on Buddhism and unemployment (Clasquin 1992a). I have 
encountered no Buddhist economic thinking explicitly based on this 
passage in the Siiigalovada Suttanta. 
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or in your difficulties with the kings officials 
and settles the matter. 
(4) One who sees you in poverty and does not 
abandon you but seeks ways of making you rich. 
The second group: 
(5) One who, seeing others in poverty, leads them 
to earn a living. 
(6) One who restrains [you] from disputations with 
others. 
(7) One who daily goes and enquires about his 
friends. 
(8) One who always thinks of others with concern. 
The third group: 
(9) One who brings back and conceals his friend 
when he is arrested by officials, and afterwards 
settles the matter. 
(10) One who brings home and looks after the 
friend when he is sick. 
(11) One who will look after the friend's funeral 
affairs after his death. 
(12) One who, after his friend's death, will take 
care of the deceased's family. 
The fourth group: 
(13) One who will stop [his friends] from 
quarreling. 
(14) One who will stop [his friend] who longs to 
have evil company, by giving advice 
(15) One who will induce [his friend] to earn his 
living when he does not wish to do it. 
(16) One who induces [his friend] to have faith in 
the Dharma, when he is not inclined towards it 
(Pannasiri 1950: 166-167). 
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Some of the characteristics of true friends mentioned.here 
(e.g. numbers 1 and 2) are direct opposites of some of the 
characteristics of false friends mentioned in CI, as 
discussed above. Compared to the Pali version, the first 
group of CI can be seen as the equivalent of the "helper" 
and the second of the friend "who is constant in happiness 
and in adversity", since there is a certain similarity 
between the defining items. The third and fourth group, 
however, do not correspond to anything in the Pali text. 
Despite this, we can see the third and fourth kinds of 
friend in CI as integral parts of the text, for in a sense 
they expand on the definitions of the helper and the 
constant friend, respectively. 
CII names the same four types of true friends as the Pali, 
though in a different order, and defines them as follows: 
(1) The friend who is the same with you-in 
happiness and adversity: 
(1.1) Giving to the friend precious things 
(1.2) Giving to his friends the same facilities as 
to his wife and children. 
(1.3) Giving to the friend what is in the 
possession of his family. 
(1.4) Speaking sincere and genuine words. 
(2) The friend who shares his benefits with 
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others160 • 
(3) The friend who is a helpmate: 
(3.1) Acting in the interest of his friend. 
(3.2) Giving strength to the friend. 
(3.3) Restraining the friend when he is relaxed161 
(3.4) Giving the friend all nourishment. 
(4) The friend who sympathises: 
(4.1) Giving encouragement to be firmly 
established in faith. 
(4.2) Teaching the friend what is righteousness. 
(4.3) Teaching the friend what is learning. 
(4.4) Teaching the friend what is alms-giving. 
(Pannasiri 1950: 180-182) 
We can see, therefore, that the friends in this section are 
defined in more practical terms than in the Pali. The 
sympathetic or compassionate friend, for instance, is 
defined in terms of teaching one about virtues such as 
righteousness, learning and alms-giving, as well as 
encouraging piety. Compare this to the Pali, where it is 
simply said that such a friend sorrows in one's adversity 
and rejoices in one's prosperity, and reacts selectively to 
the way other people speak of one. Clearly, the Chinese text 
160. Defined identically to the Pali "he who speaks with one's welfare 
in mind". 
161. The meaning of this is obscure, but it recurs in· CII, verse 25, the 
equivalent of the Pali verse 31. Perhaps for "relaxed" we should read 
"not vigilant", or "unwary" as in this translation from the Pali. 
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gives the reader a more precise list of things to look out 
for in one's friends. 
In CIII, the four types of true friend are the friend who is 
the same in happiness and in adversity, the sympathiser, the 
helper and the benefactor. 
(1) The friend who is the same in happiness and in 
adversity: 
(1.1) Sacrificing himself for the sake of a 
friend162 • 
(1.2) Sacrificing his wealth for the sake of a 
friend. 
(1.3) Sacrificing his wife and children for the 
sake of a friend. 
(1.4) Patiently bearing163 whatever is said. 
(2) The sympathiser: 
(2.1) He teaches you the Good Law. 
(2.2) He restrains you from evil. 
(2.3) He admonishes you to the face. 
(2.4) He is checking your enemies. 
(3) The helper: 
(3.1) He reveals all his secret matters to you. 
(3.2) He will hide your secrets from others. 
162. This is similar to the fourth property of the Pali version of this 
kind of true friend, but the principle is extended further in the next 
two points of CIII. 
163. While Pannasiri's text clearly says "bearing" at this point, one 
might ask whether "hearing" might not make more sense, and, therefore, 
whether a typographical error might have occurred here. 
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(3.3) He will be delighted to see you getting any 
benefits. 
(3.4) He will not be worried for not getting those 
benefits [for himself] 
(4) The benefactor: 
(4.1) He understands that your wealth is 
exhausted. 
(4.2) Knowing that your wealth is already 
exhausted, he supplies you with it. 
(4.3) When he sees you slack he would advise you. 
(4.4) Always he harbours sympathetic feelings for 
you. (Pannasiri 1950: 196-197) 
Here too, the defining characteristics of friends are very 
practically phrased. The "benefactor" can be seen as an 
amplification of the fourth characteristic of the "helper" 
in the Pali text, where it is said that "when troublesome 
matters arise, he presents twice as much [as you need]" and 
could be used as a hermeneutical key to the further 
understanding of the Pali helper. 
CIV lists the following types and characteristics of true 
friends: 
(1) One who stops [others] from doing evils: 
(1.1) Whenever he sees the other committing any 
evil, he would restrain him. 
(1.2) He would lead people to justice. 
(1.3) He is full of mercy and has an everloving 
and sympathetic mind. 
(1.4) He shows others the way to heaven. 
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(2) The sympathiser: 
(2.1) He is happy at his friend's benefits. 
(2.2) He is unhappy when his friend is in 
adversity. 
(2.3) He is unhappy when his friend is amidst 
worries. 
(2.4) He would praise the merits of the friend. 
(3) The benefactor: 
(3.1) He ... protects you by not allowing wrongful 
indulgences. 
(3.2) He protects you from indulging in what 
may make you lose wealth. 
(3.3) He protects the friend and makes him 
fearless. 
(3.4) He ... constantly and repeatedly gives you 
good instruction. 
(4) One who cooperates with others: 
(4.1) He ... would save his friend regardless of 
his own life. 
(4.2) He would sacrifice his wealth and 
property for his friend. 
(4.3) He would save his friend from fears. 
(4.4) He would have mutual and good counsel. 
(Pannasiri 1950: 210-211) 
While the "sympathiser" in this text is quite close to the 
"compassionate" friend in the Pali text, the other types of 
friends do not correspond directly. Nevertheless, the kinds 
of sentiment expressed here do not quite contradict anything 
said in the Pali text or the other three Chinese versions. 
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CI has no verse section to conclude this section. CII once 
again describes each type of friend in a separate verse, but 
also contains the equivalent of the Pali poem in its 
equivalent of verse 34 in the Pali text. The same is true 
of CIII. The poem in CIV describes the true friends once 
again, but offers no advice on dividing one's wealth into 
four parts - it too saves this information for the very last 
poem in the Suttanta. 
What, then, can we make of the divergences between the Pali 
and the four Chinese texts? The similarities and differences 
between the lists of false friends in the five manuscripts 
of the Si~galovada Suttanta have of necessity been only 
described in the broadest of terms here, but despite this, 
we can make the statement that the various types of false 
and true friends are compatible in the sense that all the 
descriptions, though not always reflecting the same 
ordering, do describe the same type of person. 
In some cases, characteristics ascribed by one manuscript to 
one kind of true friend is ascribed to another kind by a 
different manuscript, while in other cases, a principle put 
forward in one version is elaborated upon in another, but 
the overall feel is that the five manuscripts are 
nonetheless valid versions of a single text: it is not as if 
any characteristic of a false friend flatly contradicts any 
characteristic in another version. Perhaps we should look 
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beyond the precise types delineated in this section of the 
Suttanta and take an overall view of the characteristics of 
people who should or should not be regarded as one's friend. 
As intimated in chapter 1, while I shall make the occasional 
suggestion to the possible development of the Suttanta, it 
is not my intention in this dissertation to reconstruct an 
Urtext; that would call for far greater linguistic analysis 
and attention to detail than is possible here. Even less do 
I intend to prove the Pali version's status as being that 
of the Urtext. 
What I am prepared to say is that the Pali version's 
account of the false and true friends seems more consistent 
than the Chinese versions' in several respects, in that its 
description of these types of persons is more fully 
consonant with the appellations by which it names them. 
Thus, the "big talker" is described mainly in vocal terms, 
and so on. This is not always true of the Chinese versions. 
Compare the sympathiser in CIV, where all of this person's 
attributes are described in terms of sympathy and 
compassion, for instance, with the sympathiser in CII, where 
the description consists of more practical actions. While 
the Pali version is not entirely free from such defects, it 
seems to be the most internally coherent of our manuscripts; 
as a result, I would suggest that this is the most suitable 
text to use when in need of advice on the choosing of 
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friends. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
To summarise this section, it presents us with four kinds of 
false and four kinds of true friends, all of which are 
identified by the way in which they interact with us. Of all 
the sections of the Si~galovada suttanta examined thus 
far, this section has the least connection to fundamental 
Buddhist philosophical themes such as impermanence, 
insubstantiality and organic interrelatedness. There is a 
link to the theme of skilful means, however, in that we can 
see the Buddha using specific Buddhist codes like the term 
saraQa (refuge) which would indicate a subtle attempt to 
influence Si~gala to an acceptance of the Buddhist 
religion. Alternatively, it may reflect subsequent editorial 
work by Buddhist monks. 
Of this part of the text, one may or may not agree with 
Richard Gombrich (1978: 110) when he writes that"··· though 
(this advice) is extremely sound, it may strike us as 
slightly priggish" But as De Silva (1988b: 46) has put it; 
"One has to remember that even a piece of sandalwood if kept 
in close contact with rotten fish, would start smelling of 
fish". Thus, the judicious choice of one's friends is a 
matter of the greatest importance, and we might do well to 
heed the Buddha's admonishments on the matter. 
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Besides choosing friends, this section also teaches us how 
to be good friends. It teaches us exactly what kind of 
behaviour is and is not conducive to the maintenance of good 
friendships. It is then incumbent upon each of us to examine 
our own behaviour. Are we always taking, or big talkers, and 
so on? Or are we helping and compassionate friends? This may 
yet be the most vital message which the Buddha has for us in 
this part of the Suttanta. 
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CHAPTER 5 
WORSHIPPING THE DIRECTIONS - A NEW INTERPRETATION. 
The next part of the si~galovada suttanta returns to the 
question with which it started; how is one to worship the 
six directions as directed by Sil'lgala's father? The answer 
is that these injunctions are not to be taken literally, as 
Singala had been doing, at all. Instead, the six 
directions must be understood as signifying specific classes 
of people with whom Singala had relationships. I stress 
"Singala" here, for it is clear that the six classes were 
not intended to be abstract, universal social groups, but 
were rather a highly contextualised division of humanity 
which focused on the relationships of young men in Indian 
society and Singala in particular. Consider, for instance, 
how the western direction is pronounced to represent the 
wife, not some neutral term like "the spouse0 • Nor is this 
due to the Si~galovada Suttanta being the product of an 
era before inclusive language, for the different duties 
assigned to husband and wife clearly show that the Buddha 
had Singala in mind when he discussed this relationship. 
This contextualised nature of the Si~galovada suttanta 
naturally limits the extent to which we can generalise its 
contents to our own situation, a hermeneutical question to 
which we shall return in the conclusion to this 
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dissertation. Nevertheless, the range of relationships 
discussed is wide, and all of them are still relevant today. 
27. "Kathafi ca gahapati-putta ariya-savako 
chaddisa paticchadi hoti? Cha-y-ima gahapati-
putta disa vedi-tabba. Puratthima disa mata-
pitaro veditabba. Dak-khioa disa acariya 
veditabba. Pacchima disa putta-dara veditabba. 
uttara disa mittamacca veditabba. Hetthima 
disa dasa-kammakara porisa veditabba. Uparima 
disa samaoa-Brahmana veditabba. 
28. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi puttena 
puratthima disa mata-pitaro 
paccupatthatabba. "Bhato nesa• bharissami, 
kicca• nesa~ karissami, kula-va•sa~ 
thapessami, dayajjam patipajjami, atha ca pana 
petana• kalakatana• dakkhioa•, 
anuppadassamiti". Imehi kho gaha- pati-putta 
paficahi thanehi puttena puratthima disa mata-
pi taro paccupatthita paficahi thanehi putta• 
anukampanti. Papa nivarenti, kalyaoe nivesenti, 
sippa• sikkhapenti, patirupena darena 
sa.yojenti, samaye dayajja~ niyyadenti. Imehi 
kho gahapati-putta paficahi thanehi puttena 
puratthima disa mata-pitaro paccupatthita 
imehi paficahi thanehi disa mata-pitaro 
paccupatthita imehi paficahi thanehi putta• 
anukampati. Evam assa esa puratthima disa 
paticchanna hoti khema appatibhaya. 
29. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi 
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antevasina dakkhioa disa acariya 
paccupatthatabba: utthanena, upatthanena, 
sussusaya, paricariyaya, sakkaca~ sippa-
patigga-haoena. Imehi kho gahapati-putta paficahi 
thanehi antevasina dakkhioa disa acariya 
paccupatthita paficahi thanehi antevasi~ 
anukampanti. Suvinita~ vinenti, suggahita~ 
gahapenti, sabba-sippa-suta~ samakkhayino 
bhavanti, mittamaccesu parivedenti, disasu 
parittana~ karonti. Imehi kho gahapati-putta 
paficahi thanehi antevasina dakkhioa disa 
acariya paccupatthita imehi paficahi thanehi 
antevasi~ anukampanti. Evam assa esa dakkhioa 
disa paticchanna hoti khem~ appatibhaya. 
30. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi samikena 
pacchima disa bhariya paccupatthatabba: 
sammananaya, avimananaya, anaticariyaya, 
issariya-vossaggena, ala~karanuppadanena. Imehi 
kho gahapati-putta paficahi thanehi samikena 
pacchima disa bhariya paccupatthita paficahi 
thanehi samika~ anukampati. susa~vihita-
kammanta ca hoti, susa~gahita-parijana ca, 
anaticarini ca, sambhata~ anurakkhati, dakkha ca 
hoti analasa sabbakiccesu. Imehi kho gahapati-putta 
paficahi thanehi samikena pacchima disa bhariya 
paccupatthita imehi paficahi thanehi samika~ 
anukampati. Evam assa esa pacchima disa 
paticchanna hoti khema appatibhaya. 
31. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi kula-
puttena uttara disa mittamacca 
paccupatthatabba: danena, peyyavayyena, attha-
cariyaya, samanattataya, avisa~vadanataya. 
Imehi kho gahapati-putta paficahi thanehi kula-
puttena uttara disa mittamacca paccupatthita 
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paficahi thanehi kula-putta~ anukampanti. 
Pamatta~ rakkhanti, pamatassa sapateyya~ 
rakkhanti, bhitassa saraoa~ honti, apadasu na 
vijjahanti, apara-paja~ ca pi 'ssa patipujenti. 
Imehi kho gahapati-putta pancahi thanehi kula-
puttena uttara disa mittamacca paccupatthita 
imehi pancahi thanehi kula-putta~ anukampanti. 
Evam assa esa uttara disa paticchanna hoti 
khema appatibhaya. 
32. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi ayirakena 
hetthima disa dasa-kammakara 
paccupatthatabba: yathabala~ kammanta-
sa~vidhhanena, bhatta-vettananuppadanena 
gilanupatthanena, acchariyana~ rasana~ 
samvi-bhagena, samaye vossagena. Imehi kho 
gahapati-putta pancahi thanehi ayirakena 
hetthima disa dasa-kammakara paccupatthita 
pancahi thanehi ayiraka~ anukampanti. 
Pubbutthayino ca honti, paccha-nipatino ca, 
dinna-dayino ca, sukata-kamma-karaka, kitti-
vaooa-hara ca. Imehi kho gahapati-putta pancahi 
thanehi ayirakena hetthima disa dasa-
kammakara paccupatthita imehi paficahi thanehi 
ayiraka~ anukampanti. Evam assa esa hetthima 
disa paticchanna hoti khema appatibhaya. 
33. Paficahi kho gahapati-putta thanehi kula-
puttena uparima disa Samaoa-Brahmaoa 
paccupatthatabba: mettena kaya-kammena, mettena 
vaci-kammena, mettena mano-kammena, anavata-
dvarataya amisanuppadanena. Imehi kho gahapati-
putta pancahi thanehi kula-puttena uparima disa 
Samaoa-Brahmaoa paccupatthita chahi thanehi 
kula-putta~ anukampanti. Papa nivarenti, 
kalyaoe nivesenti, kalyaoa-manasa anukampanti, 
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assuta~ saventi, suta~ pariyodapenti, sagassa 
maggam acikkhanti. Imehi kho gahapati-putta paficahi 
thanehi kula-puttena uparima disa SamaDa-
BrahmaDa paccupatthita imehi chahi thanehi 
kula-putta~ anukampanti. Evam assa esa uparima 
disa paticchanna hoti khema appatibhaya ti." 
• Idam avoca Bhagava. 
27. "And what, o householder's son, is the noble 
disciple's protection of the six directions? O 
householder's son, the six directions should be 
known as [signifying] these six. 
(1) The eastern direction is to be seen a~ the 
mother and father. 
(2) The southern direction is to be seen as [one's] 
teachers. 
(3) The western direction is to be seen as the wife. 
(4) The northern direction is to be seen as [one's] 
friends and companions. 
(5) The lower direction is to be seen as the slaves 
and servants. 
(6)The upper direction is to be seen as the recluses 
and priests. 
28. o householder's son, the mother and father, as 
the eastern direction, are to be tended by the child 
in five ways: 
(1) [He thinks:]'I, once supported, shall support 
[them]; 
(2) 'I shall fulfil my duty towards them'; 
(3) 'I shall maintain the family lineage'; 
(4) 'I shall regulate my inheritance wisely'; 
(5) 'Then, later, I shall give offerings to 
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propitiate their spirits'. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do the 
mother and father, as the eastern direction, having 
been tended by the child in five ways, respond in 
sympathy: 
( 1) They restrain him from evil; 
(2) They establish him in goodness; 
( 3 ) They instruct him in a branch of knowledge; 
(4) They provide him with a suitable wife; 
(5) And in due course they present hi Ill with his 
inheritance. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways 
in which the mother and father, having been tended 
as the eastern direction by the child in five ways, 
respond in sympathy. Thus is the eastern direction 
dealt with, rendering it tranquil and free from 
fear. 
29. O householder's son,teachers as the southern 
direction, are to be tended by the pupil in five 
ways: 
( 1) By rising [out of respect]; 
( 2 ) By attending to them; 
( 3 ) By being eager to learn; 
( 4) By waiting on them; 
(5) by receiving as much as possible of their 
knowledge. 
And in these 
teachers , as 
five ways, o householder's son, do 
the southern direction having been 
tended by the pupi 1 in five ways, respond in 
sympathy: 
(1) They teach their specialty; 
(2) They cause [the pupil] to grasp what they 
themselves thoroughly understand; 
(3) They teach all their knowledge; 
( 4) They make the pupil known among their friends 
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and colleagues; 
( 5) And they make al 1 [their pupil's] directions 
safe. 
These indeed, o householder's 
in which teachers, having 
southern direction by the 
son, are the five ways 
be en tended as the 
pupil in five ways, 
respond in sympathy. Thus is the southern direction 
dealt with, rendering it tranquil and free from 
fear. 
30. O householder's son, the wife as the western 
direction, is to be tended by the husband in five 
ways: 
(1) With honour; 
(2) Without disrespect; 
(3) With faithfulness; 
(4) By relinquishing authority; 
(5) And by presenting her with ornaments. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, does 
the wife, as the western 
tended by the husband in 
sympathy: 
(1) She does her work well; 
(2) She accepts his retinue; 
( 3 ) She is faithful to him; 
direction, having be en 
five ways, respond in 
(4) She guards the provisions; 
(5) And she is skilful and diligent in her duties. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways 
in which the wife, having been tended as the western 
direction by the husband in five ways, respond in 
sympathy. Thus is the western direction dealt with, 
rendering it tranquil and free from fear. 
31. o householder's son, friends and companions, as 
the northern direction, are to be tended by the son 
of a good family in five ways: 
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( 1) By generosity; 
( 2 ) By kind speech; 
( 3 ) By guarding their welfare; 
( 4) By impartiality; 
(5) By honesty. 
And in these five ways, 0 householder's son, do 
friends and companions, as the northern direction, 
having been tended by the son of a good family in 
five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They guard the unwary; 
(2) They guard the property of the unwary; 
( 3) They give refuge to those who are in dire 
straits; 
(4) They do not forsake you in times of trouble; 
(5) And they honour your progeny. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways 
in which friends and companions, having been tended 
as the northern direction by the son of a good 
family in five ways, respond in sympathy. Thus is 
the northern direction dealt with, rendering it 
tranquil and free from fear. 
32. o householder's son, slaves and servants, as the 
lower direction, are to be tended by the gentleman 
in five ways: 
(1) By scheduling the work according to each one's 
ability; 
(2) By not making them work for food alone; 
( 3 ) By nursing them when they fall ill; 
( 4) By giving them tasty foodstuffs; 
(5) And by relinquishing them at the right time. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do 
slaves and servants, as the lower direction, having 
been tended by the gentleman in five ways, respond 
in sympathy: 
(1) They rise earlier; 
(2) They lie down later; 
(3) They give alms; 
202 
(4) They perform good deeds; 
(5) And they earn a good reputation. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways 
in which slaves and servants, having been tended as 
the lower direction by the gentleman in five ways, 
respond in sympathy. Thus is the lower direction 
dealt with, rendering it tranquil and free from 
fear. 
33. O householder's son, recluses and brahmins as 
the upper direction, are to be tended by the son of 
a good family in five ways: 
(1) With friendliness in physical acts; 
(2) With friendliness in vocal acts; 
(3) With friendliness in mental acts; 
(4) By not closing the door against them; 
(5) And by giving them food. 
And in these six ways, o householder's son, do the 
recluses and brahmins, as the upper direction, 
having been tended by the son of a good family in 
five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They restrain him from evil; 
(2) They establish him in goodness; 
(3) They respond with good thoughts; 
(4) They cause that which has not been heard to be 
heard; 
(5) They explicate that which has been heard; 
(6) And they explain the way to the life hereafter. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six ways 
in which recluses and brahmins, having been tended 
as the upper direction by the son of a good family 
in five ways, respond in sympathy. Thus is the upper 
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direction dealt with, rendering it tranquil and free 
from fear." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
5.1. THE SIX DIRECTIONS AND ETHICAL EXPRESSION 
In these verses, the ritual described in chapter 2 is 
entirely transformed, ethicised and placed in an ethical 
framework - there is no evidence that any physical ritual 
was still prescribed for si~gala to perform, contrary to 
Jones's assertion that 
When the man turns East, he is to think of his 
parents ... In this way, a ritual which could be 
performed mechanically is transformed into a 
device for recalling and revering all the people 
whose lives impinge most closely on that of the 
performer of the ritual. (J. G. Jones 1979) 
It is not impossible that some form of physical ritual might 
have been retained, or developed later, that might have 
served to reinforce the Siftgalovada Suttanta's message, 
but there is no evidence of it within the text itself. 
Moreover, the people who are set up as being symbolised by 
the six directions are "revered" neither by means of ritual 
nor in some abstract sense, but by the performance of 
specific acts which are described explicitly in this part of 
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the si~galovada suttanta. 
In verse 27, the basic scheme of the new interpretation of 
the six directions-worshipping ritual is set out. Combining 
this information with that presented in table 2.2 in chapter 
2 yields the following table:. 
East -- Parents (mata-pitaro) ------------------ Agni 
South - Teachers (acariya) --------------------- Indra 
West -- Wife (putta-dara) ---------------------- varuna 
North - Friends and companiou~ (mittamacca) ---- Soma 
Below - Slaves and servants (dasa-ka:mmakara) --- Vi~nu 
Above - Recluses and priests (SamaQa-BrahmaQa) -----
B~haspati 
Table 5.1. The Buddhistically reinterpreted directions. 
Clearly, there are no linguistic links between the 
divinities which were worshipped and the ethical 
relationships that were to replace them, except perhaps in 
the case of the sixth direction, where a certain phonetic 
similarity between Brahmaua and B~haspati does exist. It 
is tempting to posit more allegorical links between the 
Brahmanic deities and the Buddhistically reinterpreted 
directions - for instance, is the North to be considered as 
representing one's friends because of the conviviality 
suggested by Soma, the god of intoxicants? - but this, I 
believe, would be more suited to an esoteric interpretation 
beyond the bounds of academic discourse. we would be better 
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off by taking the Suttanta at face value and understand it 
as a complete recasting of the Brahmanic ritual into ethical 
terms, without seeking "hidden" connections. 
The new meanings of the six "directions" appear to display a 
clearly structured arrangement; they can be divided into a 
pair of triplets. The first of these is the parents-
teachers-wife triad - it represents the most important 
relationships a person went through while passing from birth 
through the first few of the stages of life in what would 
later in Hinduism be formalised as the ~ramadharma, a 
developmental theory and practice in which a young boy would 
pass from his parents' household into that of a teacher (the 
brahmacarya stage), and would afterwards (in the garhastya 
stage) take a wife and set up a household of his own 
{Crawford 1982: 61-70). Thus, this group of relationships is 
diachronic in nature; they trace a person's passage through 
time. It is also significant that the final two stages 
(vanaprasthya and sa:dmyasa) are not represented here; 
these stages involve a progressive withdrawal from worldly 
affairs, which is expressed in Buddhism by joining the 
monastic order, and the Buddhist equivalent of the ethical 
expression of these stages would be the Vinaya literature. 
Note that this sequence, following Siftgala's original 
ritual, starts with the east, symbolic of the rising sun and 
therefore of new life. The ritual then moves to the south, 
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which for a person facing the east would entail a turning to 
the right, and the resulting clockwise motion proceeds to 
the west, the direction of the setting sun which symbolises 
the end of life. It is interesting to note in this 
connection Hertz's (1960: 89 ff.) contention that a 
preferment of the right hand over the left is universal 
across cultures. Structuralistically speaking, one might say 
that east and west are here symbolically mediated by the 
south, in that the brahm.acarya stage is a stage between two 
households, first that of the parents, then the 
householder's own164 • 
The second triad of relationships concerns one's friends and 
companions, slaves and servants, and the recluses and 
priests. This group is synchronic in nature, but shows a 
certain progression nonetheless. In this case, we observe an 
increase in formality. We could expect Singala to be quite 
intimate with his personal friends, less so with his 
servants, and to interact very formally with priests and 
religious wanderers, whom, as we know from the canonical 
literature, he would probably have addressed as bhante 
(revered sir), just as Singala addresses the Buddha in 
verse 2. Thus, this group traces a persons' relationships 
from the least formal to the most, or to put it differently, 
from the most intimate to the least. 
164. This would differ from the mediation of east and west by the north 
in the ritual analysed by Penner (1975:61). 
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---------------------------------------------------------
l Parents (young child) l Friends (least formal) l Teacher (adolescent) Servants (businesslike) Wife (adult) Priests (most formal) 
Table 5.2. The two triads to be found in the reinterpreted 
directions, with the direction of progress indicated by 
arrows. 
As I have briefly indicated above, the list of relationships 
enumerated is far from exhaustive. While the ruler/subject 
relationship165 , for instance, could be subsumed under the 
heading of master/servant, there is no mention at all of the 
proper relationship between human and nonhuman (e.g. animal) 
forms of life166 • But if the list is not exhaustive, it is 
comprehensive; it does contain most of the kinds of people 
with whom Singala (and ourselves) would expect to come 
into contact on a day-to-day basis. 
A more telling criticism is that ethics is reduced by the 
Suttanta to interpersonal relationships. There is no 
explicit discussion here of, say, parenthood as an abstract 
concept, but rather of the concrete relationship between 
165. Or, in more contemporary terms, the relationship between the 
individual and the state. 
166. It could, however, be argued that the contemporary debate about 
"animal rights" is addressed by Buddhiosm in its condemnation of 
killing, as explained in chapter 3. 
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parent and child. While this may perhaps be explained as a 
characteristic feature of all premodern ethical thinking, 
this does not alter the fact that such a lack of structural 
awareness makes the application of this ethical teaching to 
our contemporary situation somewhat problematical. 
Moreover, while some of the classes of people discussed here 
still exist relatively unchanged (for instance, parents and 
children), other types, like the slaves, no longer exist. 
Nevertheless, one can look at the classes and see certain 
patterns. For instance, in the master/slave relationship167 
there is a pattern where one person is socially and legally 
entitled to order another person to perform certain economic 
tasks. The modern analogy would be the relationship between 
employer and employee, and this will be the context in which 
the master/slave relationship in the Si~galovada Suttanta 
will be examined here. 
After the introductory information in verse 27, verses 28 to 
33 then provide us with a more detailed exposition of the 
proper relationship between Singala and these other 
classes of society. Each of these verses follows the same 
pattern: first Si~gala's five duties towards the person or 
persons who are symbolised by the direction in question. 
167. As we shall see below, the position of the slave in ancient Indian 
society was never as severe as in the Meditarranean cultures of 
antiquity. 
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Then their f ive168 responses to being so treated is 
described. It is important to note the difference between 
these actions. In the first case, the term used is 
paccupatthatabba, which is the future passive participle 
of paccupatthahati, meaning "to stand up before" (Rhys 
Davids & Stede 1986: 385) and in this context, more 
figuratively "to tend" 169 • As the future passive participle 
denotes something which should be done, it is here 
translated as "(they) are to be tended". But the term used 
to express the other party's response to Singala's action 
is anukampati, which is simply the present indicative active 
of a verb meaning "to have pity on, to commiserate, to pity, 
to sympathise with" (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 34) 170 • 
Again, this should be understood in the context of this 
text; an action in response is implied here, and thus it is 
here translated as "responding in sympathy" 171 • Subasinha's 
168. Six in the case of recluses and Brahmins. 
169. See Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids (1977: 17l)for an explanation of 
this figurative derivation. Both Walshe (1987: 467 ff.) and Rhys Davids 
& Rhys Davids (1977: 180) translate this term as "(he) ministers". 
170. Rhys Davids and Rhys Davids (1977: 171) state that 
"Paccupatthatabba ... is rare, but its meaning is clearly that of 
attendance in tending. Etymologically it is to be re-as-sisted. 
Anukampanti is the type-word for the protecting tenderness of the 
stronger for the weaker, and means vibrating-along-after." 
171. Walshe (1987: 467 ff.) translates this as "reciprocates; Rhys 
Davids & Rhys Davids (1977: 180) as "loves". 
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translation (1982) does not reflect this difference; it uses 
"discharge their obligations" in both cases. 
The significance of this is that it shows the relationships 
between people described in the Si~galovada Suttanta to 
be somewhat more complicated than the merely "reciprocal" 
duties or responsibilities which most commentators tend to 
see in the text. The first set of actions in each verse, 
which describe Sihgala's actions, are moral duties - they 
are "to be done", as the use of the future passive 
participle indicates, while the second set of actions merely 
describe acts which happen quite naturally, if the 
previously-described moral duties have been performed, as 
indicated by the use of the present indicative active. To 
paraphrase, then, the general pattern is as follows: "You 
should treat such-and-such people in the following five 
ways, and in return they will treat you in the following 
five (or six) ways". 
Clearly, there is an element of causality involved here. The 
message is that if I were to treat certain people in a 
certain way, they would naturally and automatically respond 
in a certain other way. And causality, of course, is one of 
the principal concerns of Buddhist philosophy, as has been 
described in chapter 1. This shows how closely the 
Si~galovada Suttanta is interwoven with central Buddhist 
philosophical themes. 
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But 'it would nevertheless be wrong to think of the Suttanta 
as a cold-blooded exercise in social engineering. Although 
the second list in each verse describe events which will 
automatically occur if the duties in the first list are 
carried out, it should be recognised that the Buddha is here 
describing an ideal situation, and the results are in each 
case equally plausible as duties of the other person. 
Furthermore, the text is strongly contextualised. For 
instance, we do not know if Si~gala had any children, but 
even if he did, the description of him as the son of a 
householder (gahapati-putta) throughout the text shows that 
his primary social position at the time was that of a young 
man, and therefore a "child" rather than a "parent". One 
might speculate that had he been older, the Buddha might 
have started by saying "The eastern direction is to be seen 
as the child", rather than"··· as the mother and father" 
Although CI has no direct equivalent to verse 27, an 
analysis of the succeeding verses shows that its structuring 
of the relations between different people is identical to 
that of the Pali text, except that the terms "ground" and 
"sky" are used instead of "above" and "below" (Pannasiri 
1950: 168-170). The same is true of CII, where the terms 
"nadir" and "zenith" are used (Pannasiri 1950: 182-185), and 
CIII, which uses the same terms, but in which the 
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introductory passage merely states that"··· there are six 
directions in the Vinaya of the Aryan doctrine, [to wit]; 
the east, the south, the west, the north, the nadir and the 
zenith" (Pannasiri 1950: 197). CIV, which likewise uses the 
nadir/zenith terminology, is otherwise identical to the 
Pali version. 
This similarity between the five versions of the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta, when contrasted to the differences 
between the different documents' respective previous 
sections that we observed in chapters 3 and 4, leads one to 
suspect that the section discussed in this chapter is the 
main focus of interest of the text. It also implies that the 
original text might have consisted only of the first two 
verses of the Pali text and the verses discussed in this 
chapter, or their respective equivalents in the Chinese 
texts. This would imply that the passages which we discussed 
in chapters 3 and 4 were later additions. Against this 
thesis, one might then point out the recurring patterns 
which can be seen in all these parts of the Suttanta1 ' 2 • One 
could also mention that, as we shall see below, the precise 
ways in which the "directions" should be tended do in fact 
differ between the various manuscripts. 
172. See Appendic C for a graphical representation of such thematic 
patterns. 
213 
5.2. PARENTS AND CHILDREN 
The child's duties towards the parents vary, but none except 
the last strike one as particularly "religious". Firstly, 
one should support them, presumably in their old age. A 
measure of reciprocity can be discerned here too, for the 
reason for so supporting them is said to be that they were 
once the supporters and the child the supported. Apparently, 
this injunction was necessary even in a society in which 
parents were theoretically accorded the highest reverence: a 
case is recorded of a widow who became a bhikkhuni 
(Buddhist nun) purely to escape the ill-treatment she 
received from her children and their spouses173 • Secondly, 
one should "fulfil [one's] duty towards them". It is not 
clear just which duties are meant here; this is a very 
general statement174 • 
Next, the child should "maintain the family lineage", which 
presumably means that one should marry and produce 
offspring. This is a rather unusual dictum in a religion 
which has such a strong emphasis on the ideal of a celibate, 
monastic existence, but in this respect one should consider 
the legend that no Bodhisatta in his final life can set 
173. Commentary on Dharnmapada verse 115. Quoted in Horner 1975b: 15. 
174. But see (5) in the list of duties in CIV, listed below, which 
implies that these duties were primarily religious. 
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about attaining full Buddhahood until he has married and 
produced offspring175 • While this condition was certainly 
not applied to non-Bodhisattas170 , it does show a certain 
deference to the generally accepted belief in an orderly 
movement from youth, to full maturity, to the renunciation 
of the world in one's old age (Crawford 1982: 61-70), as 
discussed above. 
In addition, one should keep in mind that the Buddha's 
audience here was indeed a layman, and that procreation and 
maintenance of the family lineage was therefore considered 
an acceptable lifestyle for this audience. In the lay 
society of the time, which was predominantly nonBuddhist and 
Brahmanic, a man was not considered a complete person, a 
condition symbolised by his ability to offer the Brahmanic 
sacrifices, until he was married and had produced 
(preferably male) offspring (Lee 1967: 290). The chief 
reason for this seemed to be the importance of the son's 
performance of funeral rites for the father's post-mortem 
happiness (Horner 1975b: 1). Thus, this apparent endorsement 
of marriage and parenthood can be seen as a "tactical" move 
175. The historical Buddha is said by Buddhist tradition to have been 
married to a princess named Yasodhara and to have sired a son, Rahula, 
before he renounced the world. 
176. Consider in this respect how the Buddha ordained his son Rahula at 
a tender age, and how many other important bhikkhus entered the order 
while still young, presumably unmarried men. 
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by the Buddha, which facilitated the acceptance of Buddhism 
by members of society, in other words, a form of skilful 
means. It does not negate the fact that celibacy would have 
been required if singala were to enter the monastic order. 
There is, however, an alternative explanation. According to 
Buddhagosa, the maintenance of the lineage and tradition 
implied "not dissipating the property; restoring, if 
necessary, the family honour; and maintaining gifts to the 
almspeople" (Horner 1975b: 11). If this interpretation is 
accepted, the first two parts of the definition reiterate 
the other duties of the child in the si~galovada 
Suttanta, while the third anticipates one of the duties 
which laypeople have towards recluses and Brahmins, as 
explicated in verse 33. 
The last two requirements of the child refer primarily to 
actions to be undertaken after the parents' deaths, although 
the first of these two might also be undertaken when the 
parents had renounced the world or had merely relinquished 
control over the family business to the child. The first is 
an undertaking to spend or invest one's inheritance wisely. 
This underscores the theme of frugality which runs through 
the entire Suttanta, for instance in verses 7, 11, 13 and 
19. 
The child's duty to "give offerings to propitiate their 
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spirits11177 may also be a deferring gesture to popular 
religious practices - it must be remembered that Si~gala 
was not yet a Buddhist, and funerary rites were an important 
feature of Brahmanic religion as they are even today of 
great importance in contemporary Hinduism. On the other 
hand, it may simply signify a Buddhist "transference of 
merit" ceremony to be performed upon the parent's death, a 
canonically sanctioned rite which is still performed in 
certain Buddhist countries today (Gombrich 1971: 207-210) 170 
. Walshe {1987: 467) translates atha ca pana petana~ 
kalakatana~ dakkhina~ as "After my parents deaths I will 
distribute gifts on their behalf", an interpretation with 
which I disagree. He appears to use the translation of 
dakkhina as "a gift, a fee, a donation" while I believe that 
the term's proximity to the word peta179 and kalakata 
(dead) and the fact that these terms are phrased in the 
genitive plural100 , justifies the use of the alternative, 
and more specialised, reading of dakkhina: "a donation given 
to a 'holy' person with reference to unhappy beings in the 
177. Omitted by Rhys Davids (1977: vol. III, p. 180). 
178. But see the criticism of this practice, and its canonical 
orthodoxy, by Horner (1975b: 10 n.8). 
179. Peta - a "hungry ghost", one of the possible future reincarnations 
of a human being: regarded as a state of suffering. 
180. Thus reading "for the ghostly dead". The phrase peta J.calakat9 
literally means "the (hungry ghosts) who have fulfilled their earthly 
time" (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 211). 
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peta existence, intended to induce the alleviation of their 
suffering; an intercessional, expiatory offering" (Rhys 
Davids and Stede 1986: 311). In any case, my translation and 
Walshe's are not entirely contradictory, and I concede that 
he has managed to evade the problems associated with the use 
of the English words "spirit" in a Buddhist context. 
The Chinese texts list the following five duties of the 
child towards the parents as follows: 
CI: 
(1) He should think of making a living. 
(2) He should rise early and order the male and 
female servants to prepare food at the proper 
time. 
(3) He should not increase worries of his parents 
(sic) . 
(4) He should have in mind his obligations towards 
the parents. 
(5) If the parents fall ill, he should be 
anxious101 about them and seek doctors and give 
good treatment (Pannasiri 1950: 168). 
CII: 
(1) Thinking of fulfilling the obligations of the 
family. 
(2) Taking the responsibility of paying off any 
debts incurred by the family. 
181. While I am not in a position to check Pannasiri's translation, the 
term "anxious" seems rather strong in a Buddhist context, where 
equanimity is as highly prized as compassion. 
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(3) Understanding the traditional rules of 
conduct. 
(4) Maintaining and supporting the parents. 
(5) Making them happy and contented (Pannasiri 
1950: 182). 
CIII: 
(1) Increasing the wealth and the property. 
(2) Managing everything for them. 
(3) Offering whatever they wish. 
(4) Not offending them consciously. 
(5) Offering whatever personal possessions he has 
for their benefit (Pannasiri 1950: 198). 
CIV: 
(1) Offering all the requirements and allowing no 
shortage of them. 
(2) Taking previous consent of the parents in 
whatever he may do. 
(3) Being obedient to parents and never going 
against them. 
(4) Daring not to transgress any orders of the 
parents. 
(5) Never discontinuing the religious practices 
(Pannasiri 1950: 212). 
The Chinese texts, therefore, put even more emphasis on the 
maintenance of the family wealth and the parents' physical 
comfort than the Pali. One imagines that this must have 
accorded well with the Chinese, whose native religio-
philosophical tradition, Confucianism, already held filial 
piety to be among the greatest of virtues (Liu & Ge 1989: 
324-327). In this respect, the Singalovada suttanta is 
219 
quite restrained when compared to the following extracts 
from the Filial Piety sutra, a Mahayana text that displays 
clear Confucian influences: 
If the child is extremely filial, it will emerge 
with palms joined together in respect and the 
birth will be peaceful and auspicious. The mother 
will remain uninjured by the birth and will not 
suffer pain. However, if the child is extremely 
rebellious in nature, to the extent that it is 
capable of committing the five rebellious acts, 
then it will injure its mother's womb, rip apart 
its mother's heart and liver, or get entangled in 
its mother's bones. The birth will feel like the 
slices of a thousand knives, or like ten thousand 
sharp swords stabbing her heart. These are the 
agonies involved in the birth of a defiant and 
rebellious child . 
... If there were a person who, during the period 
of a kalpa102 fraught with famine and starvation, 
sliced the flesh off his own body to feed his 
parents and did this as many times as there are 
dust motes as he passed through hundreds of 
thousands of kalpas, that person still would not 
have repayed the kindness of parents. 
At that time, 
Great Assembly 
Ananda and the rest of the 
felt all the hairs on their 
end when they heard what the bodies stand on 
Buddha had said. They wept grievously and were 
unable to stop themselves. Each one of them made a 
182. Kalpa - an immeasurably long time, an aeon. 
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vow saying, "All of us, from now until the 
exhaustion of the bounds of the future, would 
rather that our bodies be pulverized into dust for 
a hundred thousand kalpas that our tongues be 
plucked out and that for a hundred thousand 
kalpas an iron plough would run over them ... We 
would rather that for a hundred thousand kalpas 
our bodies would be chopped hacked, mutilated and 
chiselled into ten million pieces so that our 
skin, flesh, joints and bones would be completely 
disintegrated, than ever go against the 
Tathagata 's 10 3 sagely teachings." (Nicholson 
[sa]: 5-6, 22, 26-7) 
Clearly, filial piety was seen as a serious business in 
Chinese Buddhism. In contrast, references to filial piety in 
other Pali sources, such as the Jataka tales, are much 
more restrained and tend to relate stories of monks who 
continued to support their parents even after their 
ordination104 • Obedience to the parents' every wish is also 
strongly emphasised in the Chinese versions pf the 
Singalovada suttanta, especially in CIV, if less 
graphically than in the Filial Piety Sutra. The Pali text 
never mentions such obedience explicitly. But in broad 
183. Tatbagata - "thus-come", another traditional appelation of the 
Buddha. 
184. e.g. Spencer (1966: 288-293), which relates one such story, and the 
mythological Jataka equivalent (J.540). Horner (1975b:l0 n.4) mentions 
a similar occurrence in the commentary on verse 110 of the Dhammapada. 
See also the Sona-Nanda-Jataka (J.532) in Cowell & Rouse (1981: vol. 
iv. pp. 164-174). 
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terms, there is nothing in the Chinese versions of the 
Suttanta that is completely incompatible with the Pali 
text. However, the Pali reference to a post-mortem ritual 
is entirely missing from all four the Chinese editions105 : 
this omission leads one to suspect that this particular duty 
may well have been inserted into the Pali verse at a later 
stage as a further concession to popular Brahmanic religious 
practices106 • If so, we may conclude that a child's moral 
duty towards his or her parents are primarily to see to 
their physical comfort and to guard the family wealth in the 
parents' dotage. This is supported by other passages in the 
canon, such as the following: 
Whoso his mother and his father keeps ... 
On such a one the three and thirty gods 
Do verily confer the name: "Good Man". 107 
In normal fashion whoso doth maintain 
His mother or his father, in this life 
Him for that cherishing the wise commend, 
185. The "religious practices" which one is never to discontinue, 
according to CIV, are not specified. 
186. This is particularly relevant in light of the fact that of the 
religions practiced in China, Buddhism tended to monopolise funeral 
ceremonies. If such a duty was ever enumerated in the original Sanskrit 
texts, the probability of the Chinese omitting it at a later stage would 
be low indeed. 
187. Saqiyutta Nikaya ix, 2, verse 1. Quoted in Horner 1975b: 9. 
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And after death he wins the joys of heaven. 100 
In return for being supported by their children, the parents 
are said to respond in the following ways: firstly, they 
restrain the child from evil and establish him or her in 
goodness. These are once again general pronouncements of the 
kind with which we have already become familiar in previous 
verses. 
Parents will also instruct the child in a branch of 
knowledge (sippa• sikkhapenti). A disagreement between 
different translations crops up here: sippa can be 
understood as an art or a branch of knowledge189 , but also 
as a craft (Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 710)and, by extension, 
a trade or vocation, and this latter interpretation has been 
preferred by many other commentators190 • If this 
interpretation is correct, and the general tenor of the 
Suttanta suggests that it is, then this should not be 
interpreted as a plea for education for its own sake, nor 
should it be seen as an argument in favour of free and 
compulsory education, as Subasinha191 appears to do in his 
translation. In this translation, I have deliberately kept 
188. Srupyutta Nikaya, vii, 2, verse 9. Quoted in Horner 1975b: 9 
189. Or as we might put it, a science. 
190. e.g. De Silva 1988b: 45. 
191. "They would educate them in arts and sciences" (1982: 15). 
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to the most neutral term, but, in line with the 
conservative, restrained tone of the Suttanta, I do believe 
that the interpretation of sippa as a trade, craft or 
vocation is closer to the original intention of the text and 
its author. One should also keep in mind that the parents 
are here said to perform this task themselves, instead of 
sending the child to an acarya or guru for instruction in 
Vedic lore, as was the custom at least among the wealthy 
(Basham 1963: 164-166, Crawford 1982: 61-63). In a society 
which was already becoming stratified into what would later 
become known as the caste system, this kind of vocational 
training would tend to reflect the father's own occupation, 
at least as far as boys were concerned. Girls were almost 
inevitably expected to become wives and mothers 192 • True, 
the pursuit of knowledge, especially of a metaphysical kind, 
was accorded the highest reverence in Indian society, but 
only when it was being pursued by those who had renounced 
the world. Householders were expected to concern themselves 
with practical affairs. 
Next, the parents would arrange a good marriage for the 
child. While the term "arranged marriage" may strike the 
modern person as a violation of one's freedom and dignity, 
we should not imagine that this was inevitably a case of 
marrying two youngsters who had never previously seen each 
192. With the singular exception of prostitutes, who did train their 
daughters to enter their mothers' profession (Horner 1975b: 20). 
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other. In the Buddha's time the majority of people lived in 
small villages, and even the cities were not the vast, 
impersonal agglomerations that we know today. Child 
marriage, so common in later Indian history, was apparently 
rare in this period (Horner 1975b: 28-29, Basham 1963: 167). 
Horner (1975b: 30) believes that both the family's and the 
girl's consent played a role in the eventual choice of a 
spouse. If so, one imagines that this must have applied 
equally or even more so to boys. 
The parents' final response to the child's caring 
ministrations was to hand over his inheritance in .iue 
course. As we have already seen above, one of the child's 
duties was to administer this inheritance responsibly. At 
first sight, and considering the difference between the 
child's duties and the parent's response to the execution of 
these duties, this creates a contradiction; how could the 
child administer an inheritance which the parent would only 
hand over if the child administered it well? But causal 
relations in Buddhism are never an all-or-nothing affair. 
The increasing performance, by the child, of his or her 
moral duties would increasingly influence the parent to 
respond in all five the ways mentioned here. Therefore the 
child would receive increasing portions of his inheritance 
when he had given evidence of his ability to administer it. 
The actions of the parents discussed here ref er clearly to 
225 
how they would treat grown children. Again, this shows how 
the Suttanta was never intended as a universal declaration 
of Buddhist ethics, but is intensely contextualised and 
centred on the person of Si~gala. It can however be said 
that small children in ancient India were treated with great 
indulgence until the age of five, when they would either 
commence with their studies or start working the fields, as 
the case might be (Basham 1963: 162). 
In the Chinese texts, the parents' responses are enumerated 
as follows: 
CI is identical to the Pali, except that the positions of 
the second and third actions are reversed, with the 
educational act being more closely specified as "They should 
train him to count and to write" (Pannasiri 1950: 168). 
CII differs slightly. It reads: 
(1) Giving training as a basis for a profession. 
(2) Providing him with sufficient provision. 
(3) Contracting a suitable marriage for him. 
(4) Instructing him to learn the scriptures. 
(5) Giving over all the family possessions to the 
child.(Pannasiri 1950: 182) 
CIII is similar to CII: 
2~6 
(1) Having loving thoughts towards the child193 • 
(2) Giving him supplies so that he may not be in 
wants. 
(3) Managing affairs in such a way that the son 
may not get into debts. 
(4) Contracting a marriage for him ... 
(5) Having such thoughts as to hand over whatever 
property they own (Pannasiri 1950: 198). 
CIV resembles the Pali text except for the third action, 
which reads " by being merciful and loving him as if [love] 
has entered their bones and even has permeated deep into 
their marrow", and the fifth, which refers not to giving the 
child an inheritance, but rather the "necessities of life" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 213). 
Thus the Chinese texts, while in no way contradictory to the 
Pali, complement it in many ways, especially as far as the 
question of education is concerned. If we wish to use the 
Si~galovada Suttanta as a hermeneutic base from which to 
examine a possible educational order, a consideration of the 
Chinese texts becomes essential, especially CI and CII. 
These two texts expand the simple vocational training 
advocated in the Pali Suttanta to include numeracy, 
literacy and a familiarity with religio-philosophical 
issues; a view of education which more closely approximates 
193. The first indication we have had that the parents' duties towards 
the child might include an emotional component. 
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our own than that proposed in the Pali text194 • 
Similarly, the modest descriptions of the parents 
restraining the child from evil and establishing him in 
goodness only recur in CI. The other Chinese texts are more 
concerned with explicating the ways in which parent cater 
for the material well-being of tne child, both positively, 
by giving provisions, and negatively, by preventing the 
child from entering into debt. The Chinese texts also 
augment the Pali by their recognition that some of the acts 
which parents perform in their child's favour are emotional 
rather than physical. 
To summarise, the Si~galovada suttanta describes a 
situation in which the child's primary responsibility is to 
support the parents physically and financially in their 
dotage, while the parents respond to signs that the child is 
ready to accept such a responsibility by extending their 
affection and releasing the family wealth to the child, and 
by ensuring that the child's education is as complete and as 
relevant as possible. the call is for the child to display 
gratitude to the parents, to act responsibly and take care 
of the parents where necessary, and for the parent to equip 
the child for the future and gradually allow the latter to 
lead a full, responsible life. 
194. Naturally, such an attempt would also have to consider the 
relationship between teacher and student (see section 5.3.). 
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There is one problem associated with this verse: I have 
stressed the contextualised nature of this text, its 
directedness towards a specific person, Si~gala. But why 
would the Buddha instruct Si~gala to treat his mother and 
his father (mata-pitaro) in a certain way, when he must 
have been aware, having been thus informed in verse 2, that 
Si~gala's father was dead? Is this a case of later 
redaction filling out some missing details or did the Buddha 
intend this Suttanta, despite its indubitable specific 
directedness towards si~gala, to have a wider 
applicability? No final answer can be given to this 
question, but the fact that both parents are named in all 
the Chinese versions strongly suggests the latter. This will 
have implications for some of the matters to be raised in 
the next chapter. 
5.3. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 
We have already seen that there was a prevailing custom in 
Indian society to send children to a teacher for instruction 
in Vedic lore and other forms of knowledge. Later, bhik.khus 
would assume a similar social position in Buddhist societies 
(Aronson 1980b:l). This educational function of the monk is 
only now declining (Buultjens 1976: 47). In verse 29 of the 
Si~galovada Suttanta, the ideal relationship between 
student and teacher is outlined. 
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On the student's part, the duties owing to a teacher are 
mainly concerned with service to the teacher and by studying 
diligently. Firstly, they are to rise, presumably a gesture 
of respect when the teacher enters the room. If we look at 
duties 2 to 5, we can see a certain pattern: 
( 2 ) By attending to them; 
( 3 ) By being eager to learn; 
(4) By waiting on them; 
( 5) by receiving as much as possible of their 
knowledge. 
One can see how 4 and 5 are reiterations of 2 and 3. In each 
pair, the first duty concerns looking after the teacher's 
physical welfare, the second the diligent pursuit of 
learning. 
CI contains much the same advice, although r,ising out of 
respect has been replaced by "he should praise (the teacher) 
in his absence". The order of the duties also differs: the 
above duty is fifth in the list, while the two duties 
concerned with respect for the teacher are first and second, 
followed by the two about studying diligently (Pannasiri 
1950: 168). 
CII is unclear, due to a typological error because of which 
only four of the five duties have been listed: 
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(1) He must have a love for studies. 
(3) He must be prompt in work. 
(4) He must be faultless 195 
(5) He must offer support to the teacher 
(Pannasiri 1950: 183). 
in CIII, the act of rising c~t o~ respect is restored. There 
are three other duties which emphasise respect for and 
service to the teacher and one which stresses learning. 
Similarly, CIV contains four 011ties concerning respect and 
service, and one concerning studying (Pannasiri 1950: 198, 
213). All these are phrased in broadly similar terms, and 
will not be repeated here. 
The conclusion to which we may arrive, then, is that there 
are three main components in the Suttanta's definition of 
the student's duty towards the teacher. First, the student 
should respect the teacher both implicitly and by means of 
ritual gestures, such as rising from a seated position when 
the teacher approaches. Secondly, the student should offer 
the teacher support - this may be financially or by means of 
services. Thirdly, the student should study diligently. 
Today, of course, we might experience some difficulty with 
these precepts: to us (post-)moderns, respect is not due to 
195. One presumes that this refers to being morally faultless - such an 
interpretation would fit in with the other versions. 
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a teacher merely because of his or her position, as it was 
in ancient India. To the contrary, respect is now something 
that has to be earned, and this relationship must be 
reestablished between the teacher and every new student. 
Perhaps this will have to be rephrased for our purposes to 
something like "respect the teacher to the extent that he or 
she is worthy of respect". The other duties are less 
problematic. Naturally, one would expect students to study 
hard and while financial support of the teacher has become 
largely a function of the state, the precept pronounced here 
still applies to purely religious teachers (ministers, 
priests etc.). 
But even in its own era, the list of duties of the student 
towards the teacher in the si~galovada Suttanta is 
surprisingly moderate when compared to the intense emotional 
bond which was supposed to exist between student and teacher 
in Brahmanic and later Hindu society. This relationship was 
expressed in the upanayana (initiation) ceremony as follows: 
on the region of the student's heart the teacher 
should place his hand with the fingers stretched 
upwards and say: 'Into my vow I put my heart; 
after my mind may thy mind follow; with single-
aimed vow do thou rejoice in my speech; may God 
Brihaspati join thee to me (Crawford 1982: 61). 
When the student treats the teacher in the five specified 
ways, the teachers respond in five ways. Firstly, they 
232 
"teach their specialty11196 • Secondly, they "cause [the 
pupils] to grasp what they themselves thoroughly 
understand", which summarises the educational process as it 
was understood in the Buddha's time. Evidently, education 
was seen primarily as the transmission of knowledge from the 
teacher to the student. Little allowance was made for 
independent study and investigation by students. Teachers 
also "teach all their knowledge - this may be an implicit 
reference to the phrase in the Mahaparinibbana Sutta19', 
which states that the Buddha did not have the closed fist of 
a teacher who held some things back. Thus, this response of 
the teacher would establish the Buddha's status as a 
teacher190 • 
Teachers would also ensure that the students' abilities 
would become known among [the teachers'] friends and 
colleagues. The final response of the teachers would be to 
make "all [the students'] directions safe. One presumes that 
this refers to the reinterpreted directions discussed in 
this part of the Suttanta. If so, the final response of the 
teachers is to assist students in establishing good 
196. Suvinitam vinenti, literally "they teach that in which they have 
been well educated". 
197. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 16. Quote in Humphreys (1981:14). 
198. For instance, in the phrase which introduces each poetic section; 
"After the Well-farer, the Teacher, had spoken thus, he continued:". 
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interpersonal relations. 
Cl's list of teachers' responses differs from the Pali: 
(1) He should make him acquire knowledge quickly. 
(2) He should make him surpass other's disciples. 
(3) He should wish to make him retain in memory 
(what is taught) and forget not. 
(4) He should explain to him all his doubts and 
difficulties. 
(5) He should desire that the disciple's knowledge 
should surpass that of his own (Pannasiri 1950: 
168). 
CII has a list with similar items to the Pali and CI, but 
it significantly adds "guiding him in the noble path", which 
indicates the specifically religious character of the 
education which is to be given (Pannasiri 1950: 183). CIII's 
distinctive contribution is that "they provide for his 
safety in every place [choosing] best quarters for his stay" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 198-199). CIV closely resembles CII as far 
as this verse is concerned. 
Thus, the Chinese versions stress both the religious and the 
educational aspects of the teachers' responses even more 
strongly than the Pali; each one of them replaces the very 
general "And they make all [their pupils'] directions safe." 
with some more specific response. Apart from this, the five 
versions are quite congruent in their discussion of the 
teachers' responses to the performance of duties by the 
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students. 
5.4. HUSBANDS AND WIVES 
The first two duties of the husband towards the wife are 
very similar to each other: he is to treat her "with honour" 
and "without disrespect".In fact, the terms sammananaya 
and avimananaya are both derived from the same root. 
Perhaps there originally was some subtle difference in 
connotation here which has been lost with the transition of 
the text from a living to a "dead", sacred language. 
The husband should remain faithful to his wife. This might 
be construed as a prohibition on polygamy, although this is 
not explicitly stated here199 • He should also "relinquish 
authority", that is, he should not act as a petty household 
tyrant over her, but allow her a measure of independence, a 
stipulation which is again quite liberal in the light of the 
patriarchal society which existed in India at the time. The 
wife's personal needs are also catered for: it is stipulated 
that the husband should provide her with ornaments 
(alaipkaranuppadana). This provision shows, perhaps more 
than anything else in this entire suttanta, the humaneness 
199. Although polygyny existed in ancient India, it was largely 
restricted to the wealthier classes. Polyandry seems to have been 
unknown in Indian Buddhism and its social environment (Horner 1975b: 35-
41), but was later found to exist in Buddhist Tibet. 
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and the considerate nature of the Buddha, who was not merely 
a strict, puritanical moralist, but who would become known 
throughout the east as the Compassionate One. 
CI differs from all other versions of the text by naming the 
wife's duties first, followed by those of the husband, thus 
departing from the contextualised nature of the Suttanta. 
The husband's duties are as follows: 
(1) When he goes out of or comes back [home], he 
should greet his wife. 
(2) He should supply her with food and clothing at 
proper times. 
(3) He should give her [ornaments of] gold, silver 
and pearls. 
(4) He should entrust her with the families 
wealth. 
(5) He should not keep unlawful wives outside 
(Pannasiri 1950: 169). 
CII is identical to the Pali, except that the duty of 
relinquishing authority is replaced by the duty of 
"supplying cloth and food at proper times" (Pannasiri 1950: 
183). CIII replaces faithfulness with "considering her as 
the dearest of all" (Pannasiri 1950: 199), which may amount 
to the same thing, but can also be interpreted as a more lax 
consideration of polygyny. CIV echoes the sentiments in CII. 
In all these cases, minor deviations in the order in which 
duties are listed have been ignored, as the type of pattern 
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which occurs in these cases has been indicated in the 
sections on parents/children and teachers/students. This 
practice will also be followed in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
As we have already seen in previous instances, therefore, 
the Chinese texts tend to replace the general pronouncements 
in the Pali text with more specific duties that tend to be 
earthy and practical. How this can be explained in terms of 
the translation from Sanskrit to Chinese is obscure. 
Although the practicality of the Chinese texts has a 
distinct Chinese flavour, was this already present in the 
(Indian) Sanskrit texts, were the Sanskrit originals 
deliberately distorted by the translators, or was it rather 
a case of the down-to-earth Chinese worldview influencing 
the translation process? No answer to these questions can be 
given until the Sanskrit originals have been recovered. 
The wife responds to her husband's ministrations firstly by 
"doing her work well". This, like the exhortation to the 
student to study diligently, is a very general pronouncement 
which stems directly from the social role of the person 
under discussion. She will also accept his retinue200 , a 
term which can be interpreted in different ways. Walshe 
(1987: 467) follows Rhys Davids and Stede (1986: 425) in 
200. Parijana - literally, "the people around" (Rhys David & Stede 
1986: 425). 
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interpreting it as the servants, while Rhys Davids and Rhys 
Davids (1977: 182) interpret it as kinfolk of both families. 
The term chosen here is a deliberately neutral one which 
includes both of these interpretations, as well as the 
husband's friends. 
The husband's faithfulness is reciprocated by the wife. It 
is also stated that she will "guard the provisions", which 
indicates the expected social role of women in those days. 
Finally, it is stated that she is "skilful and diligent in 
her duties", which amounts to a restatement of the first of 
the wife's responses. 
The Chinese texts differ more on this point than on any of 
the other relationships discussed so far. CI, as has been 
noted above, lists the wife's duties as follows: 
(1) Whenever the husband comes from outside, the 
wife should rise up in salutation and receive him. 
( 2) When the husband is out, she should do the 
cooking and sweeping and wait for him. 
( 3) She should not harbour any lewd thoughts 
towards other men, and whenever scolded by the 
husband, she should not abuse him in return or 
redden. 
( 4) She should follow the instructions of the 
husband, and should not hide from him whatever she 
possesses. 
(5) When she goes to bed she should prepare the 
bed for him, and she should go to rest after [him] 
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(Pannasiri 1950: 168-169). 
Dramatic as these divergences from the Pali may seem, CII 
goes even further by positing not five, but fourteen actions 
to be performed by the wife: these breathe the same spirit 
as CI in that all are notions of how an obedient housewife 
ought to behave and include thos_ listed in CI; it would be 
otiose to repeat them here. The same is true of CII, which 
lists thirteen of the same type of responses. CIV lists the 
wife's five actions as: 
(1) Rising earlier [than her husband]. 
(2) Resting later [than her husband]. 
(3) Using gentle speech. 
(4) Showing obedience. 
(5) Understanding the ideas (mind) of her husband 
(Pannasiri 1950: 213). 
It is clear that the Chinese texts, and perhaps their 
Sanskrit originals, have here been heavily influenced by a 
society less tolerant of the idea of the equality of the 
sexes than that which produced the Pali version of the 
Sidgalovada Suttanta. In the absence of the Sanskrit 
originals, whether this society was China or post-Asokan 
India must remain a matter of conjecture. Significantly, the 
husband's duties do not diverge from the Pali half as much 
as do the wife's. 
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How does all this affect us today? Firstly, I believe that 
we can discount the Chinese texts on this score: they are 
simply too androcentric to have much relevance for us in the 
twentieth century. That leaves the Pali text. Naturally, 
our contemporary acceptance of the equality of the sexes 
implies that, for instance, it is not so much a question of 
the husband relinquishing ''authority" as of the spouses 
sharing responsibility on an equal basis. But such 
adjustments are inevitable when we attempt to apply ethical 
prescriptions from a bygone age to our present situation. 
Still, the general trend in these injunctions is towards 
precisely such a liberalisation and equalisation of the 
relationship between the sexes. In more general terms, the 
relationships between spouses described here is one of 
harmony and mutual consideration. Perhaps for modern 
audiences, the duties of husband and wife could be modified 
by making both sets of duties mandatory for both sexes, thus 
making nine201 duties in all. Thus, with this one proviso, 
we can say that the ideal relationship between spouses is as 
applicable today as it was when the Buddha first pronounced 
it. 
201. "Faithfulness" is already present in both lists. 
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5.5. FRIENDS 
The advice on the ideal relationship between friends in 
verse 31 is unique in this section of the si~galovada 
Suttanta in that it describes a relationship between equals, 
which makes it doubly relevant for our times. Unfortunately, 
it is not a very informative part of the text. Naturally, 
this advice should be read in conjunction with the earlier 
discussion about good and evil friends 202 • 
Friends form the northern direction, and Si~gala is here 
referred to as a "son of a good family" (kula-puttena), a 
traditional appellation which was used of many of the 
Buddha's questioners. 
Si~gala is exhorted to treat his friends with the 
following qualities: generosity, kind speech, by guarding 
their welfare impartiality and honesty. To a' large extent, 
this duplicates ethical precepts first pronounced in other 
verses of the Suttanta. That generosity is a virtue can be 
deduced from the denunciation of stinginess in verse 14. 
Kind speech is indicated as a virtue of the son of a good 
family by the fact that in verse 3, false 203 speech is 
202. See chapter 4. 
203. And as discussed in chapter 3, malicious speech by extension of 
this precept. 
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called a defilement and that the spendthrift is condemned in 
verse 19 and also by the fact that two of the "enemies 
disguised as friends" 204 are identified by their vocal 
behaviour, while the same is true of the true friends: "he 
who speaks with your welfare in mind" is defined entirely in 
vocal terms, and "he who is constant in happiness and in 
adversity" partially so205 • The honesty with which one is to 
treat one's friends recalls the discretion of the friend who 
is constant in happiness and in adversity206 • 
That one should guard one's friends' welfare can be seen as 
almost an identifying characteristic of friendship. It also 
recalls the helping friend's characteristics df guarding the 
unwary and the unwary's children207 • The "impartiality" 
mentioned here recalls the fact that teachers also "teach 
all their knowledge impartially" 200 • 
The Chinese texts differ on the precise delineation of this 
relationship and just to whom it should apply. CI interprets 
the northern direction as indicating "relations and 
204. The big talker and the flatterer - see verses 17 and 18. 
205. See verses 23 and 24. 
206. See the discussion of verse 23 in ch. 7. 
207. Verse 22 - see ch. 7. 
208. Admittedly, different terms are used in the Pali: samakkbayino in 
verse 29, and samanattataya in verse 31. 
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friends". They are to be treated as follows: 
(1) Whenever he observes (any of them) committing 
a crime, he should privately take him in to a 
corner and give him sound advice and check him. 
(2) Whenever they are in need he should help them 
without delay. 
( 3) If there is any secret he should not tell 
others. 
( 4) They should give heed to each other in 
difficulties. 
(5) He should share with them whatever good things 
he has (Pannasiri 1950: 169). 
In CII, the "friend" should be treated as follows: 
(1) Showing genuine respect. 
(2) Not disliking their sentiments. 
(3) Not being insincere. 
(4) Always sharing happiness and diversity209 • 
(5) Keeping permanent friendship (Pannasiri 1950: 
184). 
In CII this relationship and that between master and servant 
have been transposed in the list of relationships: 
accordingly, this relation, which in this case has to do 
with the "friends and friendly officers of the state", is 
here presented not as the northern direction, but as the 
"nadir". The precise duties laid down here are as follows: 
209. Perhaps this should have been "adversity". 
(1) Being courteous. 
(2) Not disregarding. 
(3) Not duping210 • 
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(4) Offering them precious things. 
(5) Having constant good thoughts ... (Pannasiri 
1950: 200). 
CIV closely resembles the Pali, except that "impartiality" 
is replaced by "having feelings of common interest" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 214). This does not really contradict the 
Pali; rather, it complements it. 
Once again, we can state that the Pali and Chinese texts 
are sufficiently similar to each other to warrant regarding 
them as minor variants of a single text. Let us therefore 
examine the ways in which friends are said to respond when 
treated in the ways described above. 
The first three responses by the friend are identical to 
those of the "helper" in verse 22. The friend will guard 
those who are unwary and their property, and they give 
refuge to one when one is in dire straits. In addition, 
"They do not forsake you in times of trouble", which is 
fundamentally a restatement in negative terms of the 
previous response. They will also "honour your progeny", 
210. Probably the equivalent of the Pili "with honesty". It recurs in 
CIV. 
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which I take to mean that they will look after and take care 
of one's children. This, then is the only distinctive 
response by one's friends which has not been directly or 
indirectly mentioned elsewhere. 
However, this one unique response is absent from all the 
Chinese texts. In CI, this list of responses is entirely 
missing. In CII, however, these responses are listed, and 
comprise the following: 
(1) Taking over any dangers approaching him. 
(2) Admonishing him whenever he is relaxed211 • 
(3) Concealing his private affairs from others. 
(4) Helping him to benefits and profits. 
(5) Speaking sincere and benevolent words 
(Pannasiri 1950: 184). 
in CII, the "friends and friendly officer of the state" will 
respond firstly by realising that one's wealth is exhausted 
and replenish it. They will admonish those who are "slack", 
.have affectionate feelings and act as a refuge (Pannasiri 
1950: 201). In CIV, the first two responses are identical to 
the first two in the Pali text, the third reiterates the 
second, and the friend is then said to respond by "giving 
him advice privately and admonishing him" and by "constantly 
speaking in praise of him" (Pannasiri 1950: 214). 
211. As in the case of the true friend who is a helpmate in CII, perhaps 
we should substitute "unwary" for "relaxed". 
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Thus, the section on the ideal relationship between friends 
in this section is surprisingly insubstantial. It tends 
largely to reiterate the information discussed in chapter 4. 
For this reason, I would maintain that it would be better to 
base any ethical decisions on friendship on verses 15 to 26 
of the si~galovada suttanta. 
5.6. MASTERS AND SERVANTS 
The lower direction or, as some texts and translations have 
it, the nadir, is reinterpreted in verse 32 as the "slaves 
and servants" (dasa-kammakara). Slavery definitely existed 
in ancient India, though not on the same scale or with the 
severity as in the Mediterranean civilisations (Basham 1973: 
153-154). The term dasa originally referred to the 
aboriginal (Dravidian) inhabitants of India, but after the 
Aryan invasion, it came to mean "slave" in ~~way that 
strangely parallels the way in which the name of another 
people, the Slavs, would acquire the same meaning centuries 
later and a continent away 212 • It was possible for a slave 
to rise to a position of considerable importance, and Indian 
society in general seemed to have experienced some unease 
with slavery, since the humane treatment of slaves was laid 
down by Hindu scriptures and manumission was highly 
212. Collins Concise Dictionary. 1985. p. 1085. 
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recommended (Basham 1973: 153-154). As we shall see, the 
Singalovada Suttanta speaks in a similar vein. Ka:mmakara 
could perhaps best be understood as "workers", considering 
the presence of the element ka:mma, meaning "deed" or 
"action". Quite probably, the dividing line between slaves 
and servants was indistinct and thus it was appropriate for 
the Buddha to discuss them t)get:.ar, as one class of people. 
For the sake of brevity, I shall refer to the dasa-
ka:mmakara throughout as "servants". 
Singala was told to treat the servants as follows: 
Firstly, he should set down a reasonable working schedule 
that would take each servant's capabilities into 
consideration. This appears to be primarily a warning 
against overworking the servants. We have already seen in 
chapter 3 that this could be construed as a breach of the 
precept against "taking that which is not given". He should 
also "not make them work for food alone". One wonders if 
this was such a common practice that it was necessary for 
the Buddha to disavow it: presumably it would refer 
especially to those servants who were enslaved. 
The "gentleman", as Singala is referred to here, should 
also tend the servants when they fall ill. This recalls an 
episode in the Vinaya literature in which the Buddha tended 
a seriously ill monk with his own hands, afterwards 
admonishing the monks that, if they wished to tend the 
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Buddha, they should tend the sick213 • The gentleman should 
also supply the servants with "tasty foodstuffs". Most 
significantly, he should "relinquish214 them at the right 
time". This can be interpreted as another injunction against 
overworking the servants, as in the first duty on this list, 
but it can also be seen as an attempt to encourage 
manumission. If we accept the latter interpretation, then 
the Buddha's statement here is in line with, or possibly the 
precursor of, the other Indian sacred texts mentioned above 
that prescribed the humane treatment and manumission of 
slaves. 
CI prescribes similar, though not always identical, duties: 
(1) He should supply them with food and clothing 
at proper times. 
(2) He should summon doctors whenever they are 
ill. 
(3) He should not beat them without a cause215 • 
(4) He should not snatch away their personal 
belongings by force. 
(5) He should give equal shares when distributing 
things amongst them (Pannasiri 1950: 169). 
213. Vinaya Pitaka,Khandaka, Mahavagga 8. 
214. Vossagga - Rhys Davids & Stede 1986: 652. 
215. This has no equivalent in the Pali text, but Basham (1963: 153-
154) mentions that a similar injunction may be found in the Laws of 
Manu, an influential Hindu text. 
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In CII, four duties are similar to the Pali; but the duty 
of "relinquishing" the servant is replaced by "always 
encouraging them in the observance of fasting-days" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 184). In CIII, as mentioned above, the 
servants are regarded as symbolised by the northern 
direction rather than the nadir. The instructions regarding 
judicious allocation of work and the provision of food and 
medical aid are repeated, while there are also the following 
new instructions: the "master" should also provide the 
servants with drinks, and he should "allow them holidays" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 200). This latter injunction might cast new 
light on the Pali prescription to "relinquish" the servant. 
It might originally have meant allowing them days off, as 
here in CIII, rather than manumitting slaves216 • It is 
possible, however, that this may reflect Pannasiri's 
particular translation, and the possibility that 
"relinquishing" ref erred to manumission cannot be 
discounted. In either case, however, the Chinese 
interpretation presented here would be a more appropriate 
interpretation for our own time, in which slavery has been 
abolished in all but the most backward regions of the world. 
216. It might also explain the "fasting-days" mentioned in CI: in a 
traditional society, most holidays (holy-days) have a religious 
character, in which case the apparent contrast between CI and the Pali 
text falls away. 
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in CIV, the third duty is missing, presumably as the result 
of a typographical error. The remainder are listed are 
concerned with assigning work judiciously, giving food, 
supplying medicine, and allowing them holidays. In other 
words, it reflects the same themes as the other versions of 
the suttanta. 
There is a marked uniformity between the manuscripts' 
rendering of one's duties towards servants. All recommend 
allocating work according to each servant's ability, the 
provision of food and medical care217 • The Chinese texts 
emphasise that one also needs time off from work, while the 
Pali version might amount to the same. Unlike the situation 
in, for instance, the list of the wife's responses, then, 
there is a marked uniformity between the various versions of 
the Suttanta on the ideal relationship between master and 
servant. 
Clearly, these duties were promulgated with the household 
servant in mind, but as we have seen above, one could apply 
these injunctions to the contemporary situation by 
substituting "employer" for "gentleman" or "master" and 
"employee" for "servant". The Pali injunction that one's 
servants should not be made to work for food alone can then 
be seen as a plea for a fair wage structure, as could the 
217. Though the texts differ whether this should be provided by the 
master himself, by calling a doctor, or merely by providing medicines. 
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employer's duty to "feed" the employee. The precept 
regarding medical care can then be seen as indicating the 
need for a medical aid scheme, while the stated need to give 
employees the occasional day off speaks for itself. 
Naturally, these things are relative: what is considered a 
fair wage now may not be considered that a century hence. 
Even so, one can see that the principle of fair, 
compassionate and even-handed treatment of employees is 
supported in the Si~galovada suttanta, a reflection 
perhaps of such fundamental Buddhist emotive attitudes as 
friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity210 • 
What is missing, at least from our perspective, is the need 
for employer and employee to enter into a process of 
negotiation or collective bargaining. This is another 
example of the lack of awareness of structural impediments 
to good human relationships. 
5.7. LAYPEOPLE AND RENUNCIANTS 
In verse 33, the Buddha discusses the relationship between 
laypeople and the religious specialists of the day. This, 
218. Known as the Brahmaviruiras or "abodes of (the god) Brahma", these 
are known in Pali as metta, karu{lii, mudita and upekrui, 
respectively. Together they constitute the emotive complement to the 
many forms of Buddhist meditation that are designed to develop insight. 
See Kruger (1991: 125), Kloppenborg (1987) and Carter (1989: 42-50). 
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the Buddhistically reinterpreted upper direction 219 , is the 
last of the six classes of people whose relationships with 
Singala are regulated in this suttanta. It is the exact 
terminology employed here (SamaQa-Brahmana, i.e. recluses 
and Brahmin priests) that leads King (1964: 194) to write 
that the Sii'.tgalovada suttanta "seems quite un-Buddhist in 
its language of Brahmins anC:. hea,,en ... ".At first, it might 
indeed seem strange that the Buddha did not use the term 
bhikkhu in this context. One way of solving this dilemma is 
to follow Aronson (1980: 12) who believes that "recluses and 
priests" is merely another term for bhikkhus. 
Alternately, we may regard the term SamaQa-Brahmana as a 
conventional Buddhist reference to any ethically pure 
renunciant, whether Buddhist or not. If we look at an 
important Buddhist text such as the Dha:mmapada220 , we see 
that chapter 26 is called "The Brahmin" and is entirely 
devoted to a redefinition of the term "brahmin" in much the 
same way that the Sii'.tgalovada Suttanta as a whole is a 
redefinition of the direction-worshipping ritual. I quote 
only a few verses from this part of the Dha:mmapada: 
388. Because he has put away evil, he is called a 
Brahmin; because he lives in peace, he is called a 
219. Or, in some translations, the sky or zenith. 
220. Khuddaka Nik:aya - see Mascaro (1983) for one of the many English 
translations of this text. 
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Samaua; because he leaves all sins behind, he is 
called a Pabbajita, a pilgrim. 
396. I call not a man a Brahmin because he was 
born from a certain family or mother, for he may 
be proud, and he may be weal thy. The man who is 
free from possessions and free from desires - him 
I call a Brahmin. 
406. Who is tolerant to the intolerant, 
to the violent, free from greed with the 
him I call a Brahmin (Mascaro 1983: 
emphasis added). 
peaceful 
greedy -
89-91 
Thus, in these verses of the Dhammapada the Buddha is 
redefining the term "Brahmin" to indicate, not a hereditary 
position, but the social status of renunciant or wise 
person. The same process can be observed in the sooadaoda 
Sutta221 , where the traditional concept "Brahmin" is pared 
down until only "wisdom" and (moral) "uprightness" are left 
as defining characteristics. Some scholars, -of course, would 
maintain that in doing so, the Buddha was merely restoring a 
previous state of affairs, dating from the period before the 
classification of people into four distinct social classes 
(vanna) according to their occupations was slowly transmuted 
into a hereditary system (cf. Crawford 1982: 15-16). 
Moreover, one should keep in mind how early Buddhism viewed 
221. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 4. - see Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids 1977: 152-
156). 
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other religious traditions: in the Upali Sutta222 , for 
instance, Upali, a newly converted Jain, is exhorted to 
continue supporting his previous religious teachers. The 
mere fact that recluses of other faiths had not taken refuge 
in the three jewels did not put them beyond the religious 
pale: they too might well be honest seekers after the truth, 
and were to be treated as such by the laity. 
Thus, the fact that the Buddha is here not merely calling 
for Si~gala to support Buddhist monks is indicative of a 
higher level of Buddhist teaching. It demonstrates that the 
Buddha is here calling for a compassion and social 
cooperation that is truly universal. One might even go so 
far as to say that this usage demonstrates the implicit 
support within the Buddhist tradition for ecumenicism and 
interreligious dialogue223 • It also supports Macy's (1984: 
119-120) contention that Buddhist ethics is incompatible 
with a hierarchical, top-down social power structure. By 
emphasising all religious professionals, not merely Buddhist 
monks, the Suttanta undercuts any attempt to create a 
222. Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 56. See Horner 1975a: vol. II. p. 44) for 
an English translation. 
223. It is interesting to note in this context Bishop's (1969) thesis 
that Buddhism and Hinduism are particularly well-suited to an acceptance 
of religious pluralism, since their metaphysical structures do not 
require that one religion be absolutely true, and all others, by 
implication, absolutely false. 
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Buddhist ghetto mentality that would institute a separate 
Buddhist society of monks and laypeople, with no links to 
the "outside" world. 
Singala is exhorted to treat recluses and priests in the 
following five ways: firstly, he should treat them with 
friendliness in physical, v00al and mental acts. These three 
are standard descriptions in the Buddhist literature which 
are intended to cover the entire range of human behaviour. 
Thus, these first three injunctions indicate that one's 
dealings with religious professionals should be suffused 
with an overall quality of friendliness. Then, he should not 
"close the door against them" and he should give them food, 
in other words, he should offer them hospitality and 
support. 
Among the Chinese versions, CI replaces the last two 
precepts with "They should admire them" and ·11 (they should 
regard) Sramanas and Bhramanas as heroes amongst people" 
(Pannasiri 1950: 170). But where CI attenuates the Pali 
text's counsel on welcoming and supporting the recluses and 
priests, CII has more practical advice: 
(1) Keeping open doors for them. 
(2) Welcoming, greeting and paying homage to them 
on their arrival. 
(3) Arranging seats, etc. for them 
(4) Keeping and preserving the scriptures and 
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other sacred things that they bring. 
(5) Serving them with pure food (Pannasiri 1950: 
185). 
CIII is similar to CII in sounding a practical note. It 
replaces the precept on "Keeping and preserving the 
scriptures ... " in CII with "Giving them the required 
protection according to the Dharma (Pannasiri 1950: 201), 
but is otherwise identical. CIV, on the other hand, is 
identical to the Pali apart from the order in which the 
five duties are listed. 
In the reaction of the recluses and priests to such 
treatment, the Pali Suttanta deviates from the pattern laid 
down so far, for there are not five but six ways in which 
they are here said to respond. Of the Chinese versions of 
the text, CI and CIV concur on this, the other two give only 
five responses. The reason for this sudden deviation is 
obscure: perhaps the Buddha believed that the recluses and 
priests, by dint of their elevated position and lack of 
worldly concerns, had a greater responsibility towards or, 
to put it in another way, a greater capacity to respond to 
the layperson's supportive actions. 
The first two responses by the recluses and priests are 
identical to the first two attributes of the friend "who 
speaks with one's welfare in mind", mentioned in verse 24 -
they will "restrain him from evil" and ''establish him in 
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goodness" (Papa nivarenti, kalyaue nivesenti). This 
would indicate that the recluses and priests would ideally 
be such friends. This would be particularly true of the 
recluse, whose lack of a social status would enable him to 
speak the truth boldly with no fear of personal loss. 
Two other attributes of this kind of friend are encountered 
here: number 3 224 , which states that they "cause that which 
has not been heard to be heard" and number 4 225 , according 
to which they "explain the way to the life hereafter." The 
first of these two is strengthened by the assertion that in 
addition to causing the not-heard to be heard, the recluses 
and priests also "explicate that which has been heard", 
which implies that the recluse or priest would answer any 
kind of query on religious matters, be it old or new. In the 
context of the whole conversation, one might speculate that 
" They explain the way to the life hereafter" would here 
take on a broader meaning - one would expect-the religious 
specialists of the day to explain not only the way to a 
favourable rebirth, but also the way to attain the religious 
ultimate, nibbana226 • 
That leaves the third response, which states that they 
224. Listed as number 4 in verse 33. 
225. Listed as number 6 in verse 33. 
226. cf. Rahula, quoted in Obeyesekere 1968: 29. 
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"respond with good thoughts". To us, this might look like 
one of the general ethical statements which are so common in 
this text, but it would appear quite different to a culture 
which was steeped in the belief in the power of thought to 
act karmically on the material world, as was the ancient 
Indian world. Not only physical and vocal acts, but also the 
mental intentions underlying these were considered 
efficacious in bringing about actions and reactions in the 
web of interrelatedness that is the Buddhist universe, as is 
stated for instance in the Upali sutta227 • 
As suggested above, the Chinese versions differ from the 
Pali in their description of how recluses and priests would 
react to being treated with friendliness, hospitality and 
material support by the layperson. CI offers the very 
practical advice that they would instruct the householder to 
give charity rather than being miserly, and similarly to be 
patient, persevering, concentrated and wise ~ather than the 
respective opposite qualities (Pannasiri 1950: 170). CII 
lists four responses 220 , again including specific types of 
instructions to be given by the recluses and priests. These 
are that they should instruct the laypeople to have faith 
and learning, to give alms and improve their wisdom 
227. Majjhima Nilcaya, Sutta 56. 
228. There are supposed to be five, but number 3 has disappeared due to 
a typographical error. 
2'58 
(Pannasiri 1950: 185). CIII is similar, but adds 
"instructing them to observe precepts" (Pannasiri 1950:201). 
Given that CII and CIII coincide so often, one may safely 
assume that this is the missing response in err. CIV is 
identical to the Pali, except that "They respond with good 
thoughts" has been replaced by "Teaching him to foster a 
pure mind" (Pannasiri 1950: 215), which does cast a new 
light on the Pali text: it may well be truer to the 
original than the Pali, considering the importance of a 
"pure mind" in early Buddhism. Generally speaking, then, the 
Chinese texts show a more practical approach to the recluses 
and priests' responses to Singala's fivefold tending. 
5.8. THE VERSE SUMMARY 
34. Ida~ vatva Sugato, athapara~ etad avoca 
sattha: 
"Mata-pita disa pubba, 
acariya dakkhioa disa, 
Putta-dara disa paccha, 
mittamacca ca uttara, 
Dasa-kammakara hettha, 
uddha~ Samaoa-Brahmana, 
Eta disa namasseyya, 
alam-attho kule gihi. 
PaoQito sila-sampanno, 
saoho ca patibhanava, 
Nivata-vutti athaddho, 
tadiso-labhate yasa~. 
Utthanako analaso, 
apadasu na vedhati, 
Acchidda-vutti medhavi 
tadiso-labhate yasa~. 
Sangahako mitta-karo, 
vadanfiu vita-maccharo, 
Neta vineta anuneta, 
tadiso-labhate yasa~. 
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Danafi ca peyya-vajjafi ca, 
attha-cariya ca ya idha, 
Samanattata ca dhammesu, 
tattha tattha yatha 'raha~. 
Ete kho sangaha loke, 
rathass' aoiva yayato, 
Ete ca sangaha n' assu, 
na mata putta-karaua 
Labheta mana~ puja~ va, 
pita va putta-karaua. 
Yasma ca sangahe ete 
samavekkhanti paQQita, 
Tasma mahatta~ papponti, 
pasa~sa ca bhavanti te ti." 
34. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the 
Teacher continued: 
"Mother and father are the first direction, 
Teachers the south 
The wife the west 
And friends the north. 
Slaves and servants are the direction below; 
Above are the ascetics and priests. 
You should honour these directions; 
This will greatly prof it the householder in his 
family. 
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The wise man practices morality, 
He is mild and intelligent, 
Humble in conduct and unselfish. 
For this he receives acclaim. 
He is productive and not lazy, 
He trembles not in misfortune, 
His conduct is faultless and he is wise. 
For this he receives acclaim. 
He makes friends and keeps them, 
He is approachable and without envy; 
A guide, a teacher, a peacemaker. 
For this he receives acclaim. 
Generosity, kind speech 
And immediately useful conduct, 
Impartiality in all affairs; 
These indeed hold the world together 
As the linchpin does the wheel. 
But where these do not hold together, 
No mother receives from her son's deeds 
Any honour and respect, nor does the father. 
The holding together by these 
Has been examined by the wise. 
By that, these virtues attain eminence 
And are to be praised." 
Like the other major divisions of the Si~galovada 
Suttanta, this section is terminated by a poem, in this 
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case one of seven stanzas 229 • In the first stanza, the 
reinterpretation of the six directions is reiterated, 
and it is said that the householder will "greatly 
profit" from paying due honour to these directions. The 
precise ways of doing so are not restated. 
Stanzas ii, iii and iv then describe the qualities of 
the wise man (paQQita), who is said to receive 
acclaim from the wise for his many admirable qualities. 
These qualities are not directly related to the 
discussion on the ways of tending the six "directions", 
but they do generally comply with the types of 
behaviour extolled by the Suttanta as a whole. For 
instance, the wise man is said to be mild, intelligent, 
productive, fearless and so on. Let us keep in mind 
that this is the final poem in the Suttanta, and that 
it therefore acts as a kind of closing statement230 • 
This would explain the broad generality of such 
pronouncements. 
The same is true of stanzas v, vi and vii, in which the 
virtues of generosity, kind speech, useful conduct and 
impartiality are expounded. These four qualities, it is 
said, keep the world together just as a linchpin 
229. Verse 34 of the Suttanta. 
230. Except in CI, where the only poem is in the very last verse. 
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prevents a wheel from flying of its axle. Let us once 
more recall that the ancient Indian world did not draw 
rigid distinctions between the "physical" and the 
"mental" worlds - it is not merely the social world 
which is thought to be thus held together231 , but 
existence in its entirety. 
CI has no poem at this point. CII, CIII and CIV all 
contain the equivalent of both this poem, in expanded 
form, and that in verse 26 of the Pali text232 • But if 
three of our five texts are unanimous in placing the 
advice on dividing one's wealth into four parts and 
spending it in certain ways at this point of the 
suttanta, and a fourth (CI) ignores it entirely, we 
shall have to follow the Chinese texts and conclude 
that there is a high probability that this is where the 
advice was placed originally, and that the Pali text 
must have been corrupted in this respect. 
5.9. CONCLUSION 
How could one summarise such a vast amount of ethical 
advice? Perhaps we can merely state that the Suttanta 
231. One might get this impression from stanza vi, in which the social 
results of the absence of these factors is explained. 
232. i.e. At the end of the section on true and false friends, 
especially the advice on quartering one's wealth. 
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in this section exhorts us to adopt a lifestyle of 
friendliness and service to those with whom we come 
into daily contact. In each case, the precise way in 
which we should interact with another person will 
depend on that person's relationship to us. This is 
symbolically presented in the suttanta by dividing 
Si~gala's relationships into six classes. While this 
division is not exhaustive, it does cover a wide field, 
and the principle of treating persons according to 
their social position vis-a-vis ourselves can be 
extended to other types of relationships. We should 
always keep in mind that Buddhist ethics were never 
intended to be a moral straightjacket. 
To the contrary, the Buddhist ethic is solidly based on 
the pan-Buddhist principle of causality. It might be 
summarised as follows: "You are free to do whatever you 
want to do: there will be consequences 11233 • And these 
consequences are described in very positive terms, 
which is unusual for a Buddhist text. If we treat 
people in the ways prescribed, they will respond in 
very specific ways that will, incidentally, be to our 
benefit. And since this text is strongly 
contextualised, since it is not an ex cathedra 
pronouncement by the Buddha, but a specific sermon to 
233. cf. Humphreys (1977: 56); "In Buddhism there is no sin, only 
consequences ... ". 
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young Si~gala, the duties and responses could as 
easily have been phrased the other way round. 
Thus, this section of the Suttanta, and the principle 
that underlies it, can be of tremendous value to us in 
our relationships with other people. What it teaches us 
is that our relations to others do not exist in some 
kind of vacuum, in an "ethical" universe which has no 
relationship to the rest of our existence. To the 
contrary, our ethical acts are acts which, like all 
other acts, will have results or consequences. And 
these consequences will eventually have consequences of 
their own, which will then affect us. This shows how 
Buddhist ethics are intricately interwoven with the 
important Buddhist philosophical concepts of 
impermanence (anatta) and conditioned change 
(paticcasamuppada). And that is precisely what 
bhikkhu Buddhadasa was quoted as saying in chapter 1. 
This demonstrates that ancient Buddhist ethics and up-
to-date Buddhist philosophical interpretation do form a 
coherent whole, that they do act together as a 
comprehensive guide to the Buddhist layperson's 
lifestyle. 
5.10 THE END OF THE SUTTANTA 
35. Eva~ vutte Singalako gahapati-putto 
Bhagavanta~ etad avoca: 
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"AbhikkantalJl bhante, abhikkantalJl bhante. Seyyatha 
pi bhante nikkujjitalJl va ukkujjeyya, 
paticchannalJl va vivareyya, muihassa va maggalJl 
acikkheyya, andha-kare va tela-pajjotalJl 
dhareyya 'Cakkhumanto rUpani dakkhintiti': evam 
evalJl Bhagavata aneka-pariyayena dhammo pakasito. 
EsahalJl bhante BhagavantalJl saraDalJl gacchami, 
Dhammafi ca bhikkhu-SalJlghafi ca. UpasakalJl malJl 
Bhagava dharetu ajjatagge paDupetalJl saraDalJl 
gatan ti." 
35. When the Blessed one had spoken thus, Singala 
the householder's son said this: "Very good, sir! 
Very good, sir! Just as that which has been 
overturned may be set upright, or as that which has 
been hidden may be uncovered, or as the path may be 
shown to a lost person, or as a lamp may be carried 
into darkness saying 'may those with eyes see!', 
just so has the teaching been explained by the 
Blessed one. o sir, I wish to go for refuge to the 
Blessed one, to the teaching and to the assembly of 
monks. May the Blessed one henceforth consider me a 
lay disciple, who has gone for refuge as long as 
life lasts." 
The final verse of the Singalovada Suttanta ends it in a 
conventional way: singala expresses his deep admiration 
for the Buddha's teaching and his wish to become a lay 
Buddhist follower. No special significance need be read into 
this, since most Suttas appear to end in this way, certainly 
266 
in the Digha Nikaya234 • At most we can see some 
significance in the fact that Singala became a lay 
follower rather than a monk. This emphasises the basic 
character of the suttanta, the way it is directed to the 
laity rather than to the monkhood. 
The simple act of taking refuge-' 5 in the three jewels was 
in itself sufficient for Singala to join the Buddhist 
community in a lay follower's capacity, just as this same 
act remains sufficient today, at least in theory236 • At this 
early stage in the development of Buddhism, even joining the 
monastic order was a very simple affair (Kloppenborg 1983). 
The Chinese versions of the text are generally in agreement 
with the Pali as far as the end of the Suttanta is 
concerned, although none of them mention the precise words 
with which Singala praised the Buddha's words. CI then 
ends with a long poem of twenty stanzas, the-only one in 
this version, of which it is said that the Buddha uttered it 
after Singala had left the scene. But this poem is not 
equivalent to any poem in the other four versions. Moreover, 
234. Compare McTighe (1988:263-4), who describes a very similar stock 
passage as the conventional ending in the Majjhima Nikaya. 
235i.e. Verbally stating one's trust in the Three Jewels (Buddha, dharma 
and sangha). 
236. cf. Bodhi (1981: 32-36). 
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it reflects distinct Mahayana themes, as can be seen in 
the following extract: 
"May I obtain [a rebirth] during the presence of a 
Buddha. 
May I be sent as a Dharmaraja 
To liberate all from birth and death, 
Without a single left unsaved! (Pannasiri 1950: 
171) 
Not only is this Mahayana theme an incongruity in this 
text, with its neutral attitude to such doctrinal disputes 
in all the other versions, but it makes little sense in 
either the Hinayana or the Mahayana view for the Buddha 
to have said this. He was already a fully enlightened 
Tathagatha: why should he wish to be reborn during "the 
presence of a Buddha"? Thus, this poem is probably a later 
addition to the oldest translation among the Chinese texts 
of the singalovada suttanta. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our in-depth investigation of the singalovada suttanta 
has ended. The time has come for us to ask what we have 
learned from it. To do this, let us reiterate in a slightly 
abbreviated form the questions posed in chapter 1. There, we 
stated that: 
... to summarise the pron~em and its corollaries, 
we can ask the following questions: 
(1) What contribution can the Singalovada 
Suttanta make to our current existential 
situation? Can we learn from it anything that 
will assist us in our search for ethical 
guidelines? 
On a more specifically methodological level, in 
order to answer this question, we shall first have to 
find answers to the following: 
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( 2) What does the Sii'lgalovada suttanta 
say? How does it propose that we live our 
lives? 
(2.1) Are its ethical teachings aimed at the 
monk or at the lay follower? 
(2.2) Is the singalovada sutta internally 
coherent? Should we, and can we, accept only 
ethical advice from some of its sections, or 
should we see the text as a whole and read it 
accordingly? 
(2.3) Does it accord with fundamental 
Buddhist principles such as anatta, anicca 
and paticcasamuppada? 
In attempting to answer these questions, the focus of attention 
will be on the Pali version of the text. The differences between 
this and the Chinese manuscripts have been fully dealt with in 
the preceding chapters, and will only be mentioned again where 
they are particularly relevant. 
6.1 WHAT DOES THE SIRGM.OV~A SUTTAHTA SAY (~D WHAT DOES IT 
NOT)? 
First of all, then, what is the suttanta's message? What does it 
say and, equally importantly, what does it not say? When we read 
it, what message emerges to our twentieth-century eyes? While it 
would be otiose to repeat the storyline or plot of the text once 
more, it is possible to summarise its main ethical teachings. 
Firstly, there are general ethical injunctions that are clearly 
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in accord with more widely known Buddhist ethical formulas such 
as the five precepts (pafica sila). The taking of life, of that 
which is not given, sensual misconduct and the telling of lies 
are strongly discouraged. The prohibition on the consumption of 
alcohol is missing from this list, but this is the usual way of 
condensing the fivefold ethical code. In any case, it reappears 
in a later list, making its presence in this one unnecessary. It 
is important to note that these precepts should not be understood 
as Buddhist equivalents of the relatively rigid and legalistic 
injunctions found in some other religious and philosophical 
traditions. The precepts are voluntary commitments on the part of 
each individual Buddhist, and the degree to which P,ach of them is 
followed depends on his or her personal commitment to the 
Buddhist way of life. The ultimate level of commitment would of 
course be to join the monastic order, in which this simple scheme 
is expanded to over two hundred precise rules. 
Once the ethical groundwork has been laid, the Buddha names the 
psychological factors that usually prevent us from living up to 
it. The first three (desire, anger and delusion) are familiar to 
Buddhists as the three "unwholesome roots", but this text goes 
further by adding a fourth factor, namely fear. This, in my 
opinion, is a valuable addition to the more traditional threefold 
formula. 
Next, the Suttanta discusses certain types of behaviour that are 
said to be conducive to "loss of wealth". This phrase, while it 
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may initially seem an anomaly in a sermon given by a radical 
world-renouncer like the Buddha, can actually be seen as a 
metaphor for a life that is improved on all levels, from the 
purely physical to the highest level of spiritual attainment. The 
six types of behaviour are the following: 
1 - Careless addiction to liquor and drugs. 
2 - Being about on the street at night. 
3 - Frequenting fairs. 
4 - Careless addiction to gambling. 
5 - Joining evil friends. 
6 - Idleness. 
The great disadvantages that will flow from each of these 
behaviours is described in some detail. While these details 
have been fully discussed in chapter 3 and will not be 
reiterated here, it is worthwhile to repeat some of the 
conclusions reached by that chapter: 
... it proposes a sober, disciplined, almost 
puritanical lifestyle, centred on the home and 
family rather than on public entertainment or 
nocturnal socialising. Gambling and 
intoxication are frowned upon since these 
activities tend to dissipate wealth, in the sense 
that they are incompatible with the pursuit of 
Buddhist ideals of unimpassioned activity. The 
discussion of the dangers of sloth show a kind of 
prosperity ethic, rather than a work ethic, 
emerging from the Suttanta. 
The next section of the text discusses four types of bad or 
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false friends and four kinds of true friend. Each of these 
is defined in terms of four characteristics. But while the 
four bad and four true friends do show a certain thematic 
connection to the general ethical injunctions discussed 
above, they do not form a perfect symmetry in the sense 
that, say, the first type of true friend is directly the 
converse of the first type of false friend. Instead, the 
eight types of friend are each defined on their own terms 
and do not form a cohesive scheme. A noticeable point is 
that there are certain specifically Buddhist code-words 
built into this section that might indicate an attempt to 
influence the reader or listener subliminally to accept the 
Buddhist message. 
Then the Suttanta moves to its main message: the Buddha 
takes si~gala's existing ritual and gives it a new, 
ethical interpretation. To worship the eastern direction 
does not mean that one should literally bow down to that 
direction, nor to any divine entity believed to reside 
there. Instead, it means that one should treat one's parents 
in a certain way. Or rather, that Si~gala should do so, 
for this text is strongly contextualised. Generally 
speaking, the Buddha is here not making an ex cathedra 
pronouncement on human relations that is meant to be true 
for all human beings at all times - he is giving concrete 
advice to a specific individual, and this advice is tailored 
especially to this individual's circumstances. 
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If Si~gala treats his parents in the sensitive and 
compassionate ways recommended by the Buddha, they will 
naturally respond by treating him in a similar way. And that 
is how the eastern direction should be "worshipped". In a 
similar way, the other five directions correspond to 
Si~gala's teachers, wife, friend~, servants and to 
religious professionals. 
But what is missing from the text? What can we, from our 
vantage point two and a half millenia further on, point to 
as deficiencies in this ethical treatise's exposition of the 
ideal relationships between people? 
The Si~galovada Suttanta can be criticised on a number of 
points from many contemporary perspectives. As stated in 
chapter 1, my intention in this dissertation is to approach 
the text from an intra-Buddhist perspective, but let us 
digress briefly and consider how the text might appear in a 
broader view of contemporary trends in academic discourse. 
A critique from the psychoanalytic tradition, for instance, 
might center on the four factors (desire, anger delusion and 
fear) that are described in the text. Do these factors also 
operate on an unconscious level or are we only being 
exhorted to eradicate them on the conscious level? And if 
the latter, have we ever really gotten rid of them, or have 
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they merely been repressed into the unconscious, only to 
resurface later? 
From a Marxist-inspired position, it could be noted that 
there is no awareness in this text of the influence of 
social structures on individual behaviour. Singala is 
informed how he should treat the "recluses and priests", for 
instance, but there is no reflection on the social division 
between laypeople and religious professionals, and the 
obligation upon the former to off er material support to the 
latter. Would a more critical approach not produce more 
telling results than this tame adaptation to the status quo? 
A feminist approach would come to a similar conclusion where 
the relation between husband and wife is concerned, 
especially considering the great disparity between the two 
in some of the Chinese texts. 
But these criticisms are a little unfair, in-that they 
expect a document from a much earlier and very different age 
to reflect concerns of which even our own great-grandparents 
were entirely unaware. In Trevor Ling's telling phrase, "To 
attempt to relate the teaching of the Buddha to that of Karl 
Marx purely in terms of propositions is like trying to get a 
telephone conversation going between two men who speak 
different languages, and one of whom cannot hear the other" 
(Ling 1973: 21). Naturally, other Buddhist texts may answer 
these questions more fully than this one. The Marxist 
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criticism, for instance, is addressed in the Agafifia Sutta237 
, which describes, in mythological language, the arising of 
different social classes and the friction between these. It 
is on the basis of such texts, and also on the basis of the 
freedom of thought that is espoused in documents such as the 
abovementioned Kalama sutta230 , that the possibility of 
"updating" Buddhist philosophy, including its ethical 
theory, arises. 
More telling, then, than the above critiques is the possible 
criticism from within the Buddhist paradigm itself. To 
mention just one possibility: the Suttanta tells us that if 
Sihgala treats certain people in specified ways, they will 
of necessity respond in certain other ways. At first sight, 
this reflects the central Buddhist theme of causality, but 
Buddhists might complain that it is an oversimplification. 
After all, it restricts the causal effects of an individual 
act almost entirely to a result in this life239 , thus 
largely ignoring the other important Buddhist concept of 
rebirth. This may actually enhance its acceptability to 
237. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 27. 
238. Aiiguttara Nikaya, Tika Nipata, chapter 7, verse 65. See the PTS 
edition of the Anguttara Nikaya, vol. I, pp. 189 f. for the Pali 
text, and Woodward (1979: vol. I, pp. 170-175) for an English 
translation. 
239. Except in verse 3, where rebirth in a heavenly realm is held out as 
a result of ethical behaviour. 
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modern, and especially western, human beings, as well as to 
a few Buddhist thinkers who deny or at least downplay the 
possibility of physical rebirth240 • But mainstream Buddhism 
does accept rebirth as a given and from such an orthodox 
position it is problematical that this text almost ignores 
such an important Buddhist teaching. 
On the other hand, the virtual absence of references to the 
theory of rebirth would ease the acceptance of the 
Suttanta's ethical message among an audience of westerners, 
where the frequent occurrence of articles on the truth of 
the rebirth theory in the western Buddhist press, some of 
them quite polemical 241 , is evidence of the unease with 
which westerners in general, not excluding western converts 
to Buddhism, view rebirth theory. And it also needs to be 
said, that while the Suttanta may ignore rebirth theory, it 
nowhere attempts to deny it. 
240. Such as Buddhadasa. See his article on Everyday language and 
dhamma language in Me and mine (Buddhadasa 1989: 126-141, especially 
pages 132-133). 
241. To name just a few examples, one could look at Walshe (1967) or 
Humphreys (1968, 1978). A brief bibliography of Buddhist-oriented books 
on death and rebirth can be found in Sibley (1986). 
277 
6.2 ARE THE ETHICAL TEACHINGS OF THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA 
AIMED AT THE MONK OR AT THE LAY FOLLOWER? 
This question, at least, is easy to answer. The very last 
verse of the Suttanta makes it clear that Si~gala became a 
lay follower of the Buddha and not a monk, unlike so many of 
the Buddha's interlocutors in other early Buddhist texts. 
This alone would indicate that its primary message is 
intended for the layperson rather than for the monk or nun. 
The very language of the text backs up this claim. The 
"wealth" metaphor, the recurrent reference to Sihgala as a 
"son of a householder" rather than "son of a good family", 
the other traditional way of addressing a young person, the 
prosperity ethic that emerges from the Buddha's description 
of the disastrous effects of sloth and the explicit and 
implicit signs of approval of family life and marital 
relationships all indicate the Suttanta's role as an ethical 
treatise for the laity, not for the monastic establishment. 
In addition to this intra-textual evidence of the text's 
intended role, it can also be seen that the lay role of the 
Suttanta has been endorsed by subsequent tradition. As was 
mentioned in chapter 1, this particular text has become 
known as the gihivinaya, that is, the vinaya (code of 
conduct) for the layperson. 
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6.3. IS THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA INTERNALLY COHERENT? 
In our detailed discussion of the text's individual verses, 
the thematic and linguistic similarities between verses have 
been pointed out wherever such have been discerned. But the 
sheer number of such similarities may well have been 
obscured by this stage of the discussion. While 
considerations of space preclude reiterating them all here, 
they have been rendered in graphic form in Appendix c. This 
appendix shows quite clearly just how dense a network of 
thematic connections between individual verses and sections 
of text exists within the si~galovada Suttanta. 
In other words, whoever wrote one part of the text, assuming 
that all its parts were not written by one and the same 
person, must have had access to the other parts of it. Thus, 
regardless of whether or not the Buddha actually pronounced 
this Suttanta that morning, and regardless 0£ whether or not 
the Suttanta assumed its final form at an early stage242 , we 
can see it as a single unit which presents an integrated 
vision of how human beings ought to treat one another. 
Accordingly, this is the way in which I believe that we 
should approach it in any further investigation. 
242. A theory, incidentally, which is quite likely, considering that the 
similarities between the various Chinese and Pali versions of the 
Suttanta far outnumber the differences. 
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6.4 DOES THE TEACHING OF THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA ACCORD 
WITH FUNDAMENTAL BUDDHIST PRINCIPLES SUCH AS ANATT~, ANICCA 
AND PATICCASAMUPPADA? 
This is a crucial issue. As we have seen in chapter 1, 
authoritative figures in the field of Buddhist studies have 
not hesitated to belittle this text and disparage it as a 
nonBuddhist intrusion into the Canon. I repeat two passages 
by Winston L. King: 
(The Singalovada Suttanta) seems quite un-
Buddhist in its language of Brahmins and heaven; 
and the route by which it made its way into the 
canon may have been devious (King 1989: 21). 
On such meagre and non-Buddhist material they 
would seek to erect a total social philosophy. 
This witnesses to that meagreness of social-
ethical materials in the Buddhist scriptures and 
tradition already referred to (King 1964: 204). 
From what we have seen in chapter 2, Pali scholars like 
Pande and Rhys Davids believe the Singalovada Suttanta to 
be an early addition to the Canon, though not one of the 
very earliest. If we can accept as a methodological rule 
that an early text has a higher probability of being a fair 
reflection of what the Buddha, his retinue of monks and 
their immediate successors thought, then the onus is on King 
to show the way in which this text made its way into the 
canon in a "devious" way. 
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While it is fair to describe the specifically ethical 
material in the Pali canon as "meagre" and to question the 
possibility of constructing a "total social philosophy'' from 
it, I would dispute King's description of the Si~galovada 
Suttanta as "non-Buddhist material". The fact that many of 
the injunctions encountered here are also taught by many 
other religious traditions 243 is not in itself sufficient to 
deny this text its Buddhist status - this merely reminds us 
that all religious experiences arise from a shared matrix of 
human experience. Ethics and interpersonal relations, I 
believe, cannot be seen as something derived entirely from a 
particularly "religious" dimension, but comes into being 
from our experience of encountering others, and is only 
afterwards codified in structured and idealised form by 
great religious teachers. This can be seen clearly from the 
way in which the Vinaya came into being. In almost every 
case, the Buddha pronounced a new rule only after a monk had 
been caught doing something which was considered to be 
against the spirit, if not yet against the letter, of the 
teachings. 
But that codification should then be integrated with the 
243. The injunction against the use of alcohol, for instance, is shared 
by Islam, and that against taking life is more or less universal among 
religious and philosophical ethical systems. Further comparisons, I 
believe, are unnecessary. 
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philosophical principles of the religious tradition if it is 
to make any sense, and play a meaningful role within that 
tradition. In addition, a particular text should show an 
awareness of other texts dealing with the same or closely 
related topics. If this is not the case with the 
Si~galovada Suttanta, then King would be justified in 
calling it "un-Buddhist" 244 • But I believe that this text 
does reflect central Buddhist philosophical themes 
sufficiently to warrant the appellation of "Buddhist text". 
These have been discussed in the verse-by-verse examination 
of the text in chapters 2 to 5, but let us consider them 
again at this point. 
To start with, it must be admitted that none of the 
philosophical theories described in section 1.3.l are 
explicitly named in this text. In this, the Si~galovada 
Suttanta differs from many other Buddhist canonical texts. 
But this does not necessarily imply that such conceptual 
strategies cannot exist in the style or presentation of the 
text. A reading which looks beyond the immediately apparent 
is called for. 
244. Even then, we should still have to account for the fact that this 
text has historically been accepted as an authentic Buddhist document by 
the Buddhist tradition itself. One should ask whether a modern 
Buddhologist has the authority to override a religious tradition's 
decision on what is genuine and what is not, especially from within the 
phenomenological tradition of scientific investigation. 
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The four "active defilements" in verse 3 are identical to 
the first four aspects of the fivefold morality (pafica 
sila) that is a common Buddhist motif. Furthermore, it is 
conventional in that the missing regulation is the one 
concerning the abuse of intoxicating substances, and this is 
the usual way in which the fivefold formulation is condensed 
in other parts of the canon (J. G. Jones 1979: 50). 
Moreover, these four injunctions are also connected to 
"right speech" (sa:mma vayama) and "right action" (sa:mma 
ka:mmanta), both of which are specifically ethical aspects of 
the noble eightfold path. 
The four "conditions of wrong action" in verse 5 are 
likewise a traditional formulation. Desire, anger and fear 
are the traditional "three unwholesome roots", to which fear 
is added in this text. 
The six "causes of loss of wealth" are not themselves a 
traditionally wellknown list245 , but the way in which they 
are presented does show the influence of Buddhist 
philosophy: the motivation for correct behaviour is 
consistently presented as an extrinsic one; for example, we 
are not told to refrain from gambling because it will make 
us feel morally superior to gamblers; to the contrary, the 
undesirable results of gambling are spelled out in detail. 
245. Except for their similarity to the list in the Vyaggapajja Sutta. 
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In other words, the philosophical theme expressed in this 
section is the vital Buddhist one of causality. The same is 
true of the sections which deal with the various kinds of 
friends and especially the verses on the true meaning of the 
six directions. Although a possible Buddhist critique of the 
latter case has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, it 
is nevertheless remarkable how the basic structure of these 
verses reflect the concept of causality; "you should treat 
these people in such-and-such a way, and if you do, they 
will reciprocate in certain other ways." 
But perhaps the most important Buddhist philosophical theme 
to be noted is that of skilful means. Here I should like to 
refer to Kruger's (1988, 1989) work on the Tevijja Sutta246 , 
where it is shown how the nonBuddhist idea of "companionship 
with Brahma" is not summarily rejected, but is instead 
"gradually eroded by means of good-humoured yet relentless 
cross-examination ... " (Kruger 1988: 57). si~gala was 
evidently less intellectually-inclined than the Buddha's 
interlocutors in the Tevijja sutta, since he received a far 
more authoritative and less argumentative sermon than they 
did. 
Despite this, we can see something of the same process at 
work. The Buddha must have regarded Si~gala's ritual as 
246. Digha Nikaya, Sutta 13. 
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religiously meaningless, and wished to convert him to a 
lifestyle more congenial to Buddhist ideals, for there is no 
evidence that Singala's early-morning devotions had 
effected any changes to his general way of life. But how 
easily the Buddha could have charged in with a statement 
like "Young man, you really ought to treat people better. 
Your parents, for instance ... And while you're at it, drop 
this ridiculous morning ritual; you might catch pneumonia or 
something". But not the Buddha: instead, we see him using 
the very categories so highly revered by Singala, then 
subtly redefining them. 
Not immediately, though. First, the Buddha launches into a 
discussion of general ethical principles, then he expounds 
on the value of good friends and the dangers of false ones. 
Only then, when an atmosphere congenial to the discussion of 
ethical and interpersonal relationships has been created, 
does he return to the "worship" of the six directions. And 
just as the Tevijja Sutta subtly transmutes the ideal of 
"companionship with Brahma" into a consideration of the 
Buddhist ideal of nibbana247 , so does the Si~galovada 
Suttanta change a physical ritual performed purely out of a 
sense of filial duty into a sense of consideration for 
Singala's fellow-humans, a sense of consideration, 
247. Admittedly, this is not spelled out in the Sutta, but as Kruger 
(1988:55) states, there are pointers within this text that strongly 
suggest it. 
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moreover, which is accepted because Singala has been 
convinced that it is the right thing to do by dint of the 
desirable results that originate from it. 
Even this, it could be argued, is not quite exclusive to 
Buddhism. After all, were the anonymous authors of the 
Upani~ads not simultaneously "interiorising" the Brahmanic 
rituals into the p~actice of "internal sacrifice" that would 
later be called yoga (Eliade 1970: 111) 240 ? But the mere 
fact that the process of reinterpretation can also be found 
elsewhere does not obviate the importance which Buddhism has 
always assigned to the "skilful" handling of religious 
differences. Indeed, it could well be seen as the prime 
paedagogical and missiological device of Buddhism, just as 
the trio of impermanence, insubstantiality and 
unsatisfactoriness form the basis of its metaphysics, 
anthropology and psychology. 
248. For a Buddhist confirmation of Eliade's theory, see the Kutadanta 
Sutta (Digha Nikaya, Sutta 5. - see Rhys Davids & Rhys Davids 1977: 
173-183), where the classical Brahmanic concept of sacrifice is 
systematically reduced in typical Buddhist fashion until it is found 
that the least "troublesome", yet "of greater fruit and greater 
advantage" than any other is the practice of morality and the attainment 
of meditative insight. 
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6.5 WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA? 
The Si~galovada Suttanta is strongly contextualised: it 
is very clearly directed at a specific person. This makes it 
difficult to generalise its teachings even to another person 
in the same society, let alone to us who live so much later. 
But it cannot be entirely so, for the simple reason that it 
has come down to us. Lengthy as the Pali Canon may be 249 , 
it cannot possibly contain all the events of the Buddha's 
career of f ourty-odd years of teaching and proclaiming the 
dhamma. Innumerable little exchanges between the Buddha and 
other people must have been lost to us. So why has this one 
been preserved? 
There are a few indications within the text that point 
towards the possibility that the message contained in it was 
meant to be generalised and universalised after all 250 , 
though these are far outnumbered by the indications that 
point the message firmly towards Si~gala. But when we 
consider that Ananda's presence is not mentioned251 , it 
seems likely that the Buddha must have made a point of 
249. Variously estimated as between eleven and thirteen times the size 
of the Christian Bible, not counting the commentaries. 
250. Such as the inclusion of Singala's dead father in the list of 
people with whom Singala was to deal in various ways. See chapter 5. 
251. As discussed in chapter 2. 
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retelling the story to him, thus ensuring that it would be 
retained, for it is through Ananda, so tradition holds, 
that the Canon came into being. If so, this would indicate 
that the Buddha regarded the message of the Si~galovada 
Suttanta as an important one for the future of the Buddhist 
teaching, and by extension, for all human beings. 
Thus, we have established that the Si~galovada Suttanta 
does have a general relevance as well as the more 
immediately apparent specific one. But let us be more 
precise: what relevance does this ancient text have for us 
in the late twentieth century? Let us try to summarise all 
that has been said so far. With all that we have now learnt 
about its position in the canon, the place and the people 
involved, the situation, the ethical injunctions presented 
and the classes of people recognised within this text, what 
can we learn from the Si~galovada suttanta? How can we 
apply its teachings to our own situation? 
Like many ethical systems, the one presented by the 
Si~galovada suttanta can be summarised by a Golden 
Rule 252 • But it is a Rule that may at first strike 
nonBuddhists as rather strange. For it does not say "Do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you" as does the 
252. While this method runs the risk of oversimplification, it does have 
the advantage of expressing the kernel of a text's message in stark 
outlines. 
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Christian ethic, nor the more negative "do not treat others 
as you would not have them treat you" of Confucianism. In 
both of these, the justification for ethical behaviour is 
deontological: the moral or ethical is seen as a closed 
category of concepts, with a converse, perhaps, in the 
immoral, but with no relation to the amoral, the general 
course of nature which has precious little interest in homo 
sapiens and its affairs. 
The ethics of the Si~galovada Suttanta may at first seem 
like an afterthought stuck on an otherwise imposing system 
of philosophical subtleties, but a closer examination has 
revealed how it is in fact completely integrated into that 
system. For its Golden Rule could be formulated as follows: 
Follow this moderate lifestyle, choose your 
friends wisely, and treat the people with whom you 
come into contact with compassion and a 
sensitivity to their situation vis-a-vis your own. 
If you do this, they will respond by treating you 
with a similar compassion and sensitivity and you 
will prosper and be happy. If you do not, the 
opposite will happen. 
Or, even more concisely: 
Do unto others as you wish - you will be done to 
accordingly. 
Neither the Christian nor the Confucian examples mentioned 
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above contain such a guarantee of results, such a clear link 
to the natural world of impersonal cause and effect. In 
other words, the ethical prescriptions of the si~galovada 
Suttanta function within the same causal framework as the 
rest of the world as seen by the Buddhist teachings. Human 
beings and their interpersonal relationships are not 
uniquely·"moral" agents who are Romehow separated by this 
from the rest of the universe. 
To the contrary, we function in the same ecological "web" of 
causal relations as do the largest stars and the tiniest 
particles. In other words, the ethics of the Si~galovada 
suttanta and those of bhikkhu Buddhadasa, as described in 
chapter 1, are one and the same ethical system. Not that 
this should surprise us, for both are the practical 
application, as explicated by the Buddha and his twentieth-
century disciple Buddhadasa, of the same system of 
philosophical concepts and methodological approaches. 
Buddhist ethics follows inexorably from Buddhist philosophy. 
It follows, then, that ethical injunctions, and the legal 
and other codified systems of rules and regulations that 
emerge from them, are not carved in some metaphysical 
granite. To the contrary, they are subject to change 
(anicca), have no substantial existence independent of the 
circumstances that brought them about (anatta) and are 
forever unsatisfactory and subject to revision (dukkha). 
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Above all, they must be applied skilfully, for in themselves 
they are only a means to an end, the end being the 
liberation that results from the radical insight into the 
true nature of this fluid, impermanent reality that Buddhism 
seeks to awaken us to. 
What we should take from the si~galovada Suttanta, then, 
is not so much a specific set of rules, but the skilful 
means, the compassion and sensitivity which it exemplifies. 
If a specific injunction in this text can still be shown to 
be broadly applicable to our life, then it should by all 
means be accepted and acted upon. But Buddhist ethics, like 
all of Buddhism, remains a question of "come and see" 
(ehipassika). A text like the si~galovada suttanta may be 
useful in sensitising us to the variety of relationships in 
which we are engaged, the possible ways in which we can act 
within those relationships and the possible results of those 
actions: it is not and should not be seen a~ a blueprint for 
all human behaviour for all time. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA 
1. Thus have I heard. 
At one time the Blessed one was dwelling near Rajagaha, in 
the bamboo-grove where the squirrels are fed. In due course, 
Si~gala the householder's son, having risen early and left 
the city, his clothes and hair streaming wet, raised his 
hands in salute and veneration to the various directions: to 
the east, south, west, north, below and above. 
2. Just that morning, the Blessed one, having dressed and 
taken his bowl and robe, went towards Rajagaha on his alms-
round. The Blessed one saw singala who, having risen early 
and left the city, his clothes and hair streaming wet, was 
raising his hands in salute and veneration to the various 
directions: to the east, south, west, north, below and 
above. Having seen Singala the householder's son, the 
Blessed one said: "Why, o householder's son, do you, having 
risen early and left the city, your clothes and hair 
streaming wet, raise your hands in salute and veneration to 
the various directions: to the east, south, west, north, 
below and above?" 
"My father, when he was dying, told me; 'dear one, I wish 
you would venerate the directions'. Indeed then, sir, I, 
holding my father's words in honour, respect, reverence and 
worship, having risen early and left the city, my clothes 
and hair streaming wet, raise my hands in salute and 
veneration to the various directions: to the east, south, 
west, north, below and above". 
"But, o householder's son, thus are the six directions not 
worshipped in the discipline of a noble one." 
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"How then, sir, are the six directions to be venerated in 
the discipline of a noble one? It would be to my benefit, 
sir, if the Blessed one would explain the teaching of how 
the six directions are to be venerated in the discipline of 
a noble one." 
"Certainly, o householder's son, listen thoroughly and pay 
attention; I shall speak." 
"Just so, sir" assented Si~g§la the householder's son to 
the Blessed one. The Blessed one spoke as follows: 
3. "O householder's son, it is through abandonment of four 
active defilements, non-performance of the four causes of 
evil, non-practicing of the six causes of loss of riches, 
that the noble disciple embraces the six directions, becomes 
a conqueror of both worlds, is established in this world and 
in the world beyond. At the dissolution of the body after 
death, he is reborn in a heavenly world. 
What are the four active defilements which are to be 
abandoned? 
(1) The defilement of taking life; 
(2) The defilement of taking what is not given; 
(3) The defilement of sensual misconduct; 
54) The defilement of false speech; 
These, o householder's son, are the four active defilements 
that are abandoned." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
4. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"Slaughtering life, 
Taking with strife. 
Speaking in lies, 
Adulterous vice. 
To these comes no praise 
from those who are wise." 
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5. "Which are the four conditions of wrong actions from 
which one refrains? 
(1) The practice of desire leads to the performing of evil 
actions. 
(2) The practice of anger leads to the performing of evil 
actions. 
(3) The practice of delusion leads to the performing of evil 
actions. 
(4) The practice of fear leads to the performing of evil 
actions. 
Since the Noble disciple, o householder's son, does not 
practice desire, does not practice anger, does not practice 
delusion and does not practice fear, he refrains from the 
four conditions of wrong actions." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
6. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"Desire, anger, delusion, fear. 
Ignore this lesson and soon, 
One's authority so dear 
Declines like the waning moon. 
"Desire, anger, delusion, fear. 
Heed this lesson and soon, 
One's reputation so clear 
Grows like the waxing moon." 
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7. "And what are the six causes of loss of wealth with which 
he does not associate himself? Indeed, o householder's son, 
(1) Careless addiction to liquor and drugs is a cause of 
loss of wealth. 
(2) Being about on the street at night is a cause of loss of 
wealth. 
(3) Frequenting fairs is a cause of loss of wealth. 
(4) Careless addiction to gambling is a cause of loss of 
wealth. 
(5) Joining evil friends is a cause of loss of wealth. 
(6) Being idle is a cause of loss of wealth. 
8. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of 
careless addiction to liquor and drugs; 
(1) Tangible loss of wealth; 
(2) The breaking out of quarrels; 
(3) The increase of diseases, 
(4) Loss of reputation; 
(5) Shamelessness; 
(6) and the sixth is the decline of intelligence. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six dangers of 
careless addiction to liquor and drugs. 
9. six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of being 
about on the street at night; 
(1) He himself is unguarded and unprotected; 
(2) His wife and children are unguarded and unprotected; 
(3) His property is unguarded and unprotected; 
(4) He is suspected of evil behaviour; 
(5) False rumours about him abound; 
(6) And he is visited by great suffering. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six dangers of 
being about on the street at night. 
10. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of 
visiting fairs; 
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( 1 ) 'Where is the dancing?'; 
( 2 ) 'Where is the singing?'; 
( 3) 'Where is the orchestra?'; 
( 4) 'Where is there oratory?'; 
(5) 'Where are the cymbals?'; 
(6) 'Where are the drums?' 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six dangers of 
visiting fairs. 
11. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of 
careless addiction to gambling; 
(1) In victory he produces hate; 
(2) He mourns the possessions he has lost to the winner; 
(3) His present wealth is wasted; 
(4) His words are ineffective in the assembly; 
(5) His friends and companions treat him with contempt; 
(6) And he is not sought after as a spouse, since a gambler 
cannot support a wife. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six dangers of 
careless addiction to gambling. 
12. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of 
Joining evil friends. Any and all (1) rogues, (2) drunkards, 
(3) gluttons, (4) cheats, (5) swindlers and ~6) men of 
violence are his friends and companions. These indeed, o 
householder's son, are the six dangers of joining evil 
friends. 
13. Six indeed, o householder's son, are the dangers of 
sloth; one says, 
(1) 'It is too cold' and does not work; 
(2) 
( 3 ) 
( 4) 
(5) 
( 6) 
'It 
'It 
'It 
'I 
'I 
is 
is 
is 
am 
am 
too 
too 
too 
too 
too 
hot' and does not work; 
late' and does not work; 
early' and does not work; 
hungry' and does not work; 
full' and does not work. 
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Those abundant tasks of his that need doing stay undone, 
riches do not arise, and existing riches diminish. These 
indeed, o householder's son, are the six dangers of sloth.'' 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
14. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"One is called a drinking mate 
One professes friendship. 
But he who cares for your fate, 
he is your friend indeed. 
Sleeping late, perhaps with another's wife, 
Nursing and spreading grudges, 
Evil friends and stinginess: 
These six destroy a man. 
Evil friends, evil mates, 
Delighting in evil behaviour, 
Both in this world and the next, alas! 
This man destroys himself. 
Gambling, wenching and drinking, 
Dancing and singing, then 
Basking by day like a snake. 
Untimely prowling, evil friends and stinginess: 
These six destroy a man. 
They throw the dice, they fill the cup. 
They lie with others' dearly loved wives. 
He who serves the low and not the high 
Fades like the waning moon. 
Thirsty while drinking, 
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Having no wealth, having nothing, 
He enters debt like going 
To a well for water. 
No family will be his. 
Not by habitually sleeping late, 
Nor by using the night to roam, 
Nor by constant drunkenness and intoxication 
Can one support one's home. 
'Too cold', 'too hot' 
'Too late'; so they cry. 
Labour having been left to its lot 
Advantages pass the yougsters by. 
But he who hot and cold 
Considers no more than the grass; 
Who does the duties of a man, 
For him happiness will never pass." 
15. "These four, o householder's son, are to be known as 
enemies disguised as friends. 
(1) The ever-taking man is to be known as an enemy disguised 
as a friend. 
(2) The big talker is to be known as an enemy disguised as a 
friend. 
(3) The flatterer is to be known as an enemy disguised as a 
friend. 
(4) The spendthrift is to be known as an enemy disguised as 
a friend. 
16. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding the ever-taking man as an enemy disguised as a 
friend. 
(1) He is always taking; 
(2) He desires much for very little; 
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(3) He performs his duty out of fear; 
(4) He only performs those duties that benefit him. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
regarding the ever-taking man as an enemy disguised as a 
friend. 
17. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding the big talker as an enemy disguised as a friend. 
(1) He discourses on the past; 
(2) He discourses on the future; 
( 3 ) He takes up with useless people; 
(4) If present obligations should arise, he pleads 
misfortune. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
regarding the big talker as an enemy disguised as a friend. 
18. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding the flatterer as an enemy disguised as a friend. 
(1) He is familiar with evil; 
(2) He is unfamiliar with the good; 
(3) In one's presence he discusses one's beauty and virtue; 
(4) Behind one's back he talks about one's faults. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
regarding the flatterer as an enemy disguised as a friend. 
19. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding the spendthrift as an enemy disguised as a friend. 
(1) He is a friend while you are drinking intoxicating 
liquor; 
(2) He is a friend while you go about on the street at 
night; 
(3) He is a friend when you visit fairs; 
(4) He is a friend when you carelessly gamble. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
regarding the spendthrift as an enemy disguised as a 
friend." 
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Thus spoke the Lord 
20. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"The self-seeking friend, the big-mouth, 
The sycophant and the friend in wastage; 
These four are no friends at all. 
Having perceived this, may the wise man 
Avoid them like the plague" 
21. "Four indeed, o householder's son, are those to be known 
as true friends. 
(1) The helper is to be known as a true friend. 
(2) He who is constant in happiness and in adversity is to 
be known as a true friend. 
(3) He who speaks with one's welfare in mind is to be known 
as a true friend. 
(4) He who is compassionate is to be known as a true friend. 
22. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding the helper as a true friend. 
(1) He guards the unwary; 
(2) He guards the property of the unwary; 
(3) He gives refuge when you are in dire straits; 
(4) When troublesome matters arise, he presents twice as 
much [as you need]. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
regarding the helper as a true friend. 
23. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding he who is constant in happiness and in adversity 
as a true friend. 
He knows which hidden things to (1) divulge and which to (2) 
conceal; 
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(3) He does not forsake you in times of trouble; 
(4) He will abandon the care of his own life. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
seeing he who is constant in happiness and in adversity as a 
true friend. 
24. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding he who speaks with one's welfare in mind as a true 
friend. 
( 1) He restrains [you] from evil; 
(2) He instructs you in goodness; 
( 3 ) He causes that which has not been heard to be heard; 
( 4) He explains the way to the life hereafter. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
seeing he who speaks with one's welfare in mind as a true 
friend. 
25. Four indeed, o householder's son, are the reasons for 
regarding he who is compassionate as a true friend. 
(1) He does not rejoice in your adversity; 
(2) He rejoices in your prosperity; 
(3) He restrains [one] who speaks ill [of you]; 
(4) He encourages [one] who speaks well [of you]. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the four reasons for 
seeing he who is compassionate as a true friend." 
Thus spoke the Lord 
26. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"The helping friend, 
The friend for better or worse 
The friend who says what one should hear 
And the compassionate friend; 
These four friends are to be known as such by the wise. 
301 
He should honour and respect them 
As a mother cares for her own child. 
The virtuous and wise man 
Speaks words like drops of fire. 
He gathers possessions just as the bee does. 
Riches continue accumulating like an anthill. 
Having thus accumulated riches, 
Householders can tend to their families. 
If these riches are divided into four 
He binds the friends to him. 
With one part of this wealth let him enjoy; 
With two may he do business 
And may he hoard the fourth 
That it may be there in misfortune." 
27. "And what, o householder's son, is the noble disciple's 
protection of the six directions? O householder's son, the 
six directions should be known as [signifying] these six. 
(1) The eastern direction is to be seen as the mother and 
father. 
(2) The southern direction is to be seen as [one's] 
teachers. 
(3) The western direction is to be seen as the wife. 
(4) The northern direction is to be seen as [one's] friends 
and companions. 
(5) The lower direction is to be seen as the slaves and 
servants. 
(6)The upper direction is to be seen as the recluses and 
priests. 
28. O householder's son, the mother and father, as the 
eastern direction, are to be tended by the child in five 
ways: 
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(1) [He thinks:]'I, once supported, shall support [them]; 
(2) 'I shall fulfil my duty towards them'; 
(3) 'I shall maintain the family lineage'; 
(4) 'I shall regulate my inheritance wisely'; 
(5) 'Then, later, I shall give offerings to propitiate their 
spirits'. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do the mother 
and father, as the eastern direction, having been tended by 
the child in five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They restrain him from evil; 
(2) They establish him in goodness; 
(3) They instruct him in a branch of knowledge; 
(4) They provide him with a suitable wife; 
(5) And in due course they present him with his inheritance. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways in 
which the mother and father, having been tended as the 
eastern direction by the child in five ways, respond in 
sympathy. Thus is the eastern direction dealt with, 
rendering it tranquil and free from fear. 
29. O householder's son,teachers as the southern direction, 
are to be tended by the pupil in five ways: 
( 1) By rising [out of respect]; 
(2) By attending to them; 
( 3 ) By being eager to learn; 
( 4) By waiting on them; 
(5) by receiving as much as possible of their knowledge. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do teachers, 
the southern direction, having been tended by the pupil in 
five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They teach their specialty; 
(2) They cause [the pupil] to grasp what they themselves 
thoroughly understand; 
(3) They teach all their knowledge; 
(4) They make the pupil known among their friends and 
as 
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colleagues; 
(5) And they make all [their pupil's] directions safe. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways in 
which teachers, having been tended as the southern direction 
by the pupil in five ways, respond in sympathy. Thus is the 
southern direction dealt with, rendering it tranquil and 
free from fear. 
30. o householder's son, the wife as the western direction, 
is to be tended by the husband in five ways: 
(1) With honour; 
(2) Without disrespect; 
(3) With faithfulness; 
(4) By relinquishing authority; 
(5) And by presenting her with ornaments. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, does the wife, 
as the western direction, having been tended by the husband 
in five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) She does her work well; 
(2) She accepts his retinue; 
(3) She is faithful to him; 
(4) She guards the provisions; 
(5) And she is skilful and diligent in her duties. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways in 
which the wife, having been tended as the western direction 
by the husband in five ways, respond in sympathy. Thus is 
the western direction dealt with, rendering it tranquil and 
free from fear. 
31. O householder's son, friends and companions, as the 
northern direction, are to be tended by the son of a good 
family in five ways: 
( 1) By generosity; 
( 2 ) By kind speech; 
( 3 ) By guarding their welfare; 
(4) By impartiality; 
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(5) By honesty. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do friends and 
companions, as the northern direction, having been tended by 
the son of a good family in five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They guard the unwary; 
(2) They guard the property of the unwary; 
(3) They give refuge to those who are in dire straits; 
(4) They do not forsake you in times of trouble; 
(5) And they honour your progeny. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways in 
which friends and companions, having been tended as the 
northern direction by the son of a good family in five ways, 
respond in sympathy. Thus is the northern direction dealt 
with, rendering it tranquil and free from fear. 
32. O householder's son, slaves and servants, as the lower 
direction, are to be tended by the gentleman in five ways: 
(1) By scheduling the work according to each one's ability; 
(2) By not making them work for .food alone; 
(3) By nursing them when they fall ill; 
(4) By giving them tasty foodstuffs; 
(5) And by relinquishing them at the right time. 
And in these five ways, o householder's son, do slaves and 
servants, as the lower direction, having been tended by the 
gentleman in five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They rise earlier; 
( 2 ) They lie down later; 
( 3 ) They give alms; 
(4) They perform good deeds; 
(5) And they earn a good reputation. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the five ways in 
which slaves and servants, having been tended as the lower 
direction by the gentleman in five ways, respond in 
sympathy. Thus is the lower direction dealt with, rendering 
it tranquil and free from fear. 
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33. O householder's son, recluses and brahmins as the upper 
direction, are to be tended by the son of a good family in 
five ways: 
(1) With friendliness in physical acts; 
(2) With friendliness in vocal acts; 
(3) With friendliness in mental acts; 
(4) By not closing the door against them; 
(5) And by giving them food. 
And in these six ways, o householder's son, do the recluses 
and brahmins, as the upper direction, having been tended by 
the son of a good family in five ways, respond in sympathy: 
(1) They restrain him from evil; 
(2) They establish him in goodness; 
(3) They respond with good thoughts; 
(4) They cause that which has not been heard to be heard; 
(5) They explicate that which has been heard; 
(6) And they explain the way to the life hereafter. 
These indeed, o householder's son, are the six ways in which 
recluses and brahmins, having been tended as the upper 
direction by the son of a good family in five ways, respond 
in sympathy. Thus is the upper direction dealt with, 
rendering it tranquil and free from fear." 
Thus spoke the Lord. 
34. After the Well-farer had spoken thus, the Teacher 
continued: 
"Mother and father are the first direction, 
Teachers the south 
The wife the west 
And friends the north. 
Slaves and servants are the direction below; 
Above are the ascetics and priests. 
You should honour these directions; 
This will greatly profit the householder in his family. 
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The wise man practices morality, 
He is mild and intelligent, 
Humble in conduct and unselfish. 
For this he receives acclaim. 
He is productive and not lazy, 
He trembles not in misfortune, 
His conduct is faultless and he 
For this he receives acclaim. 
He makes friends and keeps them, 
is wise. 
He is approachable and without envy; 
A guide, a teacher, a peacemaker. 
For this he receives acclaim. 
Generosity, kind speech 
And immediately useful conduct, 
Impartiality in all affairs; 
These indeed hold the world together 
As the linchpin does the wheel. 
But where these do not hold together, 
No mother receives from her son's deeds 
Any honour and respect, nor does the father. 
The holding together by these 
Has been examined by the wise. 
By that, these virtues attain eminence 
And are to be praised." 
35. When the Blessed one had spoken thus, Singala the 
householder's son said this: "Very good, sir! Very good, 
sir! Just as that which has been overturned may be set 
upright, or as that which has been hidden ~ay be uncovered, 
or as the path may be shown to a lost person, or as a lamp 
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may be carried into darkness saying "may those with eyes 
see!", just so has the teaching been explained by the 
Blessed one. o sir, I wish to go for refuge to the Blessed 
one, to the teaching and to the assembly of monks. May the 
Blessed one henceforth consider me a lay disciple, who has 
gone for refuge as long as life lasts." 
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APPENDIX B 253 
DIE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA 
1. Die volgende het ek gehoor. 
Die Geseende het eenmaal naby Rajagaha gebly, in die 
bamboesbos waar die eekhorings gevoer word. Op 'n keer het 
Sihgala die seun van 'n huiseienaar, nadat hy vroeg 
opgestaan en uit die stad gegaan het, met druipnat klere en 
hare, sy hande in begroeting en verering na die verskeie 
rigtings opgehef: na die ooste, suide, weste, noorde, na 
onder en na bo. 
2. Juis daardie oggend het die Geseende, nadat hy aangetrek 
en sy bedelbak opgeneem het, na Rajagaha gegaan om te 
bedel. Die Geseende het Sihgala gesien wat, nadat hy vroeg 
opgestaan en uit die stad gegaan het, met druipnat klere en 
hare, sy hande in begroeting en verering na die verskeie 
rigtings opgehef het: na die ooste, suide, weste, noorde, na 
onder en na bo. Toe hy Sihgala, die seun van 'n 
huiseienaar, sien, se die Geseende : "Hoekom, o seun van 'n 
huiseienaar, hef jy, nadat jy vroeg opgestaan en die stad 
verlaat het, met druipnat klere en hare, jou hande op in 
begroeting en verering na die verskeie rigtings : na die 
ooste, suide, weste, noorde, na onder en na bo?" 
"My vader het op sy sterfbed gese: Geliefde, ek vra dat jy 
253. This Afrikaans translation was done after the English one and is 
modeled on it. Although the Pali original was continually kept in mind 
during the process, both during the original translation into Afrikaans 
and in the later post-editing stage, this Afrikaans version cannot 
reasonably lay claim to the same status as the English translation in 
chapters 2 to 5 and Appendix A. Its main purpose is to extend the 
discussion of the sutta to a wider audience. 
309 
eer aan die rigtings sal betoon.' Daarom, meneer, is dit dat 
ek, uit eerbied, respek, verering en hoogafting vir my vader 
se woorde, nadat ek vroeg opgestaan en uit die stad gegaan 
het, met druipnat klere en hare my hande in begroeting en 
verering na die verskeie rigtings lig: na die ooste, suide, 
weste, noorde, na onder en na bo" 
"Maar, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is nie hoe die ses 
rigtings in die volgens die voorskrifte van 'n edel mens 
eerbiedig word nie." 
"Maar hoe, meneer, moet die ses rigtings dan volgens die 
voorskrifte van 'n edel mens eerbiedig word? Dit sou my 
baat, meneer, as die Geseende sou verduidelik hoe die ses 
rigtings volgens die voorskrifte van 'n edel mens eerbiedig 
word." 
"Seker, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, luister goed en 
aandagtig: ek sal spreek." 
"Goed meneer," het singala, die seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
met die Geseende ooreengekom. Die Geseende het toe soos volg 
gespreek: 
3. 11 0 seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is deur die afsweer van 
die vier aktiewe besoedelings, deur nie die vier oorsake van 
die kwade uit te oefen nie, en deur nie die ses dade te 
pleeg wat rykdomsverlies veroorsaak nie dat die edel 
dissipel die ses rigtings kan omhels, dat hy albei werelde 
kan verower, dat hy in hierdie wereld en in die hiernamaals 
'n plek kan kry. Wanneer die liggaam tot niet gaan by sy 
sterwe, word hy in 'n hemelse wereld herbore." 
"Wat is die vier aktiewe besoedelings wat afgesweer moet 
word? 
(1) die besoedeling van die neem van lewe; 
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(2) die besoedeling van die neem van dit wat nie gegee is 
nie; 
(3) die besoedeling van sensuele wangedrag 
(4) die besoedeling van leuenagtige spraak. 
Hierdie, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier aktiewe 
besoedelings wat afgesweer moet word." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
4. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
"Die neem van lewe, 
of van die ongegewe, 
leuenspraak en owerspel 
word deur die wyses verwerp. 11 
5. "Wat is die vier oorsake van die kwade wat nie beoefen 
moet word nie? 
(1) Begeerte lei tot die uitvoering van bose dade. 
(2) Toorn lei tot die uitvoering van bose dade. 
(3) Verwardheid lei tot die uitvoering van bose dade. 
(4) Vrees lei tot die uitvoering van bose dade. 
Aangesien, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, die ed~l dissipel nie 
begeerte vertoon nie, nie toorn openbaar nie, nie verward is 
nie en nie vrees toon nie, maak hy horn nie skuldig aan die 
vier oorsake van die kwaad nie." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
6. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
"Begeerte, toorn, verwardheid en vrees. 
Ignoreer hierdie les en gou 
Sal jou gesag afneem 
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Soos 'n maan wat al donkerder word" 
"Begeerte, toorn, verwardheid en vrees. 
Luister na hierdie les 
Dan sal jou reputasie vinnig groei 
Soos 'n maan wat al voller word." 
7. "En wat, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses oorsake 
wat lei tot die verlies van rykdom waaraan 'n mens horn nie 
moet skuldig maak nie? Inderdaad, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
(1) onversigtige verslawing aan drank en dwelmmiddels 
veroorsaak van dat 'n mens jou besittings verloor. 
(2) Om snags op straat rond te loop veroorsaak dat 'n mens 
jou besittings verloor. 
(3) Om kermisse te besoek veroorsaak dat 'n mens jou 
besittings verloor. 
(4) Onversigtige verslawing aan dobbelary veroorsaak dat 'n 
mens jou besittings verloor. 
(5) Om met slegte vriende te meng veroorsaak dat 'n mens jou 
besittings verloor. 
(6) Ledigheid veroorsaak dat 'n mens jou besittings 
verloor." 
8. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare aan die 
onversigtige verslawing aan drank en dwelmmiddels verbonde. 
(1) Tasbare verlies van rykdom; 
( 2 ) Rusies ontstaan; 
( 3 ) Siektes neem toe; 
( 4) Ver lies aan aansien; 
(5) Skaamteloosheid; 
(6) En die sesde is dat intelligensie afneem. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses gevare verbonde 
aan onversigtige verslawing aan drank en dwelmmiddels. 
9. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare daaraan 
verbonde om snags op straat rond te loop. 
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(1) 'n Mens self is onbewaak en onbeskerm; 
(2) 'n Mens se gesin is onbewaak en onbeskerm; 
(3) 'n Mens se besittings is onbewaak en onbeskerm; 
(4) 'n Mens word van slegte gedrag verdink; 
(5) Valse gerugte oor 'n mens word versprei; 
(6) En 'n mens ly baie. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses gevare daaraan 
verbonde om snags op straat rond te loop. 
10. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare daaraan 
verbonde om kermisse te besoek; 
(1) 'Waar word daar gedans?' 
(2) 'Waar word daar gesing?' 
(3) 'Waar is die orkes?' 
( 4) 'Waar is die toespraak?' 
(5) 'Waar is die simbale?' 
( 6) 'Waar is die tromme?' 
Dit, 0 seun van 'n huiseienaar, i$ die ses gevare daaraan 
verbonde om kermisse te besoek. 
11. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare aan die 
onversigtige verslawing aan dobbelary verbonde; 
(1) As hy wen word hy gehaat; 
(2) Hy treur oor die besittings wat hy aan die wenner 
verloor het; 
( 3 ) sy geld word verkwis; 
(4) Wat hy in vegaderings se dra geen gewig nie; 
(5) Sy vriende en metgeselle behandel hom met minagting; 
( 6) En hy is nie gesog as 'n eggenoot nie, aangesien 'n 
dobbelaar nie 'n familie kan onderhou nie. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses gevare verbonde 
aan onversigtige verslawing aan dobbelary. 
12. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare daaraan 
verbonde om met slegte vriende om te gaan. Alle (1) skurke, 
(2) dronkaards, (3) vrate, (4) verneukers, (5) bedrieers en 
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(6) geweldenaars is sy vriende en metgeselle. Dit, o seun 
van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses gevare daaraan verbonde om 
met slegte vriende om te gaan. 
13. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is ses gevare aan 
luiheid verbonde. 'n Mens se; 
( 1) 'Dit is te koud' en werk nie. 
( 2) 'Dit is te warm' en werk nie. 
( 3 ) 'Dit is te laat' en werk nie. 
(4) 'Dit is te vroeg' en werk nie. 
(5) 'Ek is te honger' en werk nie. 
(6) 'Ek is te versadig' en werk nie. 
Die vele take wat hy nog moes uitvoer bly onuitgevoer, 
kry geen rykdom nie, en sy bestaande rykdom verminder. 
hy 
Dit, 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die ses gevare wat aan luiheid 
verbonde is." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
14. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
Die een noem ons 'n drinkebroer 
Die ander noem homself 'n vriend. 
Maar hy wat vir jou omgee 
Is die ware vriend. 
Laatslapery, dalk nog met 'n ander se vrou, 
Die koestering en oorvertel van griewe, 
Slegte vriende en suinigheid; 
Hierdie ses dinge vernietig 'n mens. 
Slegte vriende en metgeselle, 
Verlustiging in die kwaad; 
Helaas! In hierdie wereld en in die hiernamaals 
Vernietig hierdie mens homself. 
Dobbel, hoereer en drink, 
Dans en sing; slaap 
Bedags soos 'n slang. 
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Kuier laatnag, het slegte vriende en is suinig: 
Hierdie ses dinge vernietig 'n mens. 
Hul werp die dobbelsteen, hul vul die glas, 
Hul le met 'n ander se geliefde vrou. 
Hy wat die lae eerder as die hoe dien 
Verdof soos die maan wat donker word. 
Hy bly dors, al drink hy, 
Hy het geen rykdom, geen besittings nie; 
Hy maak skuld soos mens 
Na 'n put gaan vir water. 
Hy sal geen familie he nie. 
Deur gedurig laat te slaap, 
Deur in die nag rond te loop, 
Deur altyd dronk en onder verdowing te wees 
Kan mens jou familie nie onderhou nie. 
'Te koud', en 'te warm' 
En 'te laat' is die kreet. 
Werk word verontagsaam 
en die voordele daarvan verdwyn. 
Maar hy wat warm en koud 
as minder as die gras beskou, 
Wat die pligte van 'n man vervul 
Vir hom wag ewige geluk." 
15. "Hierdie vier, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, moet geken 
word as vyande wat as vriende vermom is: 
(1) Die mens wat altyd alles vir homself wil he is 'n vyand 
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wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
(2) Die grootprater is 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
(3) Die vleier is 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
(4) Die verkwister is 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
16. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom die 
mens wat altyd alles vir homself wil he beskou moet word as 
'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
(1) Hy palm net in. 
(2) Hy verlang veel vir baie min. 
(3) Hy doen sy plig uit vrees. 
(4) Hy voer net daardie pligte uit wat tot sy voordeel sal 
strek. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom die 
mens wat altyd alles vir homself wil he beskou moet word as 
'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom is. 
17. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom die 
grootprater beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend 
vermom is. 
(1) Hy pr a at oor die verlede. 
(2) Hy pr a at oor die toekoms. 
( 3) Hy verkeer met niksnutse. 
( 4) Wanneer daar verpligtinge 
verskoning dat hy in moeilike 
is om na te kom, is sy 
omstandighede verkeer. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom die 
grootprater beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend 
vermom is. 
18. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom die 
vleier beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom 
is. 
(1) Hy ken die kwade. 
(2) Hy ken nie die goeie nie. 
(3) In jou teenwoordigheid bespreek hy jou skoonheid en 
deugde. 
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(4) Agter jou rug bespreek hy jou swakhede. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom die 
vleier beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend vermom 
is. 
19. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier red es waarom die 
verkwister beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend 
vermom is. 
( 1) Hy is 'n vriend as jy sterk drank drink. 
(2) Hy is 'n vriend as jy snags op straat rondloop. 
( 3 ) Hy is 'n vriend as jy kermisse besoek. 
( 4) Hy is 'n vriend as jy dobbel. 
Dit, 0 seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom die 
verkwister beskou moet word as 'n vyand wat as 'n vriend 
vermom is." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
20. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
"Die selfsugtige vriend, die grootbek, 
Die vleier en die vriend as jy jou geld verkwis; 
Die vier is glad nie vriende nie. 
Mag die wyse man wat dit besef 
Hulle soos die pes vermy." 
21. "Hierdie vier, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, moet beskou 
word as ware vriende: 
(1) Die helper moet beskou word as 'n ware vriend. 
(2) Hy wat getrou bly in voorspoed en teenspoed moet beskou 
word as 'n ware vriend. 
(3) Hy wat vir 'n mens 'n voorspraak is moet beskou word as 
'n ware vriend. 
(4) Hy wat simpatiek is moet beskou word as 'n ware vriend. 
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22. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom die 
helper beskou moet word as 'n ware vriend. 
(1) Hy waak oor die wat nie waaksaam is nie. 
(2) Hy waak oor die eiendom van die wat nie waaksaam is nie. 
(3) Hy ontferm horn oor jou as jy in die moeilikheid is. 
(4) Wanneer probleme opduik, gee hy twee keer soveel (as wat 
jy nodig het). 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom die 
helper beskou moet word as 'n ware vriend. 
23. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom hy 
wat getrou bly in voorspoed en teenspoed beskou moet word as 
'n ware vriend. 
Hy we et watter verborge dinge om te (1) openbaar en watter 
om (2) geheim te hou. 
( 3 ) Hy laat jou nie in moeilike tye in die steek nie. 
(4) Hy sal homself verwaarloos. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom hy 
wat konstant bly in voorspoed en teenspoed beskou moet word 
as 'n ware vriend. 
24. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom hy 
wat vir 'n mens 'n voorspraak is beskou moet word as 'n ware 
vriend. 
(1) Hy weerhou (jou) van die kwaad. 
(2) Hy onderrig jou in die goeie. 
(3) Hy maak dinge wat nog nie openbaar gemaak is nie bekend. 
(4) Hy verduidelik die weg na die hiernamaals. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom hy 
wat vir 'n mens 'n voorspraak is beskou moet word as 'n ware 
vriend. 
25. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, daar is vier redes waarom hy 
wat simpatiek is beskou moet word as 'n ware vriend. 
(1) Hy verlustig horn nie in jou teenspoed nie. 
(2) Hy verlustig horn in jou welvaart. 
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(3) Hy weerspreek hulle wat jou belaster. 
(4) Hy spoor hulle wat jou prys aan. 
Dit, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die vier redes waarom hy 
wat meelewend is beskou moet word as 'n ware vriend." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
26. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
"Die hulpvaardige vriend, 
Die vriend deur dik en dun, 
Die vriend wat se wat gehoor moet word 
En die simpatieke vriend; 
Hierdie vier vriende moet as vriende herken word deur die 
wyse. 
Hy moet hulle eerbiedig en respekteer 
Soos 'n moeder vir haar eie kind sorg. 
Die eerbare en wyse man 
Spreek woorde soos druppels vuur. 
Hy vergaar besittings nes die by. 
Rykdom vermeerder soos 'n miernes. 
Met die rykdom wat hul so opgegaar het 
Kan die huiseienaars vir hul families sorg. 
As die rykdom in vier gedeel word, 
Word die vriende (van die lewe) aan horn verbind. 
Laat hy een deel geniet, 
Met twee ander besigheid doen 
en die vierde bere 
sodat dit in moeilike tye daar sal wees." 
27. "En wat, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, is die edel dissipel 
se eerbiediging van die ses rigtings? o seun van 'n 
huiseienaar, die ses rigtings moet as die volgende ses 
beskou word: 
(1) Die oostelike rigting moet beskou word as die moeder en 
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vader. 
(2) Die suidelike rigting moet beskou word as die 
onderwysers. 
(3) Die westelike rigting moet beskou word as die eggenote. 
(4) Die noordelike rigting moet beskou word as die vriende 
en metgeselle. 
(5) Die rigting na onder moet beskou word as die slawe en 
bediendes. 
(6) Die rigting na bo moet beskou word as die kluisenaars en 
priesters. 
28. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, die vader en moeder, synde 
die oostelike rigting, moet deur die kind op die volgende 
vyf maniere versorg word: 
(1) (Hy dink:) 'Ek, wat eers versorg is, sal hulle nou 
versorg.' 
( 2 ) 'Ek sal my plig teenoor hulle nakom.' 
( 3 ) 'Ek sal die nageslag laat voortleef.' 
(4) 'Ek sal my nalatenskap wys bestuur. I 
(5) 'En later sal ek off erandes bring om hulle geeste 
paai.' 
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En op die volgende vyf maniere, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer die vader en moeder, synde die oostelike rigting, 
liefdevol nadat hulle op vyf maniere deur die kind versorg 
is: 
(1) Hulle weerhou hom van die kwaad. 
(2) Hulle onderrig hom in die goeie. 
(3) Hulle onderrig hom in vakgebied. 
(4) Hulle kry vir hom 'n goeie eggenote. 
(5) En op die regte tyd gee hulle hom sy nalatenskap. 
O seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die vyf maniere waarop die 
ouers, nadat hulle as synde die oostelike rigting deur die 
kind versorg is, liefdevol reageer. So word die oostelike 
rigting versorg, en word dit sodoende stil en onbevrees. 
29. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, die onderwysers, synde die 
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suidelike rigting, moet deur die student op die volgende vyf 
maniere versorg word: 
( 1 ) Deur op te staan (uit respek). 
( 2 ) Deur hulle te versorg. 
( 3 ) Deur leergierig te wees. 
( 4 ) Deur hulle te bedien. 
(5) Deur so veel moontlik van hul kennis op te neem. 
seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer die onderwysers, synde die suidelike rigting, 
liefdevol nadat hulle op vyf maniere deur die student 
versorg is, 
En op die volgende vyf maniere, 0 
(1) Hulle onderrig hulle spesialisiegebied. 
(2) Hulle veroorsaak dat (die studente) dit verstaan wat 
hulle self goed snap. 
(3) Hulle dra al hul kennis oor. 
(4) Hulle stel hul studente bekend aan hul vriende en 
kollegas. 
(5) En hulle beveilig al die rigtings [van hul studente]. 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die vyf maniere waarop die 
onderwysers, nadat hulle as synde die suidelike rigting deur 
die student versorg is, liefdevol reageer. So word die 
suidelike rigting versorg, en word dit sodoende stil en 
onbevrees. 
30. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, die eggenote, synde die 
westelike rigting, moet deur die eggenoot op die volgende 
vyf maniere versorg word: 
(1) Met eerbied. 
(2) Sander minagting. 
(3) Met getrouheid. 
(4) Deur gesag te laat vaar. 
(5) En deur vir haar sierade te gee. 
En op die volgende vyf maniere, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer die eggenote, synde die westelike rigting, liefdevol 
nadat sy op vyf maniere deur die eggenoot versorg is, 
(1) Sy doen haar werk goed. 
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(2) Sy aanvaar sy volgelinge. 
(3) Sy is getrou aan horn. 
(4) Sy waak oor die voorrade. 
(5) En sy is vaardig en vlytig in haar dagtaak. 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die vyf maniere waarop die 
eggenote, nadat sy as synde die westelike rigting deur die 
eggenoot versorg is, liefdevol reageer. So word die 
westelike rigting versorg, en word dit sodoende stil en 
onbevrees. 
31. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, vriende en metgeselle, synde 
die noordelike rigting, moet deur die seun van 'n goeie 
familie op die volgende vyf maniere versorg word: 
(1) Met vrygewigheid. 
(2) Met vriendelike woorde. 
( 3 ) Deur hul welsyn op die hart te dra. 
( 4 ) Deur onpartydigheid. 
(5) Deur eerlikheid. 
En op die volgende vyf maniere, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer vriende en metgeselle, synde die noordelike rigting, 
liefdevol nadat hulle op vyf maniere deur die seun van 'n 
goeie familie versorg is, 
(1) Hulle waak oor die wat wat nie waaksaam is nie. 
(2) Hulle waak oor die eiendom van die wat nie waaksaam is 
nie. 
(3) Hulle gee skuiling wanneer jy in die moeilikheid is. 
(4) Hulle laat jou nie in moelike tye in die steek nie. 
(5) En hulle eer jou nageslag. 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die vyf maniere waarop 
vriende en metgeselle, nadat hulle as synde die noordelike 
rigting deur die seun van 'n goeie familie versorg is, 
liefdevol reageer. So word die noordelike rigting versorg, 
en word dit sodoende stil en onbevrees. 
32. O seun van 'n huiseienaar, die slawe en bediendes, synde 
die rigtingna onder, moet deur die heer op die volgende vyf 
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rnaniere versorg word: 
( 1 ) Deur aan alrnal werk volgens hul verrnoe uit te deel. 
( 2 ) Deur hulle nie net vir kos te laat werk nie. 
( 3) Deur hulle te versorg wanneer hulle siek word. 
( 4 ) Deur hulle srnaaklike kos te gee. 
(5) En deur hulle betyds te laat ophou werk. 
En op die volgende vyf rnaniere, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer die slawe en bediendes, synde die rigting na ender, 
liefdevol nadat hulle op vyf rnaniere deur die heer versorg 
is, 
(1) Hulle staan vroeer op. 
(2) Hulle gaan slaap later. 
(3) Hulle gee aalrnoese. 
(4) Hulle doen goeie dade. 
(5) En hulle kry 'n goeie reputasie. 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die vyf rnaniere waarop die 
slawe en bediendes, nadat hulle as synde die rigting na 
ender deur die heer versorg is, liefdevol reageer. So word 
die onderste rigting versorg, en word dit sodoende stil en 
onbevrees. 
33. o seun van 'n huiseienaar, die kluisenaars en Brahrnaanse 
priesters, synde die rigting na bo, rnoet deur die seun van 
'n goeie farnilie op die volgende vyf rnaniere versorg word: 
(1) Met vriendelike dade. 
( 2) Met vriendelike woorde. 
( 3 ) Met vriendelike gedagtes. 
( 4) Deur hulle nie uit te sluit nie. 
(5) En deur hulle kos te gee. 
En op die volgende ses rnaniere, o seun van 'n huiseienaar, 
reageer die kluisenaars en Brahrnaanse priesters, synde die 
rigting na bo, liefdevol nadat hulle op vyf rnaniere deur die 
seun van 'n goeie farnilie versorg is, 
(1) Hulle weerhou horn van die kwaad. 
(2) Hulle onderrig horn in die goeie. 
(3) Hulle veroorsaak dat dit wat nie gehoor is nie gehoor 
323 
word. 
(4) Hulle verduidelik dit wat wel gehoor is. 
(5) Hulle reageer met goeie gedagtes. 
(6) En hulle verduidelik die weg na die hiernamaals. 
o seun van 'n huiseienaar, dit is die ses maniere waarop die 
kluisenaars en Brahmaanse priesters, nadat hulle as synde 
die boonste rigting deur die seun van 'n goeie familie 
versorg is, liefdevol reageer. So word die boonste rigting 
versorg, en word dit sodoende stil en onbevrees." 
So het die Heer gespreek. 
34. Nadat die Voorspoedige dit gese het, het die Leermeester 
voortgegaan: 
"Moeder en Vader is die eerste rigting. 
Onderwysers die suide, 
Die eggenote is die weste 
En vriende die noorde. 
Slawe en dienaars is onder 
En bo is die askete en priesters. 
Eerbiedig hierdie rigtings; 
Dit reageer die huiseienaar in sy familiekring baat. 
Die wyse leef 'n moreel goeie lewe, 
Is sag en intelligent, 
Nederig en onselfsugtig. 
Hiervoor word hy geprys. 
Hy is vlytig, nie lui nie, 
Hy bewe nie in 'n krisis nie. 
Sy gedrag is sender foute en hy is wys. 
Hiervoor word hy geprys. 
Hy maak vriende en hou hulle ook. 
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Hy is toeganklik en sonder afguns. 
'n Gids, onderwyser, vredemaker. 
Hiervoor word hy geprys. 
Vrygewigheid, vriendelike woorde, 
En prakties in alle dinge, 
Onpartydig in alle omstandighede; 
Hierdie dinge hou die w~reld bymekaar 
Soos die lunspen die wiel. 
Maar waar hierdie dinge nie die w~reld bymekaar hou nie, 
Kry n6g moeder n6g vader eer of respek 
Vir hul seun se dade. 
Hierdie saambindende invloed 
Het die wyses bestudeer. 
Hierdeur bereik hierdie deugde hoe waarde 
En word hulle aangeprys." 
35. Nadat die Geseende so gespreek het, s~ Singala, die 
seun van 'n huiseienaar, die volgende: "Baie goed, meneer! 
Baie goed, meneer! Net soos iets wat omgekeer is reggedraai 
kan word, of net soos dit wat versteek is gevind kan word, 
of soos die weg aan 'n verdwaalde persoon uitgewys kan word, 
of soos 'n lamp die duisternis ingedra kan word met die 
kreet 'Mag die met oe sien!', net so het die Geseende dit 
verduidelik. o heer, Ek wil graag skuiling neem in die 
Geseende, in die leringe en in die gemeenskap van monnikke. 
Mag die Geseende my voortaan as 'n lekedissipel beskou, wat 
skuiling geneem het vir so lang as wat die lewe voortgaan." 
325 
APPENDIX C 
A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE SIRGALOVADA SUTTANTA. 
In chapters 2 to 6, much was made of the recurrent 
references between the various sections of the 
Si~galovada Suttanta. In this appendix, these internal 
references will be expressed graphically. This 
representation is not claimed to be exhaustive. It includes 
only those thematic similarities that have come to this 
reader's attention and which were mentioned in chapters 2 to 
6 of this dissertation. 
The idea here is not so much to indicate the relationships 
within the different sections of the Suttanta, but rather to 
show the connections between sections, as these show how the 
text, despite its initial appearance of being composed of 
discrete elements, nevertheless comprises a unitary 
composition. In addition, this chart only reflects the 
relationships found in the Pali version of the 
Si~galovada Suttanta - the Chinese texts will have to 
wait for another occasion. 
This approach does have its drawbacks - some thematic 
connections are stronger or more thematically central than 
others, and the diagram does not reflect this. Nevertheless, 
even the most cursory glance at the diagram reveals that 
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some verses are connected to a larger number of other verses 
than most. Among these are verses 3, 19, 28 and 31. Perhaps 
this indicates that future researchers would do well to 
concentrate on these verses. 
In the accompanying diagram (overleaf), each number 
represents a verse of the Sjngal~vada Suttanta, the boxes 
surrounding the numbers represents the way these verses are 
grouped and discussed in chapters of this dissertation, 
while the lines between the numbers represent the textual 
connections between verses mentioned in chapters 2 to 6. 
1 
Graphical representation of thematic similarities 
encountered in the Singalovada Suttanta. 
~ - - - D 
35 
lv 
t0 
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